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Preface 
This is a work in historical international relations. It tells the story of the bilateral 
relations between Sweden and Japan during 15 crucial years of world history. 
As such, this book seeks to combine an understanding of large movements in 
international relations with details of archival sources. The period 1931–1945 
is a long one for a short book. We naturally had to make difficult decisions as 
to what narratives to include, which focuses to set, and whose observations to 
incorporate—at the expense of other stories. The danger of this venture is that we 
might be too detailed for the international relations scholars who want to know 
how these nations behaved, but too shallow for the historians who are interested 
in details about people and institutions. We have been trying to strike a bal-
ance and speak to both audiences by following three main themes, which we tie 
together around a central framework. We focus on politics, trade, and diplomacy 
in a narrative about neutrality because that was the enabling factor of Swedish– 
Japanese relations, especially after 1937. It is an unconventional framework but 
one that befits the Swedish experience of the wartime period. Each chapter offers 
an account of the three subjects. In addition, Bert Edström added an insightful 
essay about an episode in Swedish–Japanese relations that is so important that it 
warrants its own chapter. For the busy reader, we have devised a relatively sleek 
introduction, chapter summaries, and a conclusion, which we hope will make the 
book more accessible. 
A bilateral relationship is a two-way street with politicians, diplomats, busi-
nesspeople, and private individuals of one country engaging with their coun-
terparts in the other. Although this book tries to balance the discussion, it is 
narrated from the viewpoint of Sweden. It delves into Japanese perceptions only 
occasionally, which is one of the limitations of this study. An account from the 
Japanese side has yet to be written. Furthermore, this is the first book-length 
study in English to deal with the experiences of a European neutral in the Asian 
theater of the Second World War. There are several more diplomatic experiences 
of neutrals and their engagements in Asia awaiting scrutiny. Some have received 
scholarly attention in their national languages, but much work remains to be 
done. By providing the Swedish story in English, we hope to make this national 
experience accessible and therefore contribute to the global history of the Second 
World War. 
  xii Preface 
Notes on names, places, and translations 
Whenever possible, we use the historical place names. Especially for cities and 
some geographical areas, we use the names which appear most often in source 
documents to refer to them. Modern-day names are added in brackets. This is 
especially important for Chinese city names which, today, are romanized dif-
ferently from 80 years ago. Occasionally, we use Japanese-language versions of 
names for territories that today are again Chinese. We do so when the Japanese 
version was the internationally most popular way to refer to that territory (for 
example, Dairen instead of Dalian). We adopted this naming convention purely 
for the sake of historical clarity. For Japanese names, we use the Hepburn system 
of romanization, and we adhere to the East Asian style of writing family names 
before first names. English translations of quotations from Swedish, Japanese, 
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The Japanese Empire, 1931–1945
Map 1 Japan’s territorial expansion 1931–1942 (https://worldview.stratfor.com/ 
article/japans-territorial-expansion-1931-1942). Republished with the permission of 




On the night of April 13, 1945, a lonely plane crossed the Japanese Sea. Coming 
from Tokyo, at the height of Japan’s doomed war in the Pacific, the aircraft was 
not carrying bombs or soldiers, but a foreign diplomat—the Swedish envoy to 
Japan, Widar Bagge.1 It was a solemn flight in several ways for Stockholm’s most 
senior representative in East Asia. For one, it was an emotional farewell after more 
than a decade of service in Tokyo, where he witnessed some of Japan’s brightest 
moments as well as its darkest days.2 He knew the “good” Japan of the 1920s, 
the cooperative contributor to the League of Nations, the supportive pillar of 
internationalism, and the friendly nation that welcomed foreigners to trade and 
collaborate. But he also experienced first-hand the Japan of violence, xenopho-
bia, and murder, when fanatics militarized society, assassinated politicians, and 
invaded numerous territories in the name of the Empire’s “natural” right to lead 
the peoples of Asia.3 Finally, when the bombs started falling, he had to watch the 
slow but steady destruction of a country he loved. 
Bagge’s departure was also literally a solitary flight as no other diplomat or 
foreign civilian could have even dreamed of leaving Japan on a plane this late 
into the war. He was air-lifted to Manchuli (Manzhouli), a northern Manchurian 
town under Japanese control that bordered the Soviet Union. From there, he 
could take the trans-Siberian that connected him via Moscow to Stockholm. The 
flight was a special privilege that he only received because of excellent contacts 
to the Empire’s most senior politicians and an extraordinary plan: to bring about 
a negotiated peace between Japan and the United States. The so-called “Bagge 
maneuver” or “Bagge peace feeler”—subject of Chapter 6—was ultimately 
unsuccessful but the episode incarnates a central message of this book. Sweden, a 
country that was neither an ally nor an enemy of the Empire, had a part to play in 
the events that would shape Asia and the Pacific for generations to come. During 
World War II, Sweden was a neutral country, but that did not incapacitate its 
diplomacy. On the contrary, because of its neutral position, Sweden remained 
constantly involved in global diplomacy. Not only could Bagge fly out of Japan 
at a precarious moment but he was proactively approached by peace-inclined 
Japanese to help them in the grimmest of times in a way that merely a handful of 
countries were still able to do. Only Switzerland and Spain were in a comparable 
position.4 This book tells the Swedish story.5 
  2 Introduction
A Scandinavian neutral and a belligerent faraway 
Sweden’s experience of World War II was significantly different from that of 
many other nations. While large parts of the world were consumed by the inferno 
of total war, Sweden did not share that violent fate because it never joined the 
fighting. It proclaimed its neutrality toward the various theaters of war, vowing 
not to take sides, in accordance with the provisions of international law. There 
exists a widespread misunderstanding that neutrality during wartime requires a 
neutral state to disengage from contact with belligerent nations, and that eco-
nomic or political interactions are a breach of “strict” neutrality. That is simply 
wrong. The opposite is the case, as the Law of Neutrality (a part of international 
law) explicitly guarantees the right of neutral countries to trade and interact with 
belligerent states. That is precisely what Sweden did during World War II. It 
continued normal diplomatic and economic relations with Allied and Axis Powers 
alike—including Japan. 
There is, nevertheless, something odd about Swedish wartime diplomacy 
toward Japan. Despite strong ideological differences and heavy Swedish criticism 
on Japan’s bellicose behavior (first in China and then in Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific), diplomatic interactions between the two nations did not weaken but 
intensified over time. For example, the Swedish legation in Tokyo grew from 
3 people in the late 1930s to over 20 in 1945. Telegrams from Bagge to the 
Foreign Ministry, the Utrikesdepartementet (UD), increased from one or two 
per week to several messages daily, and while Stockholm used to host only a few 
Japanese diplomats—five in 1931 and merely one in 1941—by the time Tokyo 
surrendered to the Allies 55 people were working for the Japanese mission. The 
longer the war lasted, the more Japan began to invest in its diplomatic ties with 
the only remaining Nordic neutral. What makes this situation more noteworthy 
is that, at the same time, trade between the two countries collapsed. During 
the strongest year of bilateral trade, in 1937, Sweden imported goods for over 
12 million crowns from Japan but in 1945, less than 0.3 million crowns worth of 
goods still reached its shores. 
How can we explain this bond between the bellicose, militaristic Japan and 
neutral, democratic Sweden, especially when trade—one of Sweden’s main inter-
ests in Japan—diminished so drastically? Did a solid friendship connect the two 
countries or did the necessities of the days dictate the movement of their relation-
ship? Was there something more? Maybe something sinister, an inglorious part of 
Sweden’s national history? In the wake of revelations in the 1990s about the col-
laboration of World War II neutrals with Nazi Germany, Sweden had already had 
to accept much criticism for its interactions with Axis Powers.6 In 1991 Swedish 
journalist, Maria-Pia Boëthius, published a controversial book titled Heder och 
samvete [With honor and conscience]. It was an emotional indictment of Swedish 
foreign policy during the war years, which started a long period of soul-search-
ing.7 The debate focused on the question whether Sweden’s engagement with 
Nazi Germany was done to protect the country from an invasion or if Sweden, 




interests. Should we expect to find a similar dynamic in Sweden’s interactions 
with the easternmost Axis Power? 
The short answer is no. Our book, in fact, argues that the case of Swedish– 
Japanese relations sheds a new light on neutral wartime diplomacy because clas-
sic World War II frames of reference do not apply. The question, for instance, 
whether Sweden collaborated with Japan for reasons of military security or busi-
ness interests makes little to no sense. There is no reason to analyze Swedish 
interactions with Japan under the same existential premise as its relations with 
European powers. From a militarily point of view, Sweden had nothing to fear 
from Japan. The two countries were separated by a continent and despite Sweden 
having had “unequal treaties” with Japan and China until late in its semicolonial 
history, it had no territorial interests overseas in the way the British, the Dutch, 
or the United States had.8 Under no rational scenario could Japan have ever 
posed a security threat to Stockholm. In Europe, on the other hand, Sweden was 
caught in a most delicate situation. Germany, Great Britain, and the USSR were 
all threats to Swedish security. Belligerents routinely ignored the rights of neu-
trals when it suited their military tactics. Nazi Germany (besides all of its other 
crimes) occupied neutral Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The 
Soviet Union attacked the neutral Finns and gobbled up the neutral Baltic States. 
The British invaded neutral Iceland and neutral Iran while their allies in the 
Pacific invaded the neutral Portuguese colony of (East) Timor. In other words, 
the Swedish Government had every reason to fear an invasion from its immediate 
neighbors, but not from Japan. 
Economically, too, Swedish dependence on trade with European belligerents 
presented a particular weakness in negotiations, while its trade interests with 
Japan were modest at best. In 1938 less than 1 percent of Swedish imports were 
sourced from Japan while only 1.4 percent of exports went there.9 Although 
Japan was Sweden’s largest trading partner in Asia, it was not a vital market, not 
in comparison to its bellicose neighbors for which, in the same year, 21 percent 
of imports came from Germany, 16 from the United States, and 12 from Britain 
respectively.10 (Figure 1.1) 
As unexceptional as these trading numbers are, it is noteworthy that diplo-
macy and trade with the Empire continued throughout the wartime period.11 
In fact, it is one of the arguments of this book that Sweden continued to trade 
with Japan while simultaneously protesting against its unlawful expansionism. 
Considering how dire Sweden’s situation in Europe was, it is, however, some-
what puzzling that Stockholm did not simply recall its diplomats and expatriates 
after Japan entered the war with the Allies—all the more so if one considers how 
hostile the Empire had become to European foreigners.12 In August 1940, more 
than a year before the outbreak of the War in the Pacific, a Reuters journalist, 
M.J. Cox, died during police detention. He fell from the third floor of the build-
ing where he was interrogated. Japanese Military Police claimed suicide but the 
international community in Tokyo drew a different conclusion, suspecting mur-
der.13 Another British national, Frederik Ringer, who served as Swedish Consul in 




Figure 1.1 Swedish imports and exports for selected countries in 1938. Source: 
Statistiska Centralbyrån, Statistisk årsbok för Sverige, 1939, 168–169. 
European residents in Japan to leave the country. The tenser the international 
situation got, the worse Japanese military repression against foreign nationals 
became. Widar Bagge reported at the time that “the possibility of Japan’s entry 
into the war carries special risks for its white inhabitants in view of the strong 
increase in xenophobia.”14 So, why then the continuous engagement? It would 
have been possible for Stockholm to evacuate the roughly one-hundred expatri-
ates—even after Pearl Harbor. But the UD decided not to do so. This book will 
explain the history of Stockholm’s decision to remain engaged with Japan from 
its first unlawful blunders in Manchuria until the bitter end after Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. What were the motives? Who were the actors? And how did economic, 
political, and diplomatic considerations intertwine? In short, why and how did 
Sweden engage with Japan during its wartime period? 
To find answers, we analyze four dimensions of Swedish–Japanese interactions. 
First, the international context in which the two countries operated. Second, 
the national political debates in the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament), Government, 
and popular media (mainly newspapers, books, and magazines). Third, economic 
interactions as recorded in trade statistics, reports, and telegrams. And fourth, 
the diplomacy between the two states based on a study of original documents. 
Some of the episodes that this book discusses have already been explored by 
historians but much of it draws on new sources from Swedish and Japanese 
archives.15 Together, these documents tell the story of the relationship between 
Scandinavia’s last wartime-neutral and a belligerent faraway.16 
Neutrality and the problem of being friends with enemies 
The importance of neutrality for Sweden’s foreign policy during World War II 






























in Europe, North America, and Asia sunk into the chaos of total war, Sweden 
did not have enemies—at least not formally. On the diplomatic level, Stockholm 
did not differentiate between Japan, China, the USSR, Germany, or the United 
States. It maintained friendly relations with all of them. The problem was that 
Sweden’s “friends” were at war with each other, which naturally created pressures 
from all sides. To be friends with enemies came at the cost of criticism from all of 
them for not supporting their war efforts—or for granting too many favors to the 
respective enemy. Whenever Swedish foreign policy was supportive to one side, it 
could be sure to arouse the anger of the other. The dilemma was best expressed 
by one of Sweden’s most prominent foreign policymakers of the twentieth cen-
tury, Östen Undén, foreign minister (1924–1926 and 1945–1962), who once 
privately conceded that this “fact must perhaps be accepted with resignation, but 
the apostles of neutrality will never be heralded as the liberators of mankind.”17 
Neutrals could not expect much understanding from either side of the war for 
not supporting their cause. 
Even worse, there was little prospect that belligerents would recognize the
rights of neutral countries out of love for international law, and there were no
mechanisms to guarantee the rights. After all, the international order of the
League of Nations had been dysfunctional ever since the League’s failure to pun-
ish Japan for its aggression against China in 1931 and had collapsed completely
after Italy’s campaign against Abyssinia in 1936. The Law of Neutrality, which
was a part of international law (developed over centuries but formalized at the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907), was, in this sense, mere guidelines for
the dos and don’ts of neutral states, but it was not at all a guarantee against
aggression. The UD had no illusions about the gravity of the situation and the
relative vulnerability of Sweden. In April 1939, Erik Boheman, the state secre-
tary for foreign affairs (the UD’s highest-ranking civil servant), drafted a note
that was approved by Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler and circulated among
the highest ranks of Sweden’s foreign policymakers, including Prime Minister
Per Albin Hansson and the ex-foreign minister, Östen Undén. It read like the
blueprint for a pragmatic neutrality in case of another general war in Europe.
He predicted that there was no reason to believe that belligerents would respect
the rights of neutral states any more than they did during the First World War.
There was, according to Boheman, nevertheless no direct reason for Sweden
to fear an attack as his country was not part of any of the blocks that had been
forming. But its wealth in iron ore, on the one hand, and its relative economic
vulnerability, on the other, would still pose major problems to Sweden’s neutral-
ity. The relatively rare but important metal would be sought after by different
belligerents while the trade-dependent economy would make Sweden susceptible
to pressure-politics. Boheman’s recommendations were clear; Swedish neutrality
had to be negotiated bilaterally with all belligerents and in all spheres, includ-
ing commerce, as not to become a target of reprisals by one or the other side.18 
Sweden should, in other words, be ready to compromise if national security and
national interests demanded it. Practitioners like him understood that the Law of







war but that there was no mechanism to compel belligerents to respect neutral
rights. This became especially apparent in Northern Europe where, with the only
exception of Sweden, not a single neutral escaped invasion by one or the other
side of the war. 
Boheman’s predictions were eerily accurate. Once the European war started, 
Sweden’s two biggest problems were its dominant position as one of the con-
tinent’s largest exporters of iron ore and its geographical position between the 
belligerents. Iron ore was a crucial primary material for the production of steel, 
abundant in Sweden’s north, but exceedingly rare in central Europe. That created 
a sensitive vulnerability for Germany who, by 1939, imported roughly 40 percent 
of its iron ore from Sweden. Had these shipments ceased, the German armament 
industry would have seriously suffered. In fact, the raw material was so essential 
to the German industry that Swedish diplomat Gunnar Hägglöf was convinced 
that had the iron ore mines been located in the south, Germany would most 
likely have occupied Sweden for the sake of uninterrupted access.19 Their isolated 
location in the high north and the implicit threat that should an attack happen, 
Sweden would destroy these facilities before an aggressor could seize them, pro-
vided a strong discouragement to any German military intervention, and gave 
Sweden a bargaining chip in economic negotiations with both sides. Together 
with Sweden’s exports of ball bearings, the iron ore supply was the country’s 
most vital “contribution” to Hitler’s war economy. Naturally, Britain, once at 
war with Germany, demanded that Sweden cease all exports, even threatening 
to attack Swedish mines should shipments continue.20 Four years later, it was the 
US chief negotiator who threatened bombing factories and distribution centers 
in Gothenburg should Swedish exports of iron ore and ball bearings to Germany 
not end.21 Germany, on the other side, threatened to stop crucial deliveries of 
coal, coke, and steel if Sweden did not meet the demanded quotas of iron ore 
exports. Stockholm solved the problem by negotiating War Trade Agreements 
with Great Britain and Germany (in late 1939 and early 1940), reaching compro-
mises with both of them. All political provisions were, however, highly volatile, 
depending heavily on the developments of the war.22 After Germany attacked 
and occupied Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940, Swedish trade with Allied 
nations was cut off to a large extent, which led to even closer integration of 
Swedish commerce with the German “Grossraumwirtschaft” (the Nazi vision for 
a continental economic zone). Four years later, when the Allies strode toward 
victory after landing in Normandy on June 6, 1944, the situation inversed, and 
Stockholm yielded to their pressure to stop exports to Germany altogether. Such 
developments have earned Sweden’s wartime foreign policy the reputation of 
having been reactive.23 However, as the overriding goal of Hansson’s multiparty 
coalition cabinet was to avoid war, there were only two considerations that mat-
tered when it came to concessions: would their refusal lead to an invasion or 
would their acceptance lead to a counterattack by the other side? 
The most controversial Swedish compromises had to do with concessions to 
Hitler for the transport of German cargo, weapons, and even troops on Swedish 
















position. Once Denmark and Norway had fallen prey to Germany, and with 
Finland allied to it, Hitler’s diplomats started demanding that troops could 
be transported through Swedish territory between Norway and Finland. After 
months of negotiations, and much to the consternation of the entire cabinet, the 
Government felt unable to resist the demands any longer without the serious risk 
of being invaded like its neighbors. In July 1940, at a time when the situation 
for liberal democracies in Europe was at its bleakest—Paris, Kaunas, Riga, and 
Tallinn had fallen to Germany and the Soviet Union just days before—Sweden 
agreed to German troop transports through its territory. Hansson was painfully 
aware of the seriousness of the concession, which was not only a grave infringe-
ment on the letter and the spirit of the Law of Neutrality but would probably lead 
to more German demands as well.24 Indeed, those followed immediately with 
Sweden granting more rights of transit for German soldiers to travel back home 
and, in 1941, the right of the “Engelbrecht” division to pass through Sweden on 
its way to the Eastern front—all obtained from the Swedish Government under 
the German threat of regarding refusals as “unfriendly acts.”25 
In short, Sweden had no enemies during the war but its “friends” were not 
of the friendly kind. Nevertheless, the outcome of the tight-rope walk was that 
Swedish sovereignty remained intact. Sweden maintained its democratic gov-
ernment and continued peaceful interactions with all Axis and Allied countries 
alike during the 1930s and 1940s. Although those decades were dangerous to 
Sweden’s national security, from its perspective, there was no break in relations 
with the belligerents the way that they severed relations among one another. 
That, in turn, enabled the Swedish Government and its nationals to interact not 
only with immediate European neighbors but with the rest of the world, too. 
The long Second World War 1931–1945 
Swedish neutrality also provides a special temporal frame to conceptualize Japan’s
wartime period, based on a narrative of continuity more than rupture. Most
importantly, the standard periodization of the Second World War (ranging from
1939 to 1945) is not very useful to understand Sweden’s interactions with Asia.
When Hitler attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, nothing exceptional hap-
pened in Tokyo or in Stockholm. Certainly, diplomats and politicians in both
countries were stunned by the news—like much of the world—but they were
not drawn into the conflict. In fact, what today is considered Sweden’s “war-
time cabinet”26 was not formed until December 13, 1939, while in Japan cabi-
net infights continued throughout 1939–1941. Both countries struggled to find
political positions toward the war in Europe, but between Sweden and Japan, no
change in bilateral relations occurred. In fact, Japan reacted to the outbreak of
war in Europe just like Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States, by declaring
that it would not join the fight.27 “Japanese neutrality” (subject of Chapter 5)
toward the European conflict would hold for two years until its Navy attacked the
US fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941. Only then a cascade of declara-























Powers. For many Western diplomats and civilians in the Empire and, vice versa,
Japanese nationals in the West, that was the beginning of prolonged internment
and much suffering. The US ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, and his staff,
for example, were immediately cut off from all contact with the outside world
and confined to their embassy premises—a fate shared by all enemy diplomats at
the outbreak of the war and reciprocally applied to Japanese diplomats in Allied
countries. Since Sweden again stayed neutral, Stockholm’s relations with Tokyo
remained as intact as those with Washington, Berlin, Rome, and London. If any-
thing, Swedish diplomacy intensified with the outbreak of the Pacific War because
Stockholm assumed responsibilities as a Protecting Power. That was due, in part,
to the loss of other neutrals who had been filling that role until Pearl Harbor
(foremost the United States) and, second, because of the desperate situation that
Japan maneuvered itself into. Tokyo lost most diplomatic friends as the war pro-
gressed and the “club of neutrals” who were able to help the Empire negotiate
with its enemies shrank drastically during the last years of the war, like the Soviet
Union and Turkey who declared war in summer 1945, or Spain, which ruptured
diplomatic ties in April after the Manila Massacre. Sweden and Switzerland were
the only two neutrals who remained friendly with Japan and could uninterruptedly
lend their Good Offices to the Empire. This, in turn, meant that bilateral relations
between Stockholm and Tokyo took their “regular” course with trade unfolding,
diplomats stationed in both capitals, telegrams being sent back and forth, and
both governments in constant negotiation over their respective interests. 
Because of this experience of diplomatic continuity, this book uses key 
moments of Japan’s wartime experience to separate different stages of the bilat-
eral relationship. It begins with events in China where the “Mukden Incident” 
on September 18, 1931, marked the beginning of Japan’s violent expansion 
into Asia that ended only with the Empire’s surrender to the Allied forces on 
September 2, 1945. Especially in Japan, this is not an uncommon periodization. 
The term “fifteen-year war” (jūgonen sensō) was coined by Tsurumi Shunsuke.28 
It is used by notable historians, for instance, Fujiwara Akira, Imai Seiichi, Eguchi 
Keiichi, and Hotta Eri, and features in textbooks or museums that put more stress 
on Japan’s expansion into Asia than on its belligerency in the Pacific. There are 
also US scholars who are not fond of the Eurocentric periodization of World 
War II. The eminent Harvard Japanologist and later ambassador to Japan (1961– 
1966), Edwin O. Reischauer, for example, argues that World War II “really” 
started in 1937 at the Marco Polo Bridge.29 The idea of a “fifteen-year war” is 
not without its critics.30 However, it is a useful concept for this book because it 
captures Sweden’s long and continued involvement with “violent Japan,” which, 
according to the foreign diplomats who experienced it, was markedly different 
from earlier and later periods.31 Consequently, we are using the term of the Long 
Second World War to capture this distinctive period of Swedish neutrality as it 
offers an answer to the question “neutral toward what?”—neutral toward Japan’s 
15 years of belligerency. 
Concretely, we use moments that were important to Japan as sub-periodiza-
tion for the chronological account of events. After a brief introduction outlining 
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the beginnings of Swedish–Japanese relations in Chapter 2, the next section deals 
with the events of 1931, Japan’s blunders in Manchuria, the resulting fallout with 
the League of Nations, and Sweden’s position inside this political community 
that tried (unsuccessfully) to stop Japan’s expansionist course. The account ends 
with the failure of the League system and the implications thereof for Stockholm 
and Tokyo. Chapter 4 discusses events after the Marco Polo Bridge incident, 
in 1937, which is today known as the “official” outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War. It changed Swedish attitudes toward East Asia and impacted its 
trade and diplomacy. Those developments were amplified by the outbreak of war 
in Europe, in 1939, as will be shown in Chapter 5. The attack on Pearl Harbor 
in late 1941 marks the next stage of this book in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 
7 is an essay by Bert Edström in which he chronicles meticulously the “Bagge 
Maneuver” that unfolded in late 1944 and early 1945, which marked an extraor-
dinary moment of Sweden’s neutral diplomacy, shortly before the end of the 
Long Second World War. 
Wartime diplomacy 
Besides neutrality, the other vital component to understand Sweden’s war-
time bilateral relations with Japan is its capacity as a diplomatic actor. Despite 
Sweden’s relatively small size, with a population of only 6.3 million in 1938, the 
country had a sovereign and independent foreign policy for which it could count 
on a well-trained and well-established corps of diplomats to represent its interests 
around the world. That set Sweden apart from other actors of the Long Second 
World War, when large parts of the globe were still colonized. Indonesia was not 
born yet but administered as the “Dutch East Indies” by the Netherlands. The 
Philippines, too, was under US colonial control. Washington had taken the archi-
pelago off the hands of the Spanish in the 1898 US–Spanish war, at about the 
same time as it gobbled up the neutral Kingdom of Hawaii.32 Taiwan and Korea 
were dependencies of Japan, while Indochina, the Indian subcontinent, parts of 
Arabia, and nearly all of Africa was ruled by the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, 
Portuguese, Germans, or Italians. Their territories did not have statehood and 
thereby no foreign policy or diplomacy. 
Other nations were too young, too small, or too poor to sport effective foreign 
services. The newly independent (1922) Irish Free State, for example, had simply 
not had the time to build a corps of diplomatists who could have represented 
its interests in the Far East by the time warfare began. Although Ireland also 
remained neutral, it had no diplomats stationed in Japan, nor had it yet fostered 
economic ties with the Empire. Diplomatic relations were established only in 
1957. Other sovereign neutral States like Andorra, Monaco, or San Marino also 
had no presence in Japan due to their minuscule size. The only exception was the 
Vatican who, despite being a city-state, had such a long diplomatic tradition that 
it even stationed official representatives in Japan and China where Pope Pius the 
XII tried to safeguard the interests of Catholics during the war.33 South American 




nineteenth century. But many of them had not had economic interests on the 
other side of the Pacific and hence did not maintain many diplomatic ties. Brazil 
and Argentina were two exceptions. The former had had diplomatic relations 
with Japan since 1895, but it severed all contacts in 1942 after declaring war on 
Germany and Italy (although it only declared war on Japan on June 6, 1945). 
Argentina, on the other hand, remained neutral for a long time and even had 
diplomatic relations with Japan on ambassadorial level. However, its ambassador, 
Rodolfo Moreno, was absent from Japan when the Pacific War broke out and was 
unable to return. In addition, the chargé d’affaires had only meager resources 
to work with, which made an active diplomatic engagement in Japan impossible 
after 1941.34 In the end, Argentina declared war on Japan on March 27, 1945. 
Sweden, on the other hand, was in a completely different position. Not only 
did it operate five consulates distributed over the Japanese Archipelago, but 
also maintained diplomatic outposts (legations or consulates) in most of Japan’s 
enemy countries. This led to Sweden serving as the second-largest Protecting 
Power of World War II (after Switzerland), providing so-called Good Office ser-
vices. Initially, this meant little to Japan. During its military campaigns in China, 
Stockholm was more of a nuisance than an asset to Tokyo because of Sweden’s 
actions at the League of Nations. But once the War in the Pacific began Swedish 
Good Offices became an important factor in Japan’s wartime foreign policy. 
Being a Protecting Power and rendering Good Office services meant assuming 
diplomatic functions of a belligerent state on enemy territories. To name only 
one instance, Sweden became the diplomatic representative of the Netherlands 
in Japan. The Swedish mission took over all functions usually performed by the 
Dutch embassy. It cared for the safety of Dutch diplomats and civilians, negoti-
ated with Tokyo on behalf of the Netherlands, forwarded Dutch protests, and 
performed all civil consular duties toward Dutch subjects in Japan, for example, 
the officiation of marriages or the notarization of death certificates. The render-
ing of Good Office services by neutral states had been a common practice for 
centuries and was not considered a breach of neutrality because it was—and still 
is—in conformity with customary international law and was protected by Article 
18(b) of the Second Hague Convention of 1907.35 Besides, Sweden rendered 
Good Office services with the consent of both belligerent parties. This is only 
natural as any neutral could only act on behalf of an enemy country if the host 
country accepted that. In the case of the Netherlands, the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Gaimushō) explicitly acknowledged and allowed Swedish repre-
sentation of Dutch interests on its territory. In return, the Netherlands accepted 
that Sweden would represent Japanese interests on its territory (or, rather, toward 
its government in exile, as the Netherlands was occupied by Germany from May 
1940 onward). Especially in sensitive areas like Hawaii or for the coordination of 
Prisoners of War (PoW) exchanges, Swedish assistance became a valuable asset to 
the Japanese Government. 
It would be an overstatement to claim that Tokyo “depended” on neutral 
Good Offices, but from the available records it permeates that the Gaimushō


















Swedish Minister could be depended on to initiate peace talks between Japan and 
the Allied Powers. For the purposes of this book, it simply means that Sweden 
could interact with Japan during the entire time of the war. However, that does 
not explain why it would choose to do so. To understand that, it is imperative to 
know what brought Sweden and Japan together in the first place. 
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2 In the beginning 
Early Swedish–Japanese relations 
Swedish–Japanese relations date back to the time when Stockholm and Kristiania 
(Oslo) were still under the same king. The United Kingdoms of Sweden and 
Norway was the twelfth country to establish diplomatic relations with Japan after 
the archipelago’s 250 years of relative1 seclusion from the world.2 Just as in the 
case of Japan’s contacts with other Western powers, the relations to Sweden 
underwent a rather amazing metamorphosis. Originally treated as a backward 
and weak Asiatic country, Japan later entered the Great Power club, joining Great 
Britain, France, Russia, and the United States. From around 1895, the country 
was considered to be the dynamic force in the East, a state that played in a differ-
ent league from a small power like Sweden. Some also viewed it as a dangerous 
future economic competitor. This was due to the resolute Japanese moderniza-
tion experiment, accomplished in one generation, and the victorious wars against 
China (1894–1895) and Russia (1904–1905). 
When China and Japan were “opened” to Western interests during the years 
after the Opium War (1839–1842) and Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s ulti-
matum to Japan in 1853, grand hopes for the potentially enormous East Asian 
market were born in many sectors of the Swedish trade and shipping indus-
tries. At the end of the 1850s, the Swedish and Danish governments, following 
Perry’s example, even discussed dispatching an armed naval expedition to obtain 
a treaty of amity and commerce from Japan. However, these plans of “practical 
Scandinavianism” were shelved.3 
Although Sweden did not belong to the first round of seafaring nations to 
approach Japan after its forceful opening, it was the first country to conclude 
a treaty with the new Meiji Government after the demise of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate.4 Sweden did not send its own embassy to Japan to negotiate the 
terms of the agreement, because it was, in essence, the same document that the 
other Great Powers and Switzerland had already concluded, granting more rights 
to the Western powers than to Japan and included a most-favored-nation clause.5 
The treaty was signed on November 11, 1868, by the Minister Resident of the 
Netherlands, Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek. The document was one among a 
number of such “unequal treaties” that East Asian nations were forced to accept 
during these decades. It conferred extraterritoriality on Swedish and Norwegian 





In the beginning 15 
Sweden was even given the right to “inspect trade” by sending warships into 
Japanese territorial waters.7 It is doubtful, however, that the Swedish Navy ever 
made use of this right. Despite these favorable conditions, Swedish interest in 
Japan remained relatively low. Stockholm, for example, did not name a Swedish– 
Norwegian national as its diplomatic representative for nearly 40 years.8 The UD 
left its diplomacy to Dutch (and occasionally Spanish) ministers, who lent their 
Good Offices to the Scandinavians. It was not until 1906 that a proper Swedish 
minister was chosen to handle diplomatic relations with Japan.9 
Also, Japan at first had no diplomatic representation in Stockholm. Only in 
1880 the Japanese envoy to St. Petersburg was side-accredited to Sweden. It 
took another 25 years until the first proper minister extraordinary and plenipo-
tentiary was stationed in Stockholm, due to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese 
war in 1904 (during which Sweden remained neutral), when the embassy in St. 
Petersburg had to be abandoned. From that point onward, the responsibilities of 
the Japanese Minister to Stockholm were successively broadened; in 1907 he was 
side-accredited to the legation in Oslo, in 1917 to the one in Copenhagen (which 
had earlier been subordinated to the Hague), and in 1921 to Helsinki. Slowly, 
Stockholm grew into the outpost of Japan’s entire Scandinavian diplomacy.
Table 2.1 Swedish representatives to Japan 1871–1945 
First Name Last Name Position From To 
Frederik Philip Van der Hoeven Minister R.b 1871 1872 
(Jonkheer)a 
Wilhelm F.H. Van Wekherlin Minister R. 1872 1878 
Edmond W.F. Wttewaal van Minister R. 1879 1881 
(Jonkheer) Stoetwegen 
Johannes Jakobus Van der Pot Minister R. 1881 1889 
Dmitri Louis (Greve)c Van Bylandt Minister R. 1890 1896 
Hannibal C.J. Testa Minister R. 1896 1900 
(Jonkheer) 
Hannibal C.J. Testa Envoy 1900 1902 
(Jonkheer) 
Arthur M. D. (Baron)Sweerts de Landas Envoy 1902 1905 
Wyborgh 
John (Jonkheer) Loudon Envoy 1905 1906 
Gustaf Oskar Wallenberg Envoy 1906 1918 
David Kristian Bergström Envoy 1918 1922 
Oskar A.H. Ewerlöf Envoy 1922 1928 
Johan E.E. Hultman Envoy 1928 1936 
Widar Bagge Envoy 1936 1945 
Source: Utrikesdepartementet. Kungl. utrikesdepartementets kalender (Stockholm: Almqvist & 
Wiksell 1955), 236. 
Note: a Dutch noble title for “squire.” 
b Minister Resident. 
c Swedish noble title for “count.” 
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In terms of commerce, the outcome of the 1868 treaty was rather inconse-
quential. Neither trade nor shipping yielded any substantial profits. While there 
was a clear lack of effort on the Swedish side, the Japanese viewed the trade 
agreements—signed under pressure—as a national misfortune that all Japanese 
statesmen of the new Meiji period sought to correct as soon as possible. The 
universal desire for treaty revision on the part of Tokyo became an important 
catalyst for Japan’s successful developmental policy. It was one of the motives 
behind the mission of the Foreign Minister (gaimukyō), Prince Iwakura Tomomi, 
to visit the United States and Europe in a unique diplomatic tour de force of 20 
months (1871–1873). The group of some 50 emissaries also visited Sweden for 
one week, during which the Swedish Government used a large sum of money to 
accommodate the high-ranking guests at its expenses, showing a genuine inter-
est in developing its relationship with Tokyo. The Japanese proposal for treaty 
revision, however, was rebuffed in Stockholm, as in all other Western capitals.10 
The efforts from the mission and the desire to modernize Japan resulted in a 
domestic program for industrialization which, in turn, gave Japan more leverage 
for its demand for fairer bilateral relations. Finally, in 1896, the treaty was rene-
gotiated. The new version represented a big step toward full equality. When the 
last restrictions were removed in 1911, a symbolic end to Japan’s humiliations of 
the nineteenth century was reached.11 Ironically, modernized Japan fully adopted 
Western-style colonial policies, ruling over Korea and Taiwan, and even arranging 
its own unequal treaties with China. 
Meanwhile, in Stockholm, Japan remained a relatively minor concern. The 
diplomatic and economic neglect had to do with Sweden’s foreign policy objec-
tives, which did not include competing with great colonial powers on interna-
tional markets. There were also strong Swedish stereotypes about Japan being 
a backward Asiatic country. These perceptions only changed when the Empire 
entered the club of Great Powers and became comparable to heavyweights like 
Britain, France, Russia, and the United States. Only from around 1895, Swedish 
diplomats and statesmen started to consider Japan as a dynamic force in the East, 
with a change in the national attitude toward it following a decade later.12 
The impact of 1905 
The year 1905 unexpectedly turned into one of the most important years for 
Sweden’s foreign policy in the young twentieth century. For one, its union with 
Norway ended when first the Norwegian parliament and then the population 
voted for independence. The new proportions of Sweden changed the strategic 
considerations of Stockholm significantly. Long forgotten were the days when 
the country was a major power to be reckoned with.13 Embedded in a European 
context of increasingly large, imperialistic nation-states, with Germany and Italy 
unified, Sweden had become a small power, giving an impetus for a more proac-
tive diplomacy around the globe.14 
In 1905, Japan also won an important military victory over Tsarist Russia 
that marked the moment when the Tenno’s Empire definitely rose to the status 
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of a Great Power in the eyes of many Swedes. It was the first-ever victory of an 
Eastern army over a European state in modern times. Some contemporaries com-
mented on this surprising feat positively, as it was the “under-dog” who won 
the confrontation. Authoritative writers like Sven Hedin, Hjalmar Cassel, and 
Rudolf Kjellén published books that painted a picture of Japan as the “docile” 
pupil of the West and the guarantor of stability and civilization in the East, while 
also depicting it as immature and imitative. At the same time, both Cassel and 
Kjellén (and, in fact, also Hedin) warned in their books of a “yellow peril,” as an 
economic threat to the whites that the German Emperor Wilhelm II had warned 
of. Europe would not be able to hold its ground against the cheap labor of East 
Asians, as the authors predicted.15 It was during these years that Lafcadio Hearn 
wrote his famed books on Japan and its culture, and that Puccini’s opera Madame 
Butterfy aroused international acclaim. The magazine Hvar 8 Dag (Every Eight 
Days) spoke about “Japan, this in our fantasy so romanticized oriental country 
of the Mikado, the chrysanthemum and – the geishas.”16 It is not unlikely that 
the popularity of this superficially positive image was built by the news media on 
a wish to belittle the ongoing Japanese transformation. Perhaps it was a wish to 
reassure European audiences that the country was still essentially different from 
the rational and modern Western world. 
Nevertheless, when Swedish observers drew comparisons between East Asian 
countries, Japan was treated as more “normal,” that is, influenced by the occi-
dent, than its immediate neighbors. In the standard discourse, it was presented as 
a stark contrast to China that was seen as xenophobic, barbaric, and reactionary. 
This image was established and accepted already well before the Boxer Rebellion 
of 1900. A typical Swedish East Asia travelogue from 1893 put it in this way: 
What a tremendous difference between Japan and China! In the one place 
everything is neat and tidy, in the other it is dirty and smelly. In one country 
everything is bright and jolly, in the other it is somber and restricted. Here 
you are welcomed and everywhere kindly received, there you are viewed with 
a slanted gaze (in every sense of the word) and you know you are hated, 
regardless of whether the sly Chinese show it openly or not.17 
The internal and external transformation of Japan aroused conflicting sentiments 
in Sweden, as well as in other Western countries. It created the ambivalence 
that was typical for European and American attitudes toward the Japanese and 
Chinese in the early twentieth century. 
Also in terms of trade, 1905 became a watershed moment. Sweden had certain 
advantages on the world markets in the form of domestically produced advanced 
technology, and since one-sided treaties enforced through gunboat diplomacy 
were fading away, a new foreign trade strategy began to take shape. Right after 
the dissolution of the union with Norway, a specially appointed committee on 
diplomatic and consular matters refocused Sweden’s foreign policy on the pro-
motion of trade and commerce. By concentrating on the export of high-quality 
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The committee took the decision to put more emphasis on relations with Asia, 
because for the new approach to succeed, regional trade hubs became a necessity 
to access foreign markets.19 Unlike Denmark, which chose to base its Eastern 
diplomatic headquarters in China, the Riksdag decided in accordance with the 
proposal launched by the committee to make Japan its hub in Asia. The mili-
tary might of the Empire and the already existing Swedish diplomatic network 
there made it an attractive option.20 In 1907, Dan Broström’s Swedish East Asia 
Company opened a regular sea route between Gothenburg and Yokohama with 
intermediary stops in China. Another typical trend was the founding of Swedish 
trading firms in the Far East. For instance, Knut Gadelius commenced his activi-
ties in Japan also in 1907. He was soon followed by others, but Gadelius would 
always maintain a special position.21 His company has been described as Sweden’s 
first real corporation in the machine export branch and a Japanese observer later 
claimed that no foreign enterprise had introduced so many new engine types and 
production methods to his country.22 
At the same time, the committee’s report resulted in an overhaul of the
Swedish foreign service, opening it up to non-aristocrats, and thereby broaden-
ing the choice of envoys.23 In 1906, Sweden’s Foreign Ministry named Gustaf
Oskar Wallenberg its first proper envoy extraordinary and minister plenipoten-
tiary to Japan.24 Wallenberg was an influential local ship owner and belonged
to Sweden’s most prominent families of financers. His half-brother, Knut
Wallenberg, would become Sweden’s foreign minister for most of World War
I, 1914–1917, and his grandson was the famous Raoul Wallenberg who saved
tens of thousands of Jews from deportation by the Nazis in Hungary.25 Gustaf
Wallenberg was a new kind of diplomat, a businessman who had become con-
vinced of the immense future potential of the East Asian market. From the
beginning of his mission to Tokyo, he went beyond considerations for diplo-
matic relations with Japan alone. His task was to increase Swedish trade with
Asia in general. Especially China promised large gains for a small export-oriented
nation if just the right mode of interaction could be established. Bert Edström
put it as follows: 
With one quarter of the world’s population, China had enormous needs 
that the Japanese industry could meet. The logic was that if Sweden could 
become a supplier to Japan, then it would automatically result in an upsurge 
in Swedish exports as a result of the rapid growth of Japan’s exports.26 
Wallenberg was consequently side-accredited to China in 1907, a year after his 
arrival in Japan.27 For an entire decade, he was a towering figure in the Swedish 
commercial campaign in East Asia. Displaying endless optimism, he made sus-
tained efforts to gain a foothold for Swedish companies in both countries. He 
transformed the legation into a trade agency for pig-iron, pulp, and similar com-
modities. After all, the prospects for Swedish trade with Japan and China were 
good in both cases. The local population was more inclined to seek out small 
European powers for questions of trade and knowledge transfer instead of the 
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Figure 2.1 Swedish imports and exports to Japan 1908–1914. Note: In million yen.
Source: Centralbyrån. “Levnadskostnadsindex/KPI.” 
large, imperialistic nations with whom both had already made experiences of 
being forced into unequal relationships.28 
The new trade strategy was relatively successful. Between 1908 and 1914 
Swedish exports to Japan almost tripled from KR 2.27 million to KR 6.32 mil-
lion.29 The low inflation rate of just above 1 percent (on average) signified a real 
growth of exports and not just an increase on paper.30 By 1911, Sweden had 
conquered a position as the fifth biggest European exporting nation to Japan. 
The same could not be said about imports; except for sulfur, tea, silk, and some 
“oriental curiosities,” merchandise from Japan was for a long time insignificant 
and usually managed by German middlemen.31 Comparing import and export 
values, based on Japanese statistics, shows the disparity clearly.
It must be added, however, that Swedish and Japanese statistics at the time 
were kept according to the “country-of-purchase” method rather than “country-
of-origin,” which meant that the very modest figures of imports of Japanese com-
modities are unrealistically low. In all likelihood, a substantial part was procured 
by other ways than through direct trade. Yet, it is clear that Sweden ran a signifi-
cant trade surplus with Japan. 
From the Great War to the interwar period 
The outbreak of the Great War caused inevitable disarray, affecting Swedish mari-
time lines of communication to Japan. However, at times when shipments were 
possible, they carried goods of higher value, leading to an actual increase in gains 
from trade. That is not least due to the disappearance of Germany as a Japanese 
trading partner, leaving the field open to its neutral competitors. For Sweden, this 
meant that despite the European fighting, the positive trade relationship with Asia 
could continue. At the end of Wallenberg’s tenure, in 1918, exports to Japan had 
again more than doubled to KR 13.11 million.32 Since the Great War in Europe 
caused considerable inflationary tendencies, not all of the revenue increase of that 
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two years of the war, the Swedish economy suffered from large increases in the 
general price level of goods and services.34 Nevertheless, even with this qualifica-
tion, it is evident that the Swedish trade strategy and Wallenberg’s diplomacy 
succeeded in attracting more currency from Japan in payment for Swedish goods. 
Trade relations beneficial to Sweden were on the rise.
It was only after World War I that Swedish–Japanese trade significantly slowed 
down for the first time. Although this was a period of readjustment and a return 
to “normal” pre-war trade activities, the 1920s did not see the same slow but 
steady growth of exports that the previous decade did. It was, all in all, a period of 
slight decline. Only in the late twenties did imports begin to rise again from their 
previously low levels. In absolute and relative terms, trade was very limited prior 
to 1930, and even the sales of goods and services would not exceed 1 percent of 
the total Swedish export value (Table 2.2 shows the situation in 1928). 
Still, Sweden’s corporate world directed considerable attention to the Far 
East, as it realized the large market potential of the region with its populous 
nations. Reports about Japan’s swift industrial modernization predicted that the 
country would become an ever more important actor in the global economy.35 In 
spite of the inconspicuous trade volume, Japan was Sweden’s foremost customer 
outside the West (in terms of turnover) according to statistics from 1931. From a 
Swedish commercial viewpoint, Japan was always a more important market than 
China. Conversely, Sweden was also Japan’s major Scandinavian trading part-
ner, even if it played only a marginal role in comparison with clients such as the 
United States and China.36 Sweden’s most successful export items were paper, 
pulp, iron, steel, and modern machine technology.
It is unclear how much of Swedish exports to Japan were destined for re-
export or became part of new products exported to mainland Asia. Either way, the 
Swedish strategy to foster export markets in Asia succeeded at least partially. In 
comparison with its competitors, it is also safe to say that among the Scandinavian 
Figure 2.2 Swedish imports and exports to Japan 1914–1930. Source: Ryūshi Honma, 
ed. Nihon keizai tōkeishū 1868–1945 [Japanese economic statistics, 
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Table 2.2 Swedish trade with selected countries in 1928 and 1938 
1928 1938 










































Source: Centralbyrån, Statistisk årsbok 1929, 158–159, and 1939, 168–169. 
Note: In million crowns. 
Table 2.3 Structure of the Swedish exports to Japan in 1928 
Category Export Value 
Woolen machine felt 268,709 
Tallow, oils, tar, etc. 14,998 




Other sorts of paper 4,087,094 
Potassium and sodium chlorate 326,398 
Chemical-technological preparations 507,102 
Iron, steel, and metal plate 3,687,747 
Metalwork 3,228,301 
Machines and devices of which 
Pumps, etc. 129,098 
Roller- and ball-bearings 966,671 
Water and steam turbines 570,968 
Other 91,145 
Total 15,630,734 
Source: The Official Statistics of Sweden, Commerce, Report for 1928 from the National 
Board of Trade. 
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Table 2.4 Swedish trade with Japan 1928–1932 











(0.07) 15,630,734 (0.99) 
(0.11) 15,578,518 (0.86) 
(0.26) 10,992,164 (0.71) 
(0.21) 14,035,791 (1.25) 
(0.31) 12,769,967 (1.35) 
Source: The Official Statistics of Sweden, Commerce, 
Reports for 1928–1932 from the National Board of 
Trade. 
Note: In crowns. Percentages in brackets indicate the 
ratio of Sweden’s total imports and exports, respectively. 
Table 2.5 Japanese trade with Sweden 1928–1932 
Year Exports to Sweden Imports from Sweden 
1928 812,750 10,766,854 
1929 864,661 11,025,186 
1930 939,090 8,634,489 
1931 1,239,769 8,580,826 
1932 1,610,281 9,826,582 
Source: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, Nihon bōeki seiran (Tokyo: 
1935). 
Note: In yen. 
countries Sweden was the only one that managed to forge substantial bonds with 
Japan in the first decade of the twentieth century.37 
Stagnation also befell Swedish–Japanese cultural exchange. During the inter-
war period, few Japanese resided in Sweden and also the number of Swedes in 
Japan—mostly businessmen and legation staff—was scant. When the great Kantō
Earthquake struck in 1923, some Swedish residents lost their homes and the 
Swedish consulate in Yokohama was razed. Gadelius and a number of other 
enterprises suffered from the destruction, but no Swedish citizen was hurt.38 
Culturally, there were only few opportunities for bilateral activities. In the 
1920s Sweden was only occasionally visited by high-ranking Japanese dignitaries. 
The only event worth mentioning was the visit by the Vice-Secretary General of 
the League of Nations, Nitobe Inazō, a renowned pacifist and popular politician 
in the Geneva-based organization. Vice versa, the most important Swedish visit to 
Japan was the stopover in Tokyo of the Swedish Crown Prince and his wife dur-
ing their world tour in 1926. Prince Gustav Adolf spent over a month in Japan 
where he met in Tokyo with his counterpart, Prince Regent Hirohito (soon to 
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Articles in the Japanese press contributed to increasing goodwill toward Sweden. 
The semiofficial visit, however, did not carry any political significance. It was 
clouded by the news of a sudden fever that Gustav Adolf caught and by rumors 
concerning a Chinese knife attack at the British embassy during the lunch for the 
Crown Prince there.39 In August 1930 Prince Takamatsu, the younger brother of 
Hirohito, with consort paid a return visit to Stockholm, taking the opportunity 
to inspect the big exposition that the city held in that year.40 
Diplomatically, Swedish–Japanese relations prospered at the beginning of the 
century. In a telling interview for the newspaper Chūgai Shōgyō Shinpō, Japanese 
envoy, Hioki Eki, wrote that the Japanese were particularly well received in 
Sweden since 1905 because of the traditional Swedish dislike of Russia, and he 
added that his country had received “extremely important intelligence” from the 
Stockholm legation during the Russo-Japanese conflict. Yet Japan’s status as a 
member of the Entente also led to friction with neutral states. In 1918 Envoy 
Wallenberg was recalled after alleged contacts with the German side (although 
subsequent investigation exonerated him).41 Japan’s initiative at Versailles for a 
declaration on racial equality was met with skepticism by Wallenberg’s successor 
in Tokyo, David Bergström, who had a background as a prominent member of 
the Swedish Liberal Party and took a reserved attitude to what he considered 
imperialist nations.42 He was a journalist and former member of parliament, who 
achieved fame as a public intellectual. His newspaper articles and his work for 
the introduction of universal suffrage around the turn of the century made him 
famous among the left-wing liberals—while the conservatives despised most of 
his policies. Where Wallenberg was a businessman, Bergström was a politician. 
He was interested in the developments of the Taisho Democracy and the dif-
ferent political institutions that were built during that period. At the same time 
though, like Wallenberg, Bergström devoted much of his work to improve trade 
relations.43 Revenue from export peaked under his watch. 
Bergström was succeeded by Oskar Ewerlöf in 1923. He, too, was a govern-
ment insider, although from the bureaucratic branch of the administration. He
had served as chancellor and head of the Department of Legal Affairs since 1907
and then in the position as state secretary for foreign affairs from 1913 to 1918.
Although Ewerlöf was not an industrialist like Wallenberg, or a politician like
Bergström, he was no stranger to questions of trade and politics. He had been a
member of the State Commerce Commission from 1915 to 1917 and as such he
understood the importance of trade negotiations. This proved important for his
assignment in Asia where he joined the Special Conference on Chinese Customs
Tariff in 1925.44 The conference was convened in accordance with the 1922
Washington Naval Conference and the (unequal) Nine Power Treaty, which itself
was a vehicle for the United States, Japan, and European powers to cement the
Open-Door policy in China. It gave special rights only to Japan in Manchuria but
held that all other parts of the country must be equally accessible to all nations
who wished to do business there. In return, China was promised that, in the
near future, the question of custom tariffs and the principle of extraterritorial-
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Sweden was not one of the signatories of the original Nine Power Treaty—it
included the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and China—but, for the follow-up conference, Peking
(Beiping/Beijing) extended invitations to other major seafaring nations as well,
namely Sweden, Denmark, Spain, and Norway.45 Riots and political upheaval
in Peking delayed negotiations, and toward the final phase, the conference was
deadlocked due to seemingly irreconcilable stances on the country’s internal tariff
systems. Ewerlöf, together with his Danish colleague, helped to mediate positions
during these tense moments. Ultimately, the treaty through which China regained
its tariff autonomy after 80 years was completed on November 19, 1926.46 For
Sweden, the treaty and the status of a guarantor nation to China became impor-
tant guidelines for its foreign policy toward Asia in later years.47 
Institutions and decision makers 
In Stockholm, the interwar years were marked by a second wave of reforms to the 
foreign service, which began to expand. Around 1930, the ministry was organized 
in three bureaus in charge of political, commercial, and legal questions respec-
tively. Furthermore, there were sections dealing with administration, press, and 
archives. The ministry became the workplace of about 70 employees.48 Foreign 
policy was mainly handled by the foreign minister and his subordinates without 
much interference from the rest of the government; prime ministers showed dif-
fering degrees of interest in foreign policy.49 Foreign ministers were often party 
leaders, former prime ministers, or other persons with a prominent position in 
parliament. State secretaries and the heads of the political bureau were also key 
figures in the making of Stockholm’s foreign policy. They wrote memorandums, 
implemented decisions, and they were the guardians of conversations and written 
messages that passed through them, giving them much leeway in controlling the 
flow of information. An important part of the basis for their actions consisted 
of reports that were regularly sent to Stockholm from Swedish diplomats near 
and far. All in all, the Foreign Ministry was a rather conservative and traditional-
ist environment—extant memoirs reveal, for example, that the majority of the 
staff took a very skeptical view to the “new diplomacy” that was being built on 
Sweden’s membership in the League of Nations.50 
The breakthrough of democracy in 1918–1921 was accompanied by rising 
demands for an open foreign policy accountable to popularly elected parlia-
mentarians. In 1921, the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, Utrikesnämnden 
(UN), was formed as a replacement for the earlier Secret Committee. The council 
was filled with 16 members from all parliamentary parties (except for the com-
munists) who were appointed or reappointed at each annual parliamentary ses-
sion. It was convoked several times a year for direct reports from the UD. All of 
its work was done under a vow of secrecy since it operated with highly sensitive 
international information. In a 12-month interval, members were given confiden-
tial written accounts of events in world politics from the national point of view 
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referred to as “White Papers.” If a minimum of six councilors desired to discuss 
a given topic, it had to be put on the official agenda. However, as the name sug-
gests, the council was a purely advisory body without formal power over UD 
decisions. Independent expertise, built on sources other than those provided by 
the foreign service, was not used.51 
The council, thus, did not become as influential as expected. Soon there were 
fresh demands for less secrecy and the creation of a full-fledged parliamentary 
committee. That was created in 1937 with the task of preparing foreign policy 
matters—this time officially and with powers of oversight. The change, however, 
was not momentous because the members of the new Parliamentary Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Utrikesutskottet (UU), were the same people as in the pre-
vious Advisory Council. In addition, during debates of foreign policy issues 
in parliament it had been customary to adopt government proposals without 
modification—and this pattern remained.52 Political institutions might have been 
changed, but political culture did not follow suit quickly. 
As for trade policy, there was an overlap of responsibilities. On the one hand,
the UD was responsible for questions related to agreements on trade and naviga-
tion, and it was also in charge of international political conferences and the col-
lection of commercial data abroad through the diplomatic offices of Sweden. On
the other hand, a separate Ministry of Trade (MOT) had been set up in 1920,
which took decisions on issues concerning domestic and foreign trade. At the
Trade Minister’s side were a cabinet secretary and the head of administration.
They were the respective leaders of two separate bureaus within the ministry.
The director-general of the National Board of Trade, the organization assigned
to promote Swedish commerce, was subordinate to the MOT. Its discussion
partners in matters of foreign trade were the relevant interest organizations,
among them the Swedish General Association of Exporters (a club of business-
men founded back in 1887) and the various regional chambers of commerce.
Principles of trade policy and concrete issues such as tariff bills were frequently
discussed in parliament. 
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3 Trade under protest 
A war in all but name 
At the beginning of the 1930s, the main activities that Swedes pursued in East 
Asia were foreign trade, Christianization, and exploration. The latter two were 
mostly restricted to China.1 Swedish missionaries did not endeavor to proselyt-
ize in Japan and Swedish explorers like Sten Bergman, who wrote books and 
articles on the Kuriles, Korea, and other peripheries of the Japanese Empire, 
were rare.2 Swedish–Japanese relations were firmly rooted in commerce, espe-
cially after Japan became Sweden’s largest export market outside of the West 
in 1931. Occasional cultural exchanges accompanied the growing commercial 
relationship. On November 7, 1931, for example, a large Japanese art exhibi-
tion opened in Stockholm. It was arranged by the Swedish–Japanese Association 
and was a remarkable success. Exhibition objects came from Swedish museums 
and private collectors, not least from the Royal House. Opening speeches were 
held by the Swedish foreign minister, Baron Fredrik Ramel, and Japanese envoy 
Viscount Mushakōji Kintomo. Politically, it seemed that Japan and Sweden were 
set for another decade of fruitful and friendly relations. Ramel and Mushakōji 
both stressed the hope for the exhibition to deepen mutual understanding and 
cordial feelings between the two peoples.3 Little did they know that Sweden and 
Japan were, in fact, already set for a bumpy road ahead. A few weeks earlier, a 
relatively minor “incident” had taken place in a remote and somewhat obscure 
part of China, which would eventually lead to Swedish soul-searching and to a 
deep crisis in bilateral relations with Japan. 
International politics 
A military action and its aftermath 
On September 18, 1931, an explosion damaged the Japanese-run South 
Manchurian Railway. It occurred just north of Mukden (Shenyang), the admin-
istrative center of Manchuria, in the northeastern part of China (also referred 
to as Dongsansheng, or “The Three Eastern Provinces” in Chinese). The TNT 
induced blast did not cause any injuries nor was it strong enough to seriously 
deform the railway tracks, but Japan’s media and military immediately blamed 
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came to be known, was a staged attack. The perpetrators were officers from the 
Kantō Army, which was stationed in the southern part of the Kantō Peninsula 
(Liaodong).5 Japan had gained the right to keep troops on the peninsula in 
1905, after the Russo-Japanese War and was entitled to guard the Japanese-
owned South Manchurian railway. The Kantō Army developed into a hotbed 
of militant extremism ever since the 1920s, becoming severely hostile to China 
and its nationalist movement. Its leaders were deeply disappointed with the par-
liamentarian and pacifist currents of the political élite in Tokyo, which, in the 
beginning, did not even endorse its actions during the “incident.” The whole 
affair resembled a coup d’état, with the aim of pressuring the central govern-
ment to act in China. And the strategy worked. In Tokyo the agitated press and 
public opinion demanded resolute retaliation against the anti-Japanese elements 
responsible for this “Chinese terrorist act,” and the Kantō Army used the pretext 
to unleash a heavy military campaign over Manchuria. Abroad there were many 
who suspected a plot behind the railway explosion, but the conspiracy could not 
be proven. The government of the liberal Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō soon 
believed it had no other choice but to accept the new situation. It feared that 
controversy in public would lead to a fatal loss of national prestige. A few months 
later the Wakatsuki cabinet resigned after strong military threats and was replaced 
by a leadership more sympathetic to expansion.6 
On November 5, Envoy Mushakōji presented the official Japanese account 
of what was happening to the UD. Japanese troops, he alleged, were acting in 
self-defense against local “bandits” and were not carrying out a military inva-
sion. Ramel replied that, in his opinion, an independent investigation commit-
tee would surely become necessary in order to convince the Chinese side of the 
Japanese viewpoint. This option was ruled out by Mushakōji, who claimed that 
the conflict anyway could not be understood by remote European observers. His 
argument that a “cultural barrier” prevented many foreigners from understand-
ing the true character of the conflict in China was a prevalent trope of the 1930s. 
Surprisingly, it was also a way of reasoning that appeared even in some White 
Papers of the Swedish Government.7 Mushakōji might have had a hint of this 
“benevolent” view toward Japan’s narrative. In his own report to the Gaimushō,
Mushakōji emphasized that the Scandinavians were used to “standing beside” 
world politics as they did not often express support for countries involved in con-
flicts. According to him, the best way for Tokyo to deal with Scandinavia in this 
situation was to refrain from active propaganda in “the peaceful North.”8 
The clash between the Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria was a turning point
in the political history of the interwar years. It marked the end of a decade of relative
peace, optimism, and trust at the League of Nations and the beginning of renewed
global tensions and rearmament. East Asia was only the first of many regions where
developments took a turn to the sinister. In January 1932, while fighting spread
to Shanghai, the Kantō Army claimed that there existed a strong independence
movement among the Manchu people and, on March 1, Manchurian national-
ists declared that northeastern China was from now on a separate state under the
name of “Manchukuo.” It was obvious to most international observers that the
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new “state” was the creation of the Japanese military, but the developments hap-
pened so quickly and in complete violation of international law that within weeks
the Manchu territory was de facto removed from China’s control. The Kantō Army
used intra-Chinese rifts to achieve this goal. In 1932 it nominated the previously
dethroned emperor of China, the 23-year-old Manchu national, Pu Yi, head of
Manchukuo, where he once again was elevated to the status of emperor two years
later. Sincerely convinced that he was serving his people, the Manchus, the naïve
Pu Yi henceforth acted as little more than a figurehead to his Japanese masters. 
The crisis in the East was a challenge to the League of Nations, which started 
an investigation. At the request of the Republic of China, it convened an extraor-
dinary assembly. The activity was driven by a concern that the crisis also had 
important implications for collective security in Europe. It was a test of the 
League’s ability to maintain international law and order. The assembly decided 
that a commission would be formed under a former British governor of Bengal, 
Lord Lytton, to carry out a much needed but time-consuming fact-finding mis-
sion. In September 1932, Japan recognized Manchukuo as a sovereign state, 
which led to another outcry among the international community.9 At the end of 
a long process, the League passed a resolution on the incident in 1933, which, 
on the one hand, recognized the “special position” of Japan in the region and 
recommended extensive autonomy under a local government with Japanese 
advisors, but, on the other hand, also recognized the sovereignty of China over 
Manchuria. The Japanese Government dismissed the result and withdrew from 
the League. This could have been the beginning of sanctions and other measures 
against Japan, but Europe had new problems due to a severe economic depres-
sion. This left China alone and Japan’s belligerency unopposed. 
In the end, the League was unable to solve any of the fundamental issues in 
East Asia, while Japan and China were both biding their time to settle accounts at 
a later moment. They, too, faced other problems in the short run. The Republic 
of China, under General Chiang Kai-shek, had to invest its energy in campaigns 
against a domestic enemy, the Communists, while Japan was in the midst of an 
internal power struggle between conservatives at the imperial court, extremists 
in the military forces, and party politics. Japan’s parliamentarism received unex-
pectedly strong support from the public in the general election of 1936, which 
turned out in favor of moderate parties. Unfortunately, a military faction which 
demanded “direct imperial rule” (a convenient euphemism for a military dictator-
ship) reacted by staging a sanguinary coup d’état. Prime Minister Okada Keisuke 
only narrowly escaped the murderers while his finance minister and former prime 
minister, the influential Takahashi Korekiyo, who had opposed budget increases 
for the Army and the Navy, was assassinated in his home.10 The mutiny was 
eventually put down after the emperor’s personal intervention.11 On the surface, 
the rebellious officers had lost the battle but on a deeper level, they won the 
power-political game. Their message was well understood; no moderate Japanese 
politician could ever sleep quietly again in opposition to their goals. Japan had 
moved inexorably closer toward a society where militarists, not democrats, had 
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At the same time, in Europe, another militarist and fascist, Benito Mussolini, won
a decisive victory in his own brutal war of aggression. On May 5, 1936, Addis Ababa,
the capital of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), fell to Italian forces. This second breach of the
Covenant of the League destroyed the last hopes for a return to the principles of
law-based world order. Together with the German advance into the Rhineland and
the inability of the League to prevent either event, a new balance of forces took hold
in Europe. A rapprochement between anti-League powers followed, leading to the
Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, between Germany and Japan, which
Italy joined the year after. It was the first step towards the alliance of the Axis Powers.12 
On top of this, another crisis, the Spanish Civil War, started in summer of 1936 when,
suddenly, the democratically elected socialist government in Madrid found itself
fighting against royalist insurgents under the fascist leadership of General Francisco
Franco. Western democracies, it seemed, were hopelessly put on the defensive. 
National politics
No consensus: parliament, business, and the public between idealism 
and realism 
In Stockholm, the first news reports about the Manchurian Incident were eclipsed 
by Britain’s announcement to abandon the gold standard.13 It took a few months 
for the realization that the crisis in China would not be over soon and that 
Manchuria—that unfamiliar place in the Far East—would come to play a major 
role in world politics. In the early 1920s, almost no Swedish citizen engaged in 
trade or missionary activities there. A rare but prominent exception was Major 
Carl Taube, who lived in Mukden and served as a military advisor to warlord 
Zhang Zuolin,14 and published a book about the incident.15 As inconspicuous as 
this relatively desolate setting seemed to be, the conflict-ridden region developed 
unexpected importance to Swedish commerce in three fields. First, oil imports: 
In 1908 international traders had discovered the Manchurian soybean. Since then 
growing quantities of bean cakes and in particular soybean oil were shipped to 
Europe, among others by the Swedish East Asian Company. Soybean had turned 
out to be rich in vegetable fat that could be used for margarine, chocolate, soap, 
cosmetics, and even synthetic rubber or art silk. Furthermore, the bean was easy 
to store while also high in protein and since it could be consumed either directly 
or used as feeding stuff for cattle, it promised to alleviate Sweden from the fear 
of malnutrition during times of agricultural hardship. During the height of the 
later war in Europe, soybean was even used as a replacement for coffee beans to 
brew what Yuriko Onodera once observed to be the Swedish national beverage.16 
Envoy J.E.E. Hultman in Tokyo once pointedly remarked that “the entire world 
is dependent upon the flow of oil from the Manchurian fields.”17 Second, the 
trading house Gadelius had understood the potential of Manchuria and opened 
an office in Dairen (Dalian) as early as 1921.18 During the following decade, the 
company carved out a niche in the South Manchurian mining sector, enriching 
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(SKF), another important trading company, developed strong interests in 
Manchuria. In 1931, the SKF company magazine noted that the region was a 
promising future market for Swedish exports of ball bearings, not at least because 
the railways in its southern part were among the world’s best. Furthermore, it was 
mentioned that the South Manchurian Railway already largely used ball bearings 
from Sweden and that one part of the machines in the big military factories at 
Mukden also used SKF products.20 In short, the importance of Manchuria for 
Swedish trade grew unexpectedly but mostly unnoticed by Swedish politicians, 
which turned out to produce a diplomatic dilemma after the Mukden Incident. 
In March 1932, when the League of Nations summoned its members to the 
special assembly session, Stockholm was forced to define its stance, but only little 
consensus existed on the two major components of the debate: Sweden’s rela-
tionship with the League and its approach toward “Asian affairs.” 
In parliament, the strongest political force at the time was the Social Democratic
Workers Party. Lacking an absolute majority, the Social Democrats were, how-
ever, not part of the government. Instead, the executive was controlled by the
center-left minority government of Prime Minister Carl Gustaf Ekman (June 7,
1930–August 6, 1932), which was chiefly composed of members of the teeto-
taler (prohibitionist) Free-Minded National Association. On the right-wing of the
parliamentary spectrum, the opposition consisted of a small Liberal and a much
more influential Conservative Party, while agrarian interests were defended by
the Farmers’ League. There were also two proletarian parties; the Communists
who strictly followed directives from Moscow, and the Socialists who claimed to
be independent of foreign influence. Both “red” parties played only a marginal
role since they were shunned by the much larger established popular movements.
Regarding the League of Nations, all parties (except the communists) were largely
divided among two schools of thought. One emphasized the need for change of
Swedish foreign policy and the other stressed continuity and tradition. The former
approach was broadly “idealist” or “internationalist” whereas the latter gave prior-
ity to “traditionalist” national, or at most Scandinavian, considerations that could
be broadly termed “realist” in contemporary international relations parlance.21 
Sweden had joined the League of Nations in 1920 after a fierce parliamentary 
battle in which the internationalist left had carried the vote. After that, most 
traditionalists turned around and accepted Swedish membership in the League.22 
However, suspicions about Geneva lingered and skeptics like K.G. Westman 
(Farmers’ League) sarcastically referred to Swedish activities at the League as “a 
functionalist superstructure on Swedish foreign policy.”23 
The idealists interpreted the situation in Manchuria foremost as a crisis of
international law and the peaceful work of the League of Nations. They put
the blame for it squarely on Japan and its military. This opinion was shared by
some vocal Christian and pacifist organizations. They agreed that aggression
toward a faraway country had become the business of all states under the “one
for all, and all for one” principle of the Covenant of the League.24 The most
outspoken internationalist in this regard was Östen Undén, a law professor and
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was arguably the foremost Swedish expert on international law, and his views
on world politics were decidedly legalistic. As president of Uppsala University,
he gave a public speech to his students on February 2, 1932, condemning the
Japanese violence in Shanghai and accusing Japan of disturbing world peace. He
demanded a firm response from the League (without, however, being specific
about what measures he desired).25 Like most internationalists, Undén held the
League in high esteem. In his circles, there was a general belief that Sweden and
some other small states enjoyed a very high standing as particularly peace-loving
and selfless members of the world organization. As the League’s “watchdogs,”
they were believed to have a strong moral influence in Geneva to put pressure
on the Great Powers. However, the supporters of the League of Nations were
divided on a key issue: how to attain a desirable state of collective security?
Among most (but not all) of the Swedish internationalists there was a strong
resistance to armed sanctions. The anti-militarist stance led most of them to
prefer an economic blockade while a small but powerful faction within the Social
Democratic Party was skeptical of any government measures. They were of the
even more idealistic belief that a concerted action of the world’s workers would
be enough to stop any war.26 
More moderate left-wingers, especially the sympathizers around Arthur 
Engberg, influential editor-in-chief of magazine Social-Demokraten (The Social 
Democrat), urged a cautious line.27 After all, Sweden ought not to be dragged 
into war, not even “a war in the name of peace.” This, in turn, fueled impatience 
among the most outspoken activists. An editorial in the Svenska Morgonbladet
(Swedish Morning Post), the leading Christian pacifist newspaper, on February 
24, 1932, demanded a resolute initiative from the small states at Geneva, includ-
ing Sweden. The article caused widespread criticism and caught even international 
attention, as the Svenska Morgonbladet was the mouthpiece of the government 
party. Its statements were often regarded as the reflection of official policy. In 
the end, Prime Minister Ekman had to clarify that the article had been written 
without his knowledge.28 
The right-wing opposition predictably drew rather different conclusions from 
the Manchurian crisis. To the representatives of the business community, stabil-
ity was the condition sine qua non for trade in East Asia. In these circles, there 
were experts with ample information on local conditions in China.29 Their par-
liamentary representatives—the Liberals and Conservatives—also put less trust in 
collective security and were still hailing “neutrality” as their watchword. They had 
never given up their admiration of this supposedly old-fashioned policy and saw it 
as fully compatible with Sweden’s membership in the League. They argued that 
the crisis revealed the need for greater stability in chaotic China—a view which 
more or less favored the Japanese stance. These “realists” also opposed the disar-
mament that followed the Defense Act of 1925 and wanted to rebuild Swedish 
military capability. To them, the events in Manchuria proved how perilous it was 
to put trust in security guarantees signed by the League—sheer pieces of paper 
without real value. They claimed that this was proof that Sweden should give 
more priority to its military defense. 
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However, the realists, like their left-wing counterparts, were also divided. One 
of their controversies ranged about the nature of the League. The moderately 
conservative newspaper Svenska Dagbladet (Swedish Daily), for example, repre-
sented a faction that wanted to believe in the League’s ideals, even if they had 
few illusions about the practical shortcomings of the organization. It defended 
Geneva against criticism from Tokyo and pointed to Japan as the aggressor. 
Regardless, Svenska Dagbladet did not expect Sweden to take the lead in the 
struggle for international order. Implicitly, it argued that one should wait for the 
Great Powers of Britain and France to settle the matter.30 Quite a few voices in 
the conservative press were inimical to the League, and some praised Japan for 
exposing the fraud of collective security guarantees. All agreed that Stockholm 
should stay in the background: this was a conflict that had nothing to do with 
Swedish national interest. These views flew in the face of the internationalist 
notion that “everything concerns everyone.”31 
The only influential newspaper to give unequivocal support to Japan was 
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning (Gothenburg Trade and Shipping 
Gazette), a liberal newspaper close to business circles in the trading port. Its 
editor-in-chief, Torgny Segerstedt, often went his own way with opinions that 
were not always popular. Segerstedt dismissed the legalists as people to whom 
international order only meant respect for existing borders and the defense of 
status quo. International order in a deeper sense was only possible if there was 
justice and balance between nations, he thought. In the case of Japan, this trad-
ing power on the rise had been discriminated against by tariff barriers and by 
racist laws prohibiting Japanese migration. To blame were the principal Western 
nations, not least the United States, and they should acknowledge the need for 
Japan to find a way out of this desperate situation. Segerstedt was the only one to 
point to economic reasons behind the troubles in East Asia. He was also probably 
the only publicist to comment on the tension between respect for international 
treaties and the need for peaceful adjustment inside the Versailles system. His 
defense of Japan did not imply any sympathy for authoritarian government or 
militarism.32 In fact, during the European war years, he would become legendary 
as a fierce critic of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. 
A last and obscure minority among the Swedish population were fascism-
leaning conservatives. They denied that the clash between Japan and China was 
significant at all. To them, the conflict was just an illusion created by politicians 
in Geneva. According to their ultra-right interpretation, both Asian nations had 
a basic goal in common: to surpass the West and threaten the hegemony of the 
white peoples. In other words, these conservatives believed in a serious menace, a 
genuine “yellow peril,” to which only national rearmament could be a remedy.33 
The separate worlds of parliament and business 
In the early 1930s, the debates of the Swedish legislature normally revolved 
around topics like unemployment insurance, tariffs, or food prices. Speeches 
regarding foreign matters were rare and typically delivered by members of the 
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Riksdag without government responsibility. In contrast, the Communists and 
the leaders of the tiny Socialist Party never missed an opportunity to castigate 
the League as a cabal of capitalist Great Power machinations. However, 1932 
developed somewhat atypically. Already in the general political debate of January 
18 and 19, the events in East Asia were commented on, and on February 26 they 
became the main focus of a discussion about the Swedish position in Geneva. The 
speakers were mostly from the parties on the left. Conservatives, Liberals, and 
Farmers were much less active in the debate. At any rate, the battle lines seemed to 
be the same as in the press.34 A particular characteristic of the discussion was that 
all parties frequently used the Manchurian case as a proxy in the perennial debate 
about Swedish defense. Thus, far from being a detached and calm exchange, the 
matter was tinged with strong emotions. The long-awaited disarmament confer-
ence of the League of Nations had already begun in February—timing could 
have been better—and the Swedish delegates would soon have to present an 
official standpoint on both issues—disarmament and the crisis in the Far East. 
Given the tacit nature of these deliberations, parliament convened behind closed 
doors on March 4, 1932. Under the statutes of parliament this was only possible 
in cases when sensitive foreign policy issues were discussed, which did not hap-
pen often—only six times during the entire interwar period. The special session 
regarding East Asia, from which no minutes are available, would be the shortest 
ever. In the end, the major parties tried to show a united front and sided with the 
government.35 Despite the habitual differences on foreign policy, it was custom-
ary to reach a consensus before going to Geneva. 
Like editorials in the press, parliamentary speeches dealing with the grow-
ing Sino-Japanese conflict regularly centered on lofty ideals and principles, but 
did not often dwell on concrete sanctions.36 The Prime Minister himself tried to 
downplay the sanctions article in the League Covenant, Article XVI, and insisted 
that Sweden, first and foremost, should assist in adopting “strong, clear and reso-
lute declarations.”37 The business community, on the other hand, were propo-
nents of a low-key Swedish posture on the Manchurian crisis. Trading houses 
did not want to lose foreign customers because of sudden political outbursts in 
Stockholm. They wanted to retain their markets and were, in fact, interested in 
the prospects that a new country (Manchukuo) offered. Most of the business 
representatives were pro-Japanese, first among them Knut Gadelius, who had 
moved his trading firm to Yokohama as early as in 1907.38 To be sure, Gadelius 
was no friend of the militarist wing in Japanese politics but he could see the con-
flict from the viewpoint of his host country. He thought most Swedish politicians 
were ignorant of the actual situation in China. Like other trade representatives, 
he felt annoyed by the increasingly shrill appeals from the internationalist left at 
home.39 To him, the idealist editorial in the Svenska Morgonbladet mentioned 
above was the last straw. On February 26, a group of prominent businessmen 
in Gothenburg sent a telegram to Prime Minister Ekman, urging the Swedish 
Government to show restraint in Geneva. They were supported by “their” news-
paper, the Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning.40 It was their intervention 
which led to Ekman’s disownment of the Svenska Morgonbladet editorial. 
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Diplomacy 
Defending national interests, but which ones? 
Naturally, the crisis became a pronounced headache to Sweden’s diplomats and 
foreign policymakers. It started with simple challenges. For example, where could 
reliable information on this largely unknown part of the world be obtained from? 
Most “popular” information came from European or American correspondents 
in Shanghai or Tokyo, who were far away from the battleground, and whose 
reports got filtered through Western news agencies. Reliable “insider” intelli-
gence about the mysterious explosion near Mukden reached the UD only by tel-
egram and mail from the legations and consulates in the Far East. In some cases, 
the UD had to wait weeks for vital information. Judging from the government 
report to the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, the most influential infor-
mation came from the Swedish Minister to Japan, J.E.E. Hultman, Ewerlöf’s 
successor. Like most of his Western counterparts, he judged that the incident in 
Manchuria was symptomatic for a larger conflict inside Japan’s power structures; 
it represented a military and chauvinist revolt against parliamentary government, 
internationalist diplomats, and against the conservative court circles around the 
emperor. Hultman interpreted the situation as the rise of a threatening part of 
Japan against the old elite. It was a quite accurate assessment.41 
Swedish envoys in different parts of the world sent back information about the 
rather indifferent and passive stance of the Great Powers and the smaller colonial 
powers like the Netherlands. At the same time, these diplomats also revealed 
their suspicions toward China, often describing it as an almost anarchic country, 
menaced by Bolshevism.42 Like the business community, they often expressed 
their aversion to the “lawlessness” of China which was a constant theme in the 
correspondence, and which led to sympathies for Japan.43 Former envoy Ewerlöf, 
for instance, answered in an interview about the Manchurian question that: “my 
sympathies are more on the Japanese side, because Japan represents progress, 
order and development, something that the Chinese cannot achieve on their 
own.”44 Government assessments were also ambivalent. While the White Paper 
for 1932 (printed in late autumn the year before) was strictly impartial and only 
contained a matter-of-fact description of events in East Asia, a previous White 
Paper of 1930 explicitly stated that the region did not belong to China proper.45 
Another source, the “Blue Papers” (UD-issued reports on League of Nations 
assemblies) mentioned the conflict between Japan and China, but in cautious 
wording that did not accuse either party of violating the Covenant. Only vaguely 
did it allude to Japan’s obstruction and delaying tactics in Geneva.46 At the same 
time, stereotypical images of Asia from the nineteenth century were also still very 
much present—views of an exotic continent with inhabitants who were generally 
“inscrutable.” In this vein, the 1932 White Paper, for example, concluded that: 
“The ulterior motives behind the visible course of events more or less escape 
any spectator who is not familiar with Oriental mentality.”47 In the end, Foreign 
Minister Baron Fredrik Ramel, who was a career diplomat, did not issue any 
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conflict was of a complicated nature and that Sweden was not able to judge who 
was responsible for the latest problems in Manchuria.48 
The ambivalence of internal and external assessments led to a rather timid ini-
tial response to the events in the Far East. To the UD, it was not clear what was
going on in Japan or Manchuria, and it had no desire to alienate the only Great
Power in the Far East. Therefore, Stockholm at first tried to balance its approach.
It veiledly criticized Japan while also stopping sales of arms to China. At some level
it was hoped that Sweden would not have to further deal with the Manchurian
crisis at all. In autumn 1931, many believed that the incident could be solved by
the members of the League Council.49 However, the longer the crisis lasted, the
more reports reached the UD, and the clearer it became that Japanese aggres-
sions—whether planned by Tokyo or just ad-hoc instigated by the Kwantung
Army—were infringing on the principles of the Covenant of the League. That
was an inconvenient realization because it forced Stockholm to choose between
economic interests and political principles. Should Sweden engage in outspo-
ken criticism of Japanese actions at the risk of jeopardizing its economic ties? Or
should the situation be waited out without strong words of condemnation? Both
options were less than ideal. On the one hand, Tokyo had become the commercial
linchpin of Swedish trade strategy with the Far East and the impact of an outspo-
ken anti-Japanese policy could not be reasonably predicted. On the other hand,
something larger was at stake—the very principle of the League of Nations that
no member could violate the sovereignty of another member. This was the core of
the entire idealist enterprise at Geneva and a pillar of Swedish foreign policy since
1919. To use Arnold Wolfers’s terminology, the situation had led to a conflict
between possession goals and milieu goals.50 To the small state of Sweden, support-
ing international order in Asia was indirectly a way of upholding the authority
of the League in Europe. At least such ideas were quite popular in the Swedish
center-left government of C.G. Ekman. The choice was therefore rather obvious:
Stockholm would insist on a solution acceptable to the League. 
The making of a foreign policy 
On February 8, 1932, with the situation in Shanghai spiraling out of control, 
Chinese envoy Zhu Changnian made an urgent appeal to Sweden for support at 
the League of Nations.51 A reply did not come immediately but Sweden was now 
working on a policy for the Extraordinary Assembly. The task of drafting official 
instructions for the government’s delegates was entrusted to the ever-present 
idealist Östen Undén. The appointment itself was already a strong hint at what 
direction Sweden would take in Geneva. Undén, in fact, would lead Sweden’s 
foreign policy while Foreign Minister Ramel stayed in the background. Undén’s 
stance, unsurprisingly, was that the articles of the Covenant were unambigu-
ous and universally applicable. His draft was completed in late February and was 
openly critical of Japan’s military actions.52 While Japanese diplomats argued that 
justice was the right to change an inequitable situation if it threatens the nation, 
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the existing status quo and its national borders could not be tolerated under 
any circumstance.53 Accepting such revisionist arguments of “might makes right” 
would create negative precedents, detrimental even to Sweden’s security. He thus 
formulated Swedish policy clearly on the basis of the internal political debate and 
on principles of international law, and not based on the arguments of diplomatic 
reports from the Far East. Undén, and the Ekman government in general, lis-
tened to the rather vociferous left-wing opinions in favor of collective security. 
Stockholm should “speak out” on the world arena and defend the League of 
Nations just as it had done back in the days of Prime Minister Hjalmar Branting, 
who, in the early 1920s, had been a leading exponent of ardent idealism and 
pacifism in Geneva. 
Only after the sensation created by the article in the Svenska Morgonbladet,
Foreign Minister Ramel had to soften the language in Undén’s draft as not to
appear too anti-Japanese.54 Nevertheless, it was time for the next step. Karl Ivan
Westman, the Swedish envoy to Switzerland (and brother of K.G. Westman),
was entrusted with organizing multilateral support for the Swedish position by
forming an entente of like-minded small states at the League—not an easy task,
considering that there existed no unified “small state opinion,” as was often
claimed. Even the fellow Scandinavians, Denmark and Norway, were initially
not in favor of a proactive policy. A meeting on February 29 finally led to an
agreement on a number of basic demands. First, a ceasefire must be negotiated
for Shanghai. Second, the main part of the problems related to the Manchurian
dispute must be referred to mediation and arbitration. Lastly, the session of the
Assembly must not be terminated, only adjourned, pending the solution of the
conflict.55 
In early March, Ekman convoked the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs to
confirm there was a united front behind the official line. Secrecy was upheld and
no minutes were taken, yet from the papers of the Conservative leader, Arvid
Lindman, we know that the meeting was far from harmonious. Ramel underlined
that the small states must not be passive but raise their voice in favor of inter-
national law. In contrast, the Conservatives and the Farmers’ League declared
their support of a cautious policy: Sweden should not “expose” itself. It was an
unsurprising opinion, given that both parties favored emphasizing neutrality as
an ideal. More astonishing was that Arthur Engberg, a leading Social Democrat,
also joined them. Prime Minister Ekman, however, stated unequivocally that
no case had been so clear in the history of the League. Sweden must act.56 In 
the end, the government had its way; the wording of the official instructions
was slightly modified, and the Riksdag was summoned to a closed session. The
green light was given to the foreign minister who could now address the business
community and explain that Sweden must not be restrained by “short-sighted
material motives.”57 A concern for collective security as a principle, rather than
sympathies for either conflict party was to be Sweden’s guiding interest from
now on. 
On February 16, the League Council made an appeal to Japan not to infringe 
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instructed to support the appeal and to press for an immediate ceasefire in 
Shanghai. As usual the delegates represented different political colors: among 
the appointees were Rickard Sandler (Social Democrat), Eliel Löfgren (Liberal), 
Arvid Lindman (Conservative), and K.G. Westman (Farmers’ League).58 It was 
time for Sweden to make its decision public. At the request of the still invisible 
Minister Ramel, Löfgren (himself a former foreign minister, lawyer, and leader of 
the small Liberal Party) addressed the League on March 5: 
(…) until the last few days the position in the Far East has become worse, 
and although the news appears to be contradictory, no one can deny that 
what is taking place is war in everything but name. At this moment I will say 
nothing as to what has been done by the organs of the League to put an end 
to this deplorable conflict. (…) No one can deny, especially after the report 
by the Committee of the League at Shanghai dated February 3rd, that the 
military means employed in the conflict between China and Japan are not in 
conformity with existing treaties. 
Sweden, for her part, has maintained on several occasions dur-
ing the League discussions that the provisions of the Covenant pro-
hibiting the use of armed force retain their entire validity whether either 
of the Parties describes the use of armed force as war or not. (…),
in the opinion of the Swedish Government, the landing of troops and their 
use in military operations on the territory of another power are contrary to 
the provisions of the Covenant and of the Pact of Paris. Any such attempt 
to extend the conception of legitimate defense in the manner adopted in the 
present case would render it impossible to maintain any legal international 
order. 
(…) I realise the complicated nature of the conflict and the special condi-
tions prevailing in the Far East. These special circumstances cannot, how-
ever, be invoked by one of the Parties as an excuse for evading the procedure 
of conciliation and arbitration laid down in the Covenant.59 
Löfgren’s speech, although it appears rational and calm for today’s standards, 
was radical for its time and it was radical for the League. Especially the choice 
of words, in the original French, to castigate Japanese actions as a crisis that was 
a guerre en tout, sauf le nom—a war in all but name—was the strongest pos-
sible condemnation, and exactly the wording that the Chinese side urged the 
League to take. It elevated the “incident” to the level of warfare, which was 
something that Tokyo explicitly wanted to avoid because that could be used 
to trigger Articles XV and XVI of the Covenant, sanctions, expulsion, and even 
military intervention. 
No other speaker that day condemned Japanese actions as adamantly as 
Löfgren. But that did not mean that Sweden stood alone. Other small states 
also intervened on the side of China, especially the representatives of Spain, 
Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland. Other countries took a much more evasive 
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did not follow the Swedish position, mainly due to its pro-Japanese inclination 
that stemmed from the Russo-Japanese War when Tokyo encouraged Finnish 
independence. However, most reluctant were the League’s kingpins, France 
and Britain. The British Foreign Secretary, John Simon, openly tried to appease 
Tokyo, claiming that it would perhaps not be possible to apply the Covenant 
to this conflict.60 Representing Japan’s former ally during World War I, Simon 
wanted to solve the crisis on the basis of political expediency, not legal princi-
ples. In spite of rumors of British pressure on Löfgren, Sweden, together with 
Switzerland, did not refrain from siding with what was actually the Chinese 
standpoint. They put forward a draft resolution that called for negotiations 
between the parties but also demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from 
Shanghai—an inacceptable proposal to Tokyo. In the end, the Assembly adopted 
a more diplomatic solution. Stockholm could still claim a victory though, as the 
new text established that the Covenant was fully applicable to the conflict, and 
that members were urged not to recognize any change to the 1931 status quo, 
much to the chagrin of Japan.61 Before the Assembly adjourned, Sweden was 
elected to a 19-member committee that was given the mandate for a report on 
the conflict, thereby becoming a party to the fact-finding Lytton Commission.62 
On the world stage: the “bite” of the small states 
Japan’s reaction to the criticism was furious.63 It became known as the “small-
state-side” (shōkokugawa), which was Japan’s lumping together of the small 
countries as a single actor, which it accused of sterile formalism and total igno-
rance of conditions in Asia. Some Japanese media and politicians called them 
“hardliners” or “theory faction” (rironha).64 Interestingly, this collective blaming 
of small states by the Japanese press prevented Sweden from being singled out for 
its relatively intensive critique. Nevertheless, after the Assembly, an armed guard 
had to be stationed occasionally in front of the Swedish legation in Tokyo.65 As 
for the Chinese side, Sweden would receive declarations of gratitude from per-
sonalities like Wang Xiaolai, chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce 
and organizer of the nationwide anti-Japanese trade boycott. Incidentally, this 
boycott would benefit Swedish exporters who met with less competition in 
China.66 After the end of hostilities in March 1932, Sweden also resumed its arms 
exports to Chiang Kai-shek.67 The decision provoked no Japanese protest but 
certainly did not improve bilateral relations. Still, Stockholm wanted to be seen 
as impartial and aloof from both conflicting parties. 
During the rest of the year, the world’s capitals were forced to wait for
the Lytton Report. At home, the national clash of opinions continued. The
most fervent defender of the League was Östen Undén, who continued to
give speeches around Sweden in defense of internationalism.68 More signifi-
cantly, Sweden got a new government after the election victory of the Social
Democrats, in September. Per Albin Hansson formed a cabinet with Rickard
Sandler as his foreign minister. Unlike Baron Fredrik Ramel, Sandler was an
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activism in Geneva would continue unabated once the much-awaited report
was published. 
In autumn the Council met again. On December 6, the Extraordinary 
Assembly reopened and Sandler immediately threw the influence of the new gov-
ernment behind the Lytton Report which did not recognize the independence of 
Manchukuo. During fresh deliberations among the small states, Sweden was even 
prepared to consider Article XVI of the Covenant, the sanctions article, that had 
until then never been used. Here Stockholm met resistance from the Netherlands 
and this time also from Switzerland. However, the Swedes were supported by 
Spain and Czechoslovakia, represented by Salvador Madariaga and Eduard Beneš, 
respectively.70 For Sweden, it was Undén who, in no uncertain terms, declared 
that world peace was one and indivisible. Unilateral military actions, including 
in the Far East, had to be penalized. The League must take measures, he stated, 
to maintain the respect for international law.71 To Undén, Sweden’s first line of 
defense ran through Geneva. 
After the long debate, Sweden, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Ireland drafted a 
resolution. It condemned the Japanese military occupation and strongly recom-
mended a non-recognition policy for the artificial state of Manchukuo. At this 
juncture, the Secretary General of the League, Sir Eric Drummond, intervened 
and demanded that the draft be revoked. He, too, preferred to appease Japan 
because he feared that too strong a condemnation might lead to Japan withdraw-
ing from the League. Although the draft was not rescinded, it lost in the final vote 
on December 9 to a more restrained resolution that referred the matter to the 
Lytton Report and to the 19-member committee, thus causing further delay.72 
Japanese media celebrated this preliminary outcome as a victory of Japan’s chief 
diplomat, Matsuoka Yōsuke, over the shortsightedness of the small states. By 
that time, the term “small states” had already become a derogatory expression 
in Japan and its members were repeatedly depicted in demeaning manner. For 
instance, the cartoon shown in Picture 1 was printed on December 10, in the 
Yomiuri Shimbun, one of the country’s most widely read newspapers. It accom-
panied a long article about the procedures in Geneva and shows Matsuoka throw-
ing around a small state representative (bearing resemblance to Östen Undén) 
who had dared to “bite” Japan with the first resolution text. 
However, the victory was short lived. As the 19-member committee adjourned
for a Christmas and New Year’s recess, Sandler and Undén were contacted by
Japanese representatives who wanted to make a last-ditch attempt at convincing
Sweden of the righteousness of the Japanese viewpoint. Foreseeing tense meet-
ings, Stockholm’s top diplomats decided to follow a rhetoric strategy of “fraction-
ing” the conflict into two issues: one concerning the relations between Sweden
and countries in the Far East, another the dispute between the League of Nations
and Japan. In the former, they would argue that Sweden was impartial and wanted
to keep the same correct relationship with Japan as with China. In the latter,
though, Sweden as a loyal member of the League had to fully stand behind the
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Picture 3.1 Matsuoka Yōsuke throws around a representative of the small states.
Source: Untitled Cartoon by Ikeda Eiji, Yomiuri Shimbun, December 
10, 1932. Note: The caption reads: “Poor guy being thrown around; 
Although a small country, it had the nerve to bite.” 
Japan, too, made use of its diplomatic talent to the fullest. In Stockholm,
Ambassador Mushakōji met twice with Foreign Minister Sandler on December 13
and again on January 10. In the meantime, on December 18, Matsuoka eloquently
tried to persuade Undén in Geneva to change his stance. However, both initia-
tives failed. Even when Matsuoka hinted that Japan might quit the League, which
would endanger Undén’s much-cherished world peace project, the Swede would
not agree to soften his rhetoric.75 Mushakōji, too, was so frustrated about his talks
with Sandler that he summarized them (not very diplomatically) as an encounter
between a pragmatist (himself) with a sense of reality and a stickler of formalities.76 
As late as February 1, 1933, there was still no consensus in the 19-member 
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proposed an embargo on the sales of arms to Japan, and there was also a proposal 
to recall all foreign diplomats from Tokyo. Although the Great Powers were still 
vacillating,77 the turning point was near. After another Japanese military action 
had taken place in early 1933, this time in Rehe, south of Mukden, a line was 
crossed also for London. Within days the British representative did an about-face, 
signaling his support for the Lytton recommendations. The committee could 
finally present a Japan-critical report which was officially adopted by the League 
at an Assembly vote on February 24—despite the fierce criticism from Matsuoka. 
The result of the vote was 42 to 1. The Japanese delegation left the auditorium 
and, one month later, the League.78 One and a half years of peace efforts were 
over. In the weeks following the denouement at Geneva, the British Government 
implemented a provisional arms embargo against Japan and China. A British pro-
posal for Sweden to join the embargo against both states was quickly rejected by 
Undén who declared that an embargo must only affect the aggressor.79 Swedish 
arms exports to China could henceforth be defended as an act of collective secu-
rity. London soon lifted its embargos, but to the displeasure of the idealists in the 
League, and to the utter disappointment of China, no new sanctions were taken 
against Japan. The Tenno’s Empire had lost face in international diplomacy, but 
it won the Great Power game. Manchukuo, Japan’s first satellite state, was now 
a fait accompli. 
Bilateral diplomacy after the fallout 
After the vote on the Lytton Report and Tokyo’s withdrawal from the League, 
the internationalists maintained their confidence for a while. Many predicted the 
imminent economic collapse of Japan due to the rising military expenditures.80 
On the conservative side, the foes of the League did not hesitate in reminding 
the public of what they had been saying all along: Geneva helps those who help 
themselves. Full of irony and sarcasm, the Nya Dagligt Allehanda wrote that it 
was a great relief to know there existed a League of Nations since it would adopt 
a well-formulated resolution each time Sweden’s independence came under 
threat.81 Parliamentary debates early in 1933 were less polemic, but only because 
most members of the big parties stayed away from the podium. Most active were 
the ultra-leftists who scornfully claimed that the League and Japan were in collu-
sion. Despite the disappointment, parliament voted against a Swedish secession 
from the League—based on the rationale that withdrawal would only encourage 
Japan and other states with revisionist programs.82 
In 1935, a report of the Swedish Defense Committee was announced after 
five years of inquiries and deliberations. The committee consisted of representa-
tives from all the major political parties but the chapter on Sweden’s international 
environment had been penned by diplomat Erik Boheman. He concluded that 
the League of Nations had failed in Manchuria as well as in the Latin American 
Chaco War. As one of the risks to world peace, he named the continued Japanese 
military expansion in the East.83 There were no new Swedish appeals for League 
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killed the last hopes that such measures would ever be taken. The situation dete-
riorated further in December that year, when Japan somewhat surprisingly joined 
Germany in the Anti-Comintern Pact. The mood in the internationalist press was 
by now utterly pessimistic. Among the Conservatives only rabidly anti-League 
newspapers hailed the agreement as a useful act of defense against Bolshevism.84 
Also from the Japanese side, the mid-1930s was a moment of increased interest 
in the Baltic region as a front in the struggle against world communism. In 1935, 
Onodera Makoto, a military attaché who would play a not unimportant role dur-
ing the last years of the war in Sweden, was first posted in the Latvian capital of 
Riga, while in 1936 a new Japanese legation was established in Helsinki.85 
Occasionally Japan was mentioned by Foreign Minister Sandler in his 
speeches. Sometimes he talked about it in an optimistic way, like in 1934, when 
he expressed hope for a Japanese return to the League of Nations. At other times 
he referred to it pessimistically, as in May 1935, when he warned that tensions in 
East Asia could trigger another World War. Generally, he was critical of Japanese 
rearmament and he accused its diplomacy of encouraging Germany to steer an 
adventurous course.86 Generally, Sweden refrained from taking any new initia-
tives related to Manchuria. In a way it had abdicated from its responsibility and 
referred its foreign policy to Geneva. But this passive attitude also meant that 
Sweden would not try to upset the “frozen” status quo. In reply to a démarche
from Belgium about Western interests in Manchukuo, that implicitly argued for 
the recognition of the puppet state, the UD answered that Sweden could not 
pursue a foreign policy on its own, but that it had to follow the recommendations 
of the League.87 
In 1933, Mushakōji was appointed ambassador to Turkey, and already in the 
following year reposted to Berlin. In Stockholm he was succeeded by a man of a 
very different temperament, the ultranationalist Shiratori Toshio. He was already 
famous for his Gaimushō press conferences when he was sent to Sweden—an 
assignment he took as a demotion. Although a diplomat, he was close to Japanese 
army circles, and his statements often were undiplomatic. The decision makers in 
Tokyo probably saw several advantages with his appointment: they would get rid 
of a troublemaker and at the same time have a vociferous propagandist for Japan 
as their spokesman in Stockholm.88 Shiratori was quick to publish an article in the 
1934 yearbook of the Swedish–Japanese Association. In the opinion piece, titled 
“The Reawakening of Japan,” the envoy described how public opinion in his 
country was rallying around the emperor, abandoning the parties in parliament, 
and giving its support to a strong foreign policy. An era of soulless imitation and 
Westernization was over, he wrote.89 Time would not be very kind to his article, 
as Japanese public opinion did not disavow political parties and parliamentarism 
even during the War in the Pacific when, in 1942, parliamentary elections surpris-
ingly strengthened many anti-militarist candidates—despite the strong govern-
ment push for a one-party state.90 In any case, Shiratori’s article was the first of 
its kind in the usually apolitical yearbooks, which were filled with contributions 
dealing with Japanese art and culture. Shiratori’s concern was world politics and 
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over porcelain tariffs. He followed developments in the Soviet Union and trave-
led to Berlin to take part in conversations that might have been the prelude to the 
Anti-Comintern Pact. Already in 1936, he was recalled and would soon become 
Japan’s ambassador to Italy.91 
Trade 
Weathering the storm with business as usual 
The diplomatic quarrel in Geneva was a long and exhausting affair. By the time the 
League closed the case on Japan, without deciding to implement any sanctions, 
the international community at large, and Sweden in particular, had to move on 
with mixed feelings. It had gained nothing but a symbolic moral victory at the 
League—but at what price? Would the disenchantment of Japan over Sweden’s 
role as a “ringleader” of the small states in Geneva have repercussions on its cul-
tural exchange and the much more important trade relationship? Interestingly, 
the answer is a straightforward no. Despite what took place at Geneva, the com-
mercial relationship remained stable. In the early 1930s, Swedish spokesmen 
would repeatedly stress the fact that their country did not have any “special inter-
ests” in the Far East. There were no Swedish colonies, no spheres of influence, 
and no military bases in the region. Yet, in several respects Sweden had interests 
in East Asia—not just in Japan but also in China. For instance, Sweden had 
been one of the countries that guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Chinese 
republic and “the open-door policy.” This was because Sweden had ratified the 
Nine-Power Treaty, concluded in Washington in 1922.92 Swedish citizens (like 
Japanese and other nationals of colonial powers) still enjoyed extraterritoriality 
in China, and Sweden was thus a member of the cartel of foreign nations that 
guarded their privileges in treaty ports like Canton and Tientsin (Tianjin). Most 
of the Swedish business community in China was stationed in Shanghai where 
Sweden also operated a consulate general, which, in many respects, was more 
important than its legation in Peking. 
Although Japan had become Sweden’s largest export market in the East, com-
merce was not overwhelmingly lively. Actually, it was modest in absolute and in 
relative terms. The same was true for the other side. Sweden was Japan’s main 
market in Scandinavia, but it was rather insignificant in comparison with much 
larger Japanese trade partners like the United States and China, as Figure 3.1
shows evidently. 
The trade balance in the 1930s remained unchanged from the previous dec-
ades. Sweden exported more to Japan than it imported, creating a trade surplus, 
but at relatively low levels. Exports accounted for no more than 1 percent of the 
total national export value. Trade had diminished during the previous decade and 
fell further after the Great Depression of 1929. Only in the early 1930s imports 
from Japan started picking up again—albeit from a low level.93 Commerce with 
the Empire was not more than a footnote to Swedish foreign trade in 1931. Still, 
commercial circles in Stockholm and Gothenburg harbored high hopes for trade 
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Figure 3.1 Japanese imports and exports for selected countries in 1931. Source: 
Data from Honma, Nippon keizai tōkeishū 1868–1945, 35–47. 
with East Asia: Japan’s industry was developing swiftly, and the large Chinese 
and Japanese populations represented a great number of potential consumers. 
Business analysts concluded that living standards in East Asia would rise.94 Reality 
would later surpass their boldest expectations. The Japan of the 1930s acted as a 
“hungry” nation, a challenger of the developed Western world with its high pro-
duction costs. It was evident that the Japanese economy had experienced a swift 
recovery from the depression and entered a phase of dynamic change. Europe 
was now being inundated by cheap import goods “made in Japan,” not least 
textiles, rubber boots, and toys. Japan was also in the midst of a structural trans-
formation: factors such as the military’s expansionist program and the global arms 
race spurred the development of an up-to-date heavy industry. This transforma-
tion also stimulated strong demand for advanced technology from abroad and 
there was an upsurge in the imports of modern machinery from different Western 
countries. This notwithstanding, European and American popular opinion railed 
against the “economic yellow peril.” It could even be said that peaceful commer-
cial competition evoked more hostile sentiments in the West than any military 
measure that Japan had ever taken during the Manchurian crisis. The Japanese 
economic offensive did not violate principles of international law, but it threat-
ened domestic jobs.95 
The practical aspects of commerce with the Far East were largely conducted 
by trading houses which acted as intermediaries. Their expertise and local knowl-
edge were in high demand among export firms unfamiliar with the culturally 
different Asian markets. The three biggest Swedish trading houses in Japan were 
Gadelius, J.A. Kjellberg & Sons, and Carl Ekman & Co. An exception was Svenska 
Kullagerfabriken (SKF), which very successfully sold its own products directly in 
East Asia. The high quality of its ball bearings created a steady demand especially 
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from the growingly industrialized economy of Japan. Other typical Swedish 
export commodities included iron, steel, paper, pulp, and all sorts of machines 
(turbines, pumps, drills, etc.). The sophisticated products were most sought after 
in the high-end manufacturing sector of the Empire where either local quality 
could not meet the needed standards or where technological know-how had not 
yet been achieved for indigenous production. On the import side, Sweden mainly 
bought tea, soybeans, and other “colonial goods” from East Asia.96 With only a 
few exceptions (like soybeans and tea), those were rarities, not intended for the 
mass market. The manufacturing sectors in China and Japan were not yet big 
enough, nor were shipping costs low enough, to create a noteworthy interconti-
nental export industry. That would only arise in the second half of the century. In 
the 1930s, East Asia was still a net-importer from Sweden. That is why the trade 
surplus with Japan was roughly threefold while the situation with China was even 
more pronounced; in 1934 exports were 14 times more valuable than imports.97 
Most of these products were transported by specialized shipping companies, of 
which the Svenska Ostastiatiska Kompaniet (Swedish East Asian Company) was 
particularly important to Sweden. It was founded in Gothenburg in 1907 and, 
after two decades of growth, disposed of a fleet of nine modern motor vessels and 
seven steamers, operating routes to India and Southeast Asia, but it also sailed to 
Hongkong, Shanghai, and Yokohama three times a month, in cooperation with 
a Danish and a Norwegian firm. Its main competitor was the Japanese freight 
company Nihon Yūsen K.K. (NYK).98 
A particularly “thorny” trade category—especially in view of the ongoing crisis 
in Geneva—was Sweden’s role as an arms dealer. In a parliamentary speech of 
1933, Communist MP Hilding Hagberg suspected that Sweden was among the 
nations that exported arms to Japan.99 He was wrong. Swedish arms were sold 
to China. This had nothing to do with the Manchurian crisis. The arms manu-
facturer AB Bofors had been present in Northeast Asia ever since 1916, when it 
helped local dictator Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin) to build up a weapon arse-
nal. For a while, his factory was the biggest in China.100 Swedish arms were sold 
to competing warlords but by the end of the 1920s, the Nationalist Party under 
Chiang Kai-shek had unified the country. The Swedish authorities then recom-
mended Bofors and a gunpowder exporter, AB Nobelkrut, to maintain contact 
only with the Chinese central government.101 According to League of Nations 
statistics, Sweden was the world’s fifth-largest arms dealer in 1930 after Great 
Britain, France, the United States, and Czechoslovakia. Japan, on the other hand, 
was largely self-sufficient in arms and ammunition and there was, consequently, 
no demand for Bofors’ products. SKF and the trading houses, on the other hand, 
sold ball bearings to the Japanese, which could be used for civilian purposes 
but also for tanks, cannons, and weapon-manufacturing. Ball bearings were thus 
partly a commodity that contributed to Japan’s war industry.102 
The sales of arms had always been controversial in Swedish domestic politics. 
Not only the communists condemned it, but it was also criticized by Christian 
pacifists and left-wing socialists. Together, the left accused the government of 
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workers. This criticism diminished after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and 
Tokyo’s rapprochement to the rightist dictatorships of Europe silenced it alto-
gether.103 From the conservative side, the morally dubious trade was defended 
with the argument that the defense industry in a small country like Sweden had 
to produce for a larger market in order to be viable.104 
Post-crisis: the show must go on 
The years 1933–1937 were a lull before the next storm in Swedish–Japanese
relations. There were tendencies toward a détente but the unresolved conflict in
Manchuria continuously cast a shadow over bilateral contacts. Japan became a new
topic in the national debate, framed as a potential economic menace to Swedish
industry. The argument gained traction that Japan was not just militarily, but also
economically, aggressive. Cheap articles from the East were suddenly depicted as
“invading” Western markets. Whereas the crisis in Manchuria had been regarded
as a relatively distant matter, the Japanese export offensive was believed to be an
immediate threat. This feeling existed in two different quarters: among entrepre-
neurs in sectors hit by Japanese competition, and in the workers’ movement. The
latter dreaded unfair competition from workers with very low wages. In the 1930s,
the specter of mass unemployment was never far away. The debate was held in a
highly emotional tone. Yet there were also a number of businesspeople (mostly
exporters) and economists who warned of hysteria and who claimed that the threat
was being wildly exaggerated. The controversy peaked in 1933–1934 and then
gradually calmed down. The anti-Japanese opinion-makers fulminated against the
“dumping” of cheap Japanese goods. According to their views, Japan’s economic
success could only be explained by unfair trade practices. Imperialist Japan needed
more markets and exploited its workers who had to put up with minimum wages
and poor working conditions in “sweatshops.” Books with horror stories, among
them Japan’s Feet of Clay by Freda Utley, a Marxist living in the Soviet Union,
were readily quoted. The implicit conclusion was that commodities made in Japan
should be boycotted. The question of what this would do to Japanese workers was
never addressed, nor was the possibility contemplated to hold talks with Japanese
trade unions in the name of international solidarity.105 
Swedish businessmen in Tokyo and Osaka had a completely different view of 
the purported “economic yellow peril.” They knew only too well that Sweden 
ran a large trade surplus with Japan and was vulnerable to Japanese reprisals if, for 
example, porcelain tariffs were to be raised. Supported by Professor Bertil Ohlin, 
a leading economist, they claimed that the wages of “Oriental workers” had to 
be put into context: the living cost in Japan was very low. Workers also enjoyed 
a number of important fringe benefits that had to be included in order to get a 
realistic picture of the social situation. Anyway, Japan exported a smaller share 
of its production than Sweden did. Ohlin derived the country’s successes not 
from low wages but from the depreciation of the national currency, the yen, in 
December 1931. Furthermore, he added that Japanese firms had invested in new 
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Figure 3.2 Swedish imports & exports to Japan 1931–1937. Source: Data from Honma,
Nihon keizai tōkeishū 1868–1945, 35–47. Note: In million yen. 
While diplomacy and trade with Japan took place under a cloudy sky, both areas,
in fact, grew again around the middle of the decade. According to Swedish trade
statistics, the value of exports to Japan increased rather impressively between 1931
and 1935 from SEK 12,769,967 to SEK 21,924,432.107 Also imports more than
doubled from SEK 3,615,383 to SEK 8,927,033, which, as mentioned, stirred up
resistance from different interest groups inside Sweden. Figure 3.2 shows the same
trend in the statistics as recorded from the Japanese side, denominated in yen.108 
In the protectionist climate of the 1930s, there was ample talk in Stockholm 
and in Tokyo about raising tariff barriers and other methods to artificially decrease 
real or perceived trade deficits. For example, on January 8, 1935, Fujiwara Ginjirō, 
the chief executive of the large paper concern Ōji Seishi, and president of the 
Japanese–Swedish Society (Nichizui kyōkai), held a speech at which he pointed 
out that Swedes did excellent business in Japan whereas Japanese exporters met 
with considerable difficulties in Sweden. As a useful step to create more balanced 
relations and come to grips with the steadily expanding Swedish trade surplus, he 
suggested an official commitment from Stockholm to buy more Japanese com-
modities. Envoy Hultman, who was in the audience, replied at once that Sweden 
did nothing to deter Japanese firms from entering the Swedish market. On the 
contrary, he argued, there existed no trade obstacles.109 Sweden’s envoy blamed 
a lack of Japanese interest in Sweden as an export market for the deficit. If that 
criticism was warranted or not is difficult to say but Swedish trading houses and 
export-oriented firms like SKF feared that Japanese dissatisfaction over the trade 
deficit might lead to retaliation against their products or that it might further 
alienate Sweden’s friends among the Japanese. Fujiwara, for instance, was not 
only the president of the Japanese–Swedish Society, but also the main donor of a 
unique Japanese teahouse that was opened in Stockholm in October 1935. The 
head of SKF, Gösta Guston, therefore, wrote a private letter to assuage Fujiwara 
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treatment to Japanese goods.110 Also when the argument arose against Japanese 
imports that they were produced by the exploitation of cheap labor, Guston was 
among those who vehemently rejected the criticism pointing out the difference 
in living costs and the availability of social welfare programs.111 He was afraid 
of retaliation from the Japanese side, should his country decide to implement 
import restrictions. He also supported the lowering of Swedish tariffs to facilitate 
the sales of goods from East Asia, in the hope of encouraging the Japanese parlia-
ment to follow suit and not slide further into protectionism. In the end, Guston’s 
lobbying did not lead to significantly more imports but that would also not mat-
ter too much as trade continued. New Japanese tariffs in the mid-1930s did not 
hurt Swedish exports while also Sweden’s upwards adjustment of import duties 
on porcelain (1934) was tolerated by Japanese companies as it was not exclusively 
directed at them.112 After all, Tokyo did not lose sight of the big picture: Sweden 
was one of the few remaining liberal bastions in a world of economic national-
ism. Trade figures reflected that. Between 1936 and 1937, the value of Swedish 
exports doubled again. 
Manchukuo and trade realism 
Last but not least, Swedish business was also confronted with the new elephant 
in the room. What to do about Manchukuo? Of course, it was out of the ques-
tion that the Swedish Government would recognize it as a state in any form, 
neither de jure nor de facto. But what did that mean for the business connection 
to the region? Manchukuo, with its 30 million people, could hardly be ignored 
as a market. After all, 15 percent of customs revenue with China had come from 
there.113 But even more importantly, what about the soybean oil? Manchurian 
soybean had been a growth market and had the potential to become strategi-
cally important for the food security of Sweden—something that its diplomats 
in the Japanese Empire not only recognized but emphasized very much. In early 
March 1937, Guston, who also served as Swedish consul in Yokohama, informed 
the new envoy to Japan, Widar Bagge (see Chapter 5), in two letters about the 
situation of soybean exports from Manchukuo. Firstly, shipments from Dairen 
with destination Stockholm had reached an all-time high in the previous year. 
A total of 136,456 tons had left the harbor. The value of that trade was SEK 
20 million.114 In comparison, total imports from Japan proper for the same year 
were merely half that number and the total of imports from China (to which the 
Manchurian imports belonged in the official statistics) was SEK 28 million. Even 
imports from Japan proper that year were worth merely SEK 15.6 million. In 
terms of total trade volume, Manchukuo’s soybeans accounted for roughly 1.2 
percent of all Swedish imports in 1936.115 It was a commodity in high demand, 
as shown in Figure 3.3. Although imports from Manchukuo were certainly not a 
lifeline of the Swedish economy, soybean had become a not unimportant consid-
eration to Swedish trade and diplomacy.116 
Guston’s detailed assessments are an interesting account in this regard. On the 
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Figure 3.3 Growth of soybean imports from Manchukuo to Sweden 1932–1936.
Source: Guston to Bagge, Letter, March 8, 1937 (BA, 230033.2, E4, III). 
a detailed report to his new boss. Officially, Sweden recognized Manchurian soy-
bean only as a produce of China, which is why in the trade statistics it was not 
included in trade with Japan. Also from the Japanese side, the commodity was not 
a Japanese export but one of the “independent” state of Manchukuo. However, 
to diplomatists no such illusions prevailed. It was clear that Swedish imports from 
Manchukuo depended on the good will of Tokyo to export them, and that this 
trade de facto was part of Sweden’s commercial relationship with Japan. Guston, 
in fact, explicitly listed exports from Manchukuo to Sweden under the head-
ing “trade relations between Sweden and the Japanese Empire.”117 As consul he 
was of the opinion that this needed to be kept in mind when negotiating with 
Japanese representatives. He even suggested that the recognition of this trade 
volume might help Sweden to receive favorable export terms with Manchukuo— 
or at least not to be discriminated against when competing with Germany that 
had signed a trade agreement with Manchukuo in April 1936.118 Under such 
unofficial considerations for the size of the Japanese Empire, trade balance tipped 
in favor for it. Guston calculated in the same letter that, all in all, Sweden was run-
ning a trade deficit with the Japanese Empire of ¥2.6 million. To him the strategic 
question was not if Manchukuo should be recognized or not—the political situ-
ation would not allow for such considerations—but how to utilize these figures 
to receive more favorable trade terms? He was convinced about “the importance 
of protecting our interests in this territory as a future valuable export market,”119 
which could be achieved because the “Manchukuo Authorities well recognize 
the necessity of confining any discussion to strictly trade questions, and also that 
the unsatisfactory experience with the German-Manchukuo Trade Agreement 
may invite consideration of Sweden as a substantial buyer of soybeans—a fact 
hitherto not known.”120 Guston never grew tired of emphasizing the importance 
of Manchukuo. In subsequent letters he recommended exploring possibilities for 
Swedish direct investments as well as collaborations with Japanese companies that 









Trade under protest 53 
were remarkably strong for an official representative of Sweden, but they must be 
understood in the context of his personality and the mission he saw himself pro-
moting, namely the increase of trade relations with East Asia. Through his role as 
SKF manager, Guston was well connected within the Japanese business world and 
he had a sharp eye for local conditions. In this sense, he was an idealist-interna-
tionalist businessman, and not a representative of Swedish politics. International 
politics merely set the boundaries within which he and the Swedish business com-
munity operated. Overall, Swedish business was—like Guston—friendly toward 
Japan perceiving Manchukuo not as a threat to principles of international law and 
the life among nation-states, but as an opportunity to strengthen the national 
interest through commerce.122 
Guston’s views were an expression of a general trend in the second half of the 
1930s, namely that trade and diplomacy were becoming even closer bedfellows 
than before. When long-time trade partners started isolating themselves behind 
tariff barriers and other commercial regulations, Sweden was increasingly forced 
to reappraise its trade policy and look for new markets. Official diplomatic chan-
nels became an ever more important instrument in this endeavor. “Our lega-
tions have been converted into business agencies,” Foreign Minister Sandler once 
commented, admitting that the Social Democratic government stood behind this 
export activism. It was his view that “creating stable conditions for our export 
sector must be a main purpose in Swedish foreign policy.”123 In relation to a 
country like Japan this demonstrated that there existed a real dilemma between 
money (full employment and higher living standards for Swedes) and morals (a 
foreign policy that was loyal to the principles of international law). This question 
would grow in importance as living standards inside and outside of Sweden con-
tinued to deteriorate. Sandler, therefore, tried to defend the vital importance of 
foreign trade to the national economy. In his own optimism for idealist goals his 
statements read as if though he almost desperately wanted to believe that trade 
might be another way of building confidence between nations: 
It is necessary that we realize that, as long as Bolshevik, Nazi and Fascist 
dictatorships exist in parallel with democracy, all states must try to find a 
modus vivendi, solve economic problems and maintain the economic bonds 
that we need. We must not cut off the possibilities for peaceful co-existence 
with states having diverging political systems, just because we have a strong 
opinion on their nature.124 
This statement stood in clear contrast to the prevailing viewpoint in the left-
wing of his party, where many objected to trade that was not “politically cor-
rect.”125 Also, the authority of the League of Nations continued to wane. The
disarmament conference of 1932 had foundered on insoluble controversies
between the Great Powers. In 1935, the League was facing a new showdown,
this time because of Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia. The sanctions fiasco made
Sweden and other small states look for an emergency exit. They expressed strong
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return to their traditional policies. Eliel Löfgren’s speech in Geneva on March
3, 1932 had been prophetic. In the summer of 1937, a disillusioned Swedish
Government was slowly reconsidering the benefits of a “true” neutrality policy.
World peace was threatened by an increasing number of hotspots and Geneva
seemed powerless. 
Summary 
The violent expansion of Japan’s Kantō Army into China, which resulted in the 
creation of the artificial state of “Manchukuo,” and a bloody “war in all but 
name,” was not only a serious challenge to the world community but the first 
time that Sweden and Japan found themselves at opposite ends of a diplomatic 
struggle that touched their core interests. In Stockholm, it took months until 
some form of consensus on the crisis emerged. However, once the decision 
to stand resolutely behind the principles of the League of Nations was taken, 
Sweden sent its most apt diplomats to Geneva to forcefully defend a rule-based 
international order and the noble ideas of collective security. For once, countries 
the size of Sweden and Czechoslovakia stood at the forefront of League actions 
against an aggressor state, but that did not meet with much enthusiasm by the 
Great Powers. Britain and France had colonies in the East and did not want to 
risk a confrontation with the Japanese Empire, which also served as a check on 
Chinese nationalism and the influence of the Soviet Union. But to Sweden and 
other states in favor of active internationalism, the situation looked different. The 
long-awaited disarmament conference of the League had started its sessions in 
early 1932 and negotiations demonstrated the vital link between disarmament 
and credible security guarantees. In the opinion of the Swedish Government, 
disarmament was the key issue of their time. If the League could not enforce col-
lective security at this crucial moment, the dream of a peaceful world would have 
to wait for another generation.126 Stockholm, therefore, took the calculated risk 
of alienating Japan for the sake of the power of the League and, in the long run, 
for its own security at home. Unfortunately, this failed. Japan left the League, 
Manchukuo became a fait accompli, collective security was heavily discredited, 
and on top of that, Sweden’s image in Japan deteriorated to that of a “nasty dog” 
that had dared to “bite” Asia’s Great Power. At the same time, however, there 
was no spillover effect from the diplomatic into the commercial realm. Swedish 
business to Japan continued undisturbed. Trade grew significantly until 1937. 
Not even Swedish trade with Manchuria suffered. On the contrary, the very lucra-
tive business with Manchukuo’s soybeans grew manifold, benefitting not only the 
companies engaged in the business but Sweden in general who gained access to a 
food source that would become important in the nutrition-depleted years to fol-
low. The initial fears over Japanese commercial retaliation for Sweden’s political 
opposition to its actions in China turned out to be unfounded. Japan did not try 
to punish Sweden for its position on the world stage. By 1937, the backbone of 
Swedish–Japanese relations remained unchanged. Even under protest, the two 
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Total war in China 
International politics 
A bridge to war 
Fifteen kilometers southwest of Peking there is an impressive stone arch bridge by 
the name of “Lugouqiao” or, as known in the West, the “Marco Polo Bridge.” 
Since 1901, as a result of the colonial open-door policy and in accordance with 
a multilateral treaty, the Boxer Protocol, Japan had the right to station a mili-
tary regiment in the surrounding area. For unknown reasons, on July 7, 1937, 
a handful of Japanese soldiers exchanged fire with Chinese troops. Although 
nobody came to harm, the “Marco Polo Bridge Incident” marked the next stage 
of Japanese belligerency in East Asia. Within days, General Sugiyama Hajime and 
the Japanese military capitalized on the incident to use force against an enemy 
that they had been wanting to fight for a while. Shanghai became a war zone 
when expeditionary forces landed on the Chinese coast as part of an invasion. 
In Japan, the conflict became euphemistically known as the “China Incident,” 
because both sides avoided formal declarations of war.1 That would have trig-
gered US neutrality laws and cut them off from US arms and commodity mar-
kets. History today remembers the “incident” as the Second Sino-Japanese War, 
which lasted for eight years and killed more than 20 million people. 
The first year of the war saw major Japanese victories on the Asian continent. 
Important population centers such as Peking, Tientsin (Tianjin), and Tsingtao 
(Qingdao) were conquered. The International Concession of Shanghai—which 
was a foreigner-administrated part of the city—was left untouched, but the Chinese 
part soon fell to the invading forces. Later, after taking Hangzhou, the Japanese 
marched on Nanking (Nanjing), the capital of the republic, which was defeated 
and occupied on December 13. The Nanking Massacre (Nanjing Massacre), the 
most notorious mass killing of the war, followed.2 After abandoning the inde-
fensible Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Chungking (Chongqing) which 
he made the provisional capital of the Republic. Meanwhile, Japan’s invasion 
expanded. When Canton (Guangzhou) fell in the autumn of 1938, the mili-
tary situation for Chiang became precarious on several fronts.3 For one, the for-
eign invasion greatly strengthened his internal enemy, the Chinese Communist 




several strongholds in the Northwest, which effectively divided the country into 
three parts: a Nationalist (Guomindang) area, a Communist stronghold, and a 
Japanese-occupied zone. Chiang and Communist leader Mao Zedong officially 
cooperated under the umbrella of the Popular Front, but their rivalry continued, 
including armed battles. By the end of 1938, another political fraction emerged 
when Wang Jingwei, the Vice Chairman of Chiang’s Nationalist Party, defected 
to French Indochina and started voicing support for a peace agreement with 
Japan. Tokyo took advantage of this to divide the nationalists and reached an 
agreement with Wang, in 1940, making him the head of a pro-Japanese govern-
ment in Nanking. 
China did not even try to alert the League of Nations until a month after the 
outbreak of hostilities. The disappointment over the Manchukuo affair was still 
running deep. Only on August 30, 1937, Chinese diplomats appealed for the first 
time to Geneva and, on September 12, they called for international action under 
Articles X, XI, and XVI of the Covenant. However, the League could do little 
but express “moral support” and promise to “investigate the possibility” of giving 
assistance. In October, it urged the signatories of the 1922 Nine-Power Treaty— 
among them Sweden—to mediate in the conflict. A conference was summoned 
in Brussels, but Japan declined to participate. The Empire considered the treaty 
a dead letter and even protested against the involvement of states “without sub-
stantial interests in East Asia.”4 The conference ended without significant results. 
A few additional resolutions were adopted but to little avail. A year later, the 
Chungking Government once more appealed to Geneva when, to the surprise 
of many, the Assembly reacted resolutely, issuing an unequivocal call for sanc-
tions on September 30, 1938. However, no member complied with the resolu-
tion and Japan simply severed all remaining ties with the League.5 Only in early 
1939 the military situation stopped deteriorating for Chungking. The Japanese 
invasion came to a stalemate as various Chinese resistance movements resorted to 
guerrilla tactics and the sheer vastness of the Chinese geography started working 
in Chiang’s favor. The more territory the Japanese invaded, the more difficult 
it became for them to secure the long supply routes and control the area. The 
Imperial forces had not planned for a protracted war.6 
National politics 
Swedish foreign policy and the war in East Asia 
Since 1932 the man at the helm of the UD had been Rickard Sandler. His ten-
ure as foreign minister lasted until 1939 with a three months’ interruption only 
in 1936. A Social Democrat who had never belonged to the activist fringe of 
his party, Sandler was not known for his decisiveness. The prominent diplomat 
Erik Boheman once described him as “a sphinx with a sardonic smile uttering 
oracles,” and the British Envoy, Michael Palairet, wrote that he was usually a 
“combination of reticence and affability.”7 For example, in 1936, responding 
to the increasingly urgent question of Sweden’s return to strict neutrality (see 
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Chapter 5), Sandler argued that solidarity and neutrality did not exclude each 
other: Sweden’s loyalty to the League did not mean taking sides in the contro-
versies between Great Powers. Two years later, he warned of a scenario where 
the League itself would become an alliance of nations and that enthusiasts who 
demanded action in the name of democracy were, in fact, only contributing to a 
dangerous division. Sweden, he proclaimed, should stay out of any conflict as its 
first priority, hence also out of conflicts that included the League.8 Whatever the 
foreign minister’s real opinion was on the future of a solidaristic foreign policy 
is hard to deduce and was known probably only to himself. However, what he 
lacked in firmness he compensated through political foresight. Already in spring 
1937, Sandler warned the Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs (UN) in a report 
that “what sort of trouble a Japanese army commander in Northern China could 
stir up and the sequel of such an action cannot be predicted.”9 
While Sandler was usually undecided, his fellow party member Östen Undén 
was still a strong supporter of a collective security approach. As the man who 
had held a central role in Swedish foreign policy in Geneva during the previous 
crisis, he had not given up on the role of the League in taming the Great Powers. 
Although he was no longer part of the Swedish Government, he was still a del-
egate to the diplomatic mission in Geneva, influencing Swedish diplomacy at the 
League.10 
When warfare in China erupted, Sweden was left with few options. It could 
either choose to continue along the same path as it did in the Manchurian and 
Abyssinian crises, working through the League and pushing for resolute collec-
tive security measures, or it could choose to invoke traditional Swedish neutrality 
to avoid a new confrontation. Views about the military developments of the war 
varied. Intelligence implied that China was not as weak as before, and that the 
invasion would hardly be an easy task for Japan. A military attaché reported that 
the Chinese national unity in the face of war was a surprising development and 
that Japan, on the other hand, had to cope with a severe inner division between 
its military and civilians.11 In short, among foreign policymakers, there was no 
clear-cut position toward this renewed Japanese challenge. 
The formal standpoint of the Swedish Government crystalized only over time 
and was finally made official through a report, in 1938. It put the blame for 
the warfare squarely at the feet of Japan, which it described as “having seized 
an occasion to subjugate China with armed force, when the European Great 
Powers and the United States were embroiled in various difficulties.”12 However, 
while the same report described the bombing of cities—a relatively new method 
of warfare—as a violation of international law, atrocities such as the Nanking 
massacre were not mentioned.13 In contrast, considerable space was devoted to 
the Japanese infringements of Western interests. Echoing the colonial views of 
the business community, the main concern of the UD was that the interests of 
“whites” in East Asia would be “supplanted” by those of the Japanese.14 In a 
similar vein, Sandler also once remarked in 1939, “the ancient and immeasurably 
vast China might devour its conquerors.” If the Chinese could win the war on 

















one without any debt of gratitude to Westerners. But whatever the outcome of 
the war, Sweden would experience the effects.15 
Shifting opinions 
Sweden’s official policies remained largely within the bounds of international cus-
tom and were guided by its foreign policy goals. Public opinion, on the other 
hand, was more fluid. Even in 1937, views on Japan still varied greatly among dif-
ferent communities in society. However, compared to 1931, opinions this time 
would change quickly. It is important to keep in mind that the incidents in East 
Asia took place against a backdrop of dramatic international change: economic 
deglobalization, dictatorships on the march, rearmament, and recurring political 
crises in Europe. The rapid European transformation helps to explain some baf-
fling political somersaults of Swedish opinion-makers between 1937 and 1939. 
Staunch pacifists like Lindhagen stopped condemning Japanese expansionism, 
while strong supporters of the League of Nations, like Prime Minister Hansson, 
became neutralists. A pro-business editor-in-chief (Torgny Segerstedt), who had 
earlier tolerated the Kantō Army in Manchuria, turned into a critic of Japan, 
and politicians who had cautioned against the yellow peril were now rallying 
behind the slogan “Asia for Asians.” Another illustrative example is the explorer 
Sven Hedin with his strong political commitment. In the interwar years, he was 
arguably the most well-known Swede in the world. His sympathies were com-
plex: while being a close friend to China he still defended the “unequal trea-
ties,” while his strong allegiance to Nazi Germany also brought him closer to the 
Japanese standpoint. In short, in 1937 the future battle lines were still unclear. 
The Swedish press, for instance, did not equate the Tenno’s Empire with Fascist 
Dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini. The phrase “Japan and the Axis Powers” 
appears repeatedly until 1941.16 
Meanwhile, the optimism of internationalists was shrinking. Only few still
believed that the League of Nations or multilateral cooperation would help small
states. The sinister turn of developments in Europe empowered the voices that
demanded a more cautious and self-reliant foreign policy, and the developments
in Asia supported such calls. From July 1937, there was not a single day with-
out reports about the new conflict between China and Japan. By August, most
newspaper readers had realized that the hostilities formed part of the most seri-
ous war since 1918. In the same month, Pearl Buck’s success novel The Good
Earth,17 which dramatizes family life in rural China, was premiered at the cinemas
in Stockholm. It generated sympathy for a China that was now again the victim
of aggression.18 As in 1931, a good deal of debate ensued on the Sino-Japanese
War, the League of Nations, and the endangered world peace. Journalists and
opinion columnists disagreed on most accounts except for Japan’s role as a driv-
ing force behind the events. The debate in 1937 was strikingly different from
the one six years earlier. Only ultra-right-wingers still upheld illusions about a
“benign” objective behind Japan’s actions. They viewed Japan in a positive light
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For example, the Nya Dagligt Allehanda, one of their mouthpieces, ran an article
arguing that pacifism did not exist in East Asia and that “the Japanese policy in
the Far East cannot be judged according to European standards. Their whole
thinking is different.” The broad mass of the Chinese population, the newspaper
claimed, only wanted calm and security, which was something that Japan could
provide.19 Of course, this was precisely the narrative that Japanese diplomats
had been touting after the Manchurian Incident and which their government
still wanted the rest of the world to believe. Interestingly, there was a divid-
ing line between the ultraconservative faction and outright National Socialists
(the Swedish Nazi party). The latter were strongly influenced by racial thought,
leading them to abhor Japan. Their mouthpiece, Den Svenske Nationalsocialisten
(The Swedish National Socialist), viewed the war in China in conspiratorial
terms. It almost sounded like the German propaganda paper, Der Stürmer, when
it interpreted the war as part of a grand plan for world conquest, designed by the
Mongolian race and carried out with infinite patience over many generations. To
the European whites, it was imperative that colonial rule would remain intact.
If Scandinavia and Britain could rise again, after centuries of decadence, there
would still be some hope the day when the “yellow peril” would strike directly
at the West.20 
The majority of the Swedish press certainly did not use this kind of lan-
guage. The socialist papers were apprehensive. In the Göteborgs Handels- och 
Sjöfartstidning, Japan was sharply attacked as an imitator of Germany and 
especially Italy who took by force what they could not get through diplomacy. 
Almost from the beginning, the invasion was dubbed a “foray” and few observers 
believed Japan would be able to conquer all of China. Milder in its criticism was 
the Nya Dagligt Allehanda, which reported with a rather cool-headed attitude, 
typical of a newspaper framing the world in terms of Realpolitik.21 Mainstream 
media mostly worried that the camp of “hungry states” would unleash an aggres-
sive war against the weak democracies which could lead to another world war. 
Liberal papers agreed, but Torgny Segerstedt formulated the problem in a pecu-
liar (racist) way: if no Western power took action against Japan, it would mean 
the end of white world hegemony. Japan would establish control over East Asia, 
the largest market on earth, and the colored races would rise up also in Africa. 
This would mean that the British and other colonial empires would be a thing of 
the past—something his newspaper branded as bad news for Sweden. Göteborgs 
Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, the paper that previously had criticized Western 
colonialism, had obviously changed its mind when it came to the conclusion that 
British and French rule was beneficial after all. It argued that this would bring the 
Swedes security in a perilous world. If the West could not act from a position of 
strength, its business interests would not stand a chance in the East. Suddenly, 
racial solidarity was paramount also to this paper, as it thought that Asians might 
unite under Japanese leadership. On the other hand, Segerstedt’s liberal newspa-
per also touted democracy. Moreover, the articles were eloquent and very remote 
from the crude style of the Nazi press. Yet, the opinions on the issue of the Sino-
















Much less discussion occurred in parliament. The worsening world situation
and the unreliable mechanism of collective security had created deep disillusion
among the internationalist MPs, normally the ones most eager to discuss for-
eign policy matters. The only exception was Carl Lindhagen, the oldest member
of the Swedish parliament. Nominally, he belonged to the Social Democratic
Party but his speeches on “little Japan, overpopulated and deprived of natural
resources,” were far off the party line. Although he was a pacifist, he also har-
bored strong Pan-Asianist feelings, deeply suspicious of Western colonial power.
That might explain a bizarre statement when he said that Japan had “recuper-
ated Manchuria for the Mongolian nation.”23 He was a left-wing outlier who
chose to believe and repeat Japan’s narrative of the Empire being the only Great
Power in Asia which confronted Western colonialism and the “lawlessness” of
China. Which, ironically, was the same narrative that the ultra-rightists prop-
agated—albeit for very different ideological purposes. Overall, Swedish party
leaders talked less and less about Asia in their public speeches. They were more
preoccupied with the storm clouds over Europe. Just as many had warned, the
failure of the League to solve the Manchurian crisis had also created a dangerous
precedent for Europe. 
A boycott movement and the debate on freezing trade with Japan 
Today the Sino-Japanese War has become most infamous for atrocities like the 
Nanking massacre. However, while it was in progress, the Swedish press mostly 
focused on other topics. Much space was devoted to the war in the air. The 
bombing raids on big cities like Shanghai, Nanking, and Chongqing fomented 
a movement of furious protest all over Europe. Not much fantasy was needed 
to realize that the bombing of civilians could also become a reality in another 
general war in Europe. In fact, it was already happening in Spain, gruesomely 
exemplified by Franco’s leveling of Guernica in the Basque Country. European 
protest usually came from the ranks of Socialists and Liberals, and Christian paci-
fists who were seized by an almost holy wrath because of their strong emotional 
ties to the missionaries in China. By and large, it was the same ideological spec-
trum that had already opposed Japanese actions and voiced protest during the 
Manchurian crisis. Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler was beleaguered by peace 
organizations that wanted him to deliver petitions, statements, and resolutions 
against the indiscriminate bombings of the big cities of China. On October 9, 
the Swedish Committee of the International Peace Campaign visited him and 
demanded urgent application of the League Covenant, restricting trade with 
Japan. Simultaneously, the Ecumenical Board of Sweden started fund-raising for 
war refugees and medical equipment under the name “The China Aid.” Within 
four months, it collected SEK 170,000, which was a respectable sum. Chinese 
Envoy Wang Jingqi effusively praised the Swedish effort in a letter to his own 
government.24 Sandler himself was not completely hostile to the movement but 
resisted its pleas nevertheless. His conviction was that trade issues must be sepa-
rated from ideological preferences—which remained Sweden’s official policy.25 
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Many anti-war activists suspected that the League of Nations would remain 
passive again and that independent initiatives would be needed. That became 
the background for a consumer boycott movement against Japan. Supporters 
and opponents mobilized a catalogue of arguments that was inspired by simi-
lar opinions in the Anglo-Saxon world. For example, in Great Britain a mass 
meeting was held in Albert Hall on October 5, 1937, where representatives 
of the Labour Party urged consumers not to buy Japanese products, while the 
Archbishop of Canterbury denounced the air raids over China as barbaric acts. 
In the United States too, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was organ-
izing a trade boycott. These initiatives were underpinned by the belief that the 
dictatorships were in dire economic straits, and that consumer boycotts could 
have a far-reaching effect. The debate on trade and morals was very much alive 
in 1937 and 1938. The global boycott movement swiftly spread to Sweden 
where the Social Democrats published reports from “the financially and socially 
undermined Japanese Empire.” They referred to Freda Utley, who was by then 
a leading name in the consumer movement and a fierce critic of Japan. While 
many in the movement mainly wanted to express their disappointment with the 
failure of the League’s sanctions system—even accusing the League of appease-
ment—there also was an ideologically motivated belief in the power of ordinary 
people. Some wanted to resuscitate the old idea of a workers’ blockade, a form 
of grass-root level sanctions.26 In Gothenburg, the Association of Free-minded 
Women adopted a manifesto urging Swedish, British, and American custom-
ers not to buy Japanese goods. On October 8, just three days after the rally in 
London, the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions (LO) and the board of the 
Social Democratic Party made statements that endorsed the appeal. It was clear 
to most, however, that putting the boycott into practice would be no easy feat. 
Without origin marking of products in the stores, how could consumers know 
what goods were actually Japanese? But supporters of the boycott movement 
rarely contemplated the practical difficulties of their demands. Japan’s economy 
was believed to be in extremely bad shape. Thus, some activists presumed the 
problem would “solve itself” with just a little help from the outside. However, 
prospects for the movement were not good. The LO had launched a trade boy-
cott of its own against Germany, in 1933, without official endorsement from 
the Social Democratic Party. This campaign had met with little success, which 
led some well-known internationalists, like Elin Wägner, a pioneer for women’s 
rights, to dismiss the new boycott against Japan. Attempts to obstruct trade would 
hardly aid the Japanese opposition but rather bolster the forces behind militarism, 
she wrote.27 The population would only close ranks behind their government. 
Other voices deplored the lack of dialogue between Western liberals and Japanese 
anti-militarists, and some representatives of organized labor expressed misgivings 
about unemployment in Europe if a boycott escalated into trade war.28 
Unsurprisingly, also Swedish exports came under scrutiny. Mauritz Enander, 
the editor of Informationsbyrån Mellanfolkligt Samarbete för Fred (Information 
Bureau on the International Co-operation for Peace), indirectly accused Sweden 
























most popular in Japan were products essential for waging war. Exports to this 
Asian Great Power certainly yielded profits but they were not all that important to 
the national household. Anyway, Swedish industry received and served so many 
orders that it could not satisfy all customers—a clear sign of Sweden’s compla-
cency with Japanese actions, in Enander’s eyes.29 
An interesting sideshow of this debate was a somewhat different campaign 
against the planned Tokyo Olympic Games of 1940. Should a country that was 
invading its neighbor be allowed to host the world’s foremost peace event? In 
summer 1938, the Swedish Olympic Committee received an open letter from 
a number of (left-wing) youth organizations, among them some Christian 
and teetotaler associations. They questioned Swedish participation in activities 
which would obviously serve Japanese propaganda. However, before the ques-
tion reached a point of a true discussion, the issue disappeared from the agenda. 
In July 1938, Japan relinquished its right to arrange the Olympics—probably 
not over Western indignation but because the costs of building an arena would 
have strained the national budget at a moment when nationalistic priorities were 
clearly with the Army and Navy.30 
While the boycott movement did have some momentum, it never convinced
a majority of the Swedish public. Many remained skeptical of consumer action,
like Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, which declined to comment on the
question in its editorials. Liberal papers even pointed to the utter futility of try-
ing to isolate Japan. “The eagerness to boycott Japan died quickly in Britain.
Business and most newspapers oppose the movement,” declared a headline
already on October 15, 1937.31 Torgny Segerstedt had called for Western action
against Tokyo but, evidently, hoped for political measures that would not pri-
marily hit trade. After all, his newspaper represented the commercial circles of
Gothenburg. Right-wing newspapers such as Nya Dagligt Allehanda scorned
peace activists who wanted to cure evil with something even worse. A nation at
war would never sign a ceasefire just because a few foreign countries expressed
their moral indignation. The paper declared that those who feared aerial bom-
bardment in Europe had better turn to Bofors, the Swedish manufacturer of
modern anti-aircraft guns.32 The paper was joined in its criticism by the chair-
man of the Conservatives, Gösta Bagge. He denounced the movement as engag-
ing in “private foreign policy,” which he thought was meddling in the work of
diplomats and statesmen that would do more harm than good.33 Sure enough,
enthusiasm for a consumer’s boycott against Japan soon abated. It was eclipsed
by indignation over the developments in the Spanish Civil War. The issue was
raised in earnest only once more in the parliamentary sessions of spring 1938
when the Communists demanded mandatory origin marking of imported prod-
ucts. However, their request was rejected as a violation of existing agreements.34 
In the end, the movement disappeared and there is no evidence that it had an
impact on Swedish foreign trade. Soon, news about Japan’s war in China died
down. There were still sporadic reports about gas attacks against Chinese troops
and civilians, and in autumn 1938, detailed accounts about the Nanking massa-
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anymore.35 After a year, the initial indignation had exhausted itself and the war
in the East was overshadowed by the conflicts closer to home. Chamberlain was
now on his way to Munich. 
The corporate world and the confict 
In stark contrast to the boycott movement, the Swedish business community 
not only clung to basic optimism about trade but even argued in favor of Japan. 
Swedish businessmen viewed Japan as a guarantor of order and stability in the 
East, unlike China which they often portrayed as suffering from irresponsible 
nationalism that was paving the way for Sovietization.36 This perception was espe-
cially common in Sweden before 1931 and the business community did not sub-
stantially revise its views even after the Mukden Incident. Most Swedish firms in 
China seem to have welcomed the Japanese conquest. However they had mixed 
feelings toward the realities of military occupation. Some observers worried that 
“the open-door policy” would be abolished and that the Japanese would install 
themselves as the new masters of the Middle Kingdom. Westerners would then 
see their opportunities limited step by step. We can find such views in a letter 
written in autumn 1938, by Sigurd Yngve Eurén. He was the executive of the 
American Far Eastern Match Co. in Shanghai—which was actually a subsidiary 
of the Swedish Match Corporation (STAB). Eurén worried about the future after 
the war, but he mainly blamed the Western Powers for the situation. They had 
encouraged the undemocratic Nanking regime and missed the chance of com-
ing to an understanding with Japan. Eurén also believed that the Chinese in 
Manchuria and other places would have a better future under foreign rule than 
under their own government. Still, he was not confident about Swedish prospects 
in the country. More optimism was voiced by a representative of Ekman Foreign 
Agencies Ltd. who believed a Japanese victory was within reach and that this 
would create a unique market opportunity for foreign firms already established 
in China.37 Such arch-liberal ideologies strictly separated politics and business, 
believing that nearly all trade was apolitical in nature. They were, therefore, little 
concerned with the political (or moral) nature of business opportunities, even 
when operating in an environment shaped by belligerency. 
Another example of a Swedish apologist of Japan’s actions was Robert Thune 
at Gadelius. He claimed that the Japanese economy was in good shape (he dis-
missed all rumors about inflation) and that the citizens of Japan stood behind 
their government, which he thought had no ambitions to conquer territory on the 
continent. Like the far-left politician Carl Lindhagen, the business-liberal Thune 
also chimed into the Japanese narrative that it was just natural that a country with 
such a large population needed more resources. Communism and Fascism, Thune 
believed, were ideologies alien to Japan, and foreigners were still well-treated.38 
Other leaders of Swedish businesses in Japan agreed. For instance, Gösta Guston, 
the representative of SKF, and Swedish honorary consul in Yokohama, published 
an article in 1939 in the Svensk Tidskrift (The Swedish Journal) arguing that 




populace they [the Japanese] hope to raise the standards of living to a level where 
the Chinese can buy Japanese articles to a desirable extent and also adopt a more 
conciliatory attitude to the men of ‘the new order’.”39 Gösta Guston, too, rea-
soned in purely economic terms. He saw the invasion of China as nothing other 
than a way of securing an outlet for Japanese products and improving the purchas-
ing power of Chinese customers. The towering menace, according to Guston, 
was Communism—in the shape of Chiang Kai-shek! The SKF representative and 
honorary consul, took the view of the Japanese Government that Chiang was 
but the scourge of the Communists. According to Guston, the Japanese planned 
to police China “by ultramodern motorization and strong air fleets,” and he 
added that such occupation forces would not need to “be so numerous as to dis-
turb.”40 His first priority was business, not the civilian population. On October 
5, 1937, during a meeting between leading Swedish businessmen and the new 
envoy to Japan, Widar Bagge, Guston expanded on his optimistic assessment, 
stating that he thought the war had opened opportunities to sell substantially 
more steel to Japan than before. Other members of the meeting were more criti-
cal—albeit not critical toward Japanese actions. Nils Ericson, the Carl Ekman & 
Co representative, stated bluntly that the major obstacle to prosperous business 
in this market was “the unfortunate effect of Sweden’s present political attitude 
towards Japan,” by which he meant Sweden’s criticism at the League of Nations. 
Envoy Bagge tried to ward off the accusation by saying that foreign policy was 
beyond the agenda of the meeting, but Ericson reiterated his point, stating that 
Swedish foreign policy was highly relevant because in Manchukuo the Japanese 
clearly favored the Germans and never the Swedes. Guston objected saying that 
the Japanese were buying what they needed and cared little about the country of 
origin. In the end, Bagge closed the awkward topic by promising that he would 
do anything necessary in order to assist Swedish business—nota bene in Japan 
and Manchukuo.41 
The October meeting shows not only how Japan-friendly Swedish business in 
the Empire was but how diplomacy, policy, and trade started converging as the 
security situation in East Asia deteriorated. All in all, it was a delicate moment, 
considering that Sweden did not recognize Manchukuo nor any changes in China 
brought about by force. Envoy Bagge was caught in the middle between the posi-
tion of his government and the demands of the business community. However, 
compared to his predecessor, J.E.E. Hultman, Bagge was clearly more inclined 
to cultivate a closer relationship not only with Swedish business in Japan but 
also to the parts of East Asia that were under Japan’s de facto control. He even 
promised to turn to the Parliamentary Treaty Committee concerning Swedish 
trade with Manchukuo. He wanted to ask for a report about possible measures 
for establishing state control of soybean imports. He had planned to use such a 
document as a bargaining chip with the Gaimushō to help Swedish exporters in 
Manchukuo.42 But even with this far-reaching pledge, it was not easy to satisfy 
the impatient Swedish businessmen. In spring 1938, Bagge indignantly reported 
that Guston, Ericson, and Ingemar Tennberg, the Gadelius representative, had 
acted behind his back when they entered into direct negotiations with authorities 
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in Manchukuo, especially with Director Matsushima Kan, the Japanese head of 
the Manchurian Agricultural Product Institute. Guston, who in his capacity as 
Swedish Honorary Consul visited the Kantō Leased Territory (the part of main-
land China that Japan legally controlled), had promised Bagge that he would not 
go further than to the port city of Dairen. But, in utter disregard of that promise, 
he traveled to Hsinking (Xinjing/Changchun), the Manchurian capital. This act 
of defiance was so grave that Bagge had to write a letter to the UD to explain the 
incident and apologize.43 Luckily, the affair passed fairly unnoticed internation-
ally and there is no evidence that Guston or the other businessmen were given 
an official reprimand. After all, Bagge and the business community were on the 
same side, agreeing on the goals of Swedish trade diplomacy—just not always on 
the means. 
Another noteworthy episode occurred in spring 1938, when the financial 
magnate, Axel Wenner-Gren, the chairman of the board of Electrolux (a leading 
home appliance manufacturer), visited Tokyo. He arrived on board his luxury 
yacht, which attracted much media attention. For Japanese newspapers, it was a 
glamorous episode in the midst of wartime restrictions. Among other statements, 
the financier reportedly promised that a full Swedish trade delegation would 
be sent to Japan and Manchukuo, although he also added that he was “not 
directly related to this matter.” He also talked openly about bartering Swedish 
steel and Manchurian soybeans and that he would be holding “important talks” 
with Foreign Minister Hirota and Trade Minister Yoshino. Envoy Bagge was 
understandably annoyed as he had to vehemently correct these statements and 
clarify that Wenner-Gren was not a representative of the Swedish Government as 
he had made it seem.44 This affair, again, shows how Swedish business did not 
worry much about Japanese belligerency in China. The warfare hardly dampened 
Swedish commercial enthusiasm, at least not as long as it seemed to generate 
opportunities for their ventures. 
Diplomacy 
Attempting a League response—again 
When hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge began, the prospects for a collective 
security endeavor through the League of Nations were unclear. The attempt of 
applying sanctions against Italy (1936) had already failed miserably. Stockholm 
was mostly looking toward London and Paris and their willingness to commit 
military resources to East Asia.45 However, neither Great Power was willing to risk 
confrontation.46 This became the leading argument for proponents of a cautious 
Swedish foreign policy. That is why on September 2, 1937, when the Chinese 
Minister to Switzerland, Hu Shize, presented his country’s version of the “inci-
dent” with a plea for support, the Swedish Envoy, Karl Ivan Westman, was unable 
to commit to diplomatic action. Privately, there was no doubt about the situa-
tion. In his report, Westman wrote that he had no illusions and that the confron-




This was clearly a case for the League under Article XVI of the Covenant.47 His 
government, on the other hand, was weary about commitments. Only after the 
League had begun discussing the case did Stockholm deliberate internally on a 
course of action. Not surprisingly, its position remained vague and ambiguous. 
As a compromise between those who still believed in collective security and 
those who did not, a consensus was finally reached, to the extent that Sweden 
should not hesitate in its support for a firm attitude toward Japan, but that it 
should act as discreetly as possible. Consequently, the instructions that Westman 
received from his ministry stated that the government was prepared to observe 
the League’s rules but only “in the light of gained experience of how they have 
been put into practice.” Westman should voice critique on Japan but should not 
demand any measures. Stockholm was not willing to expose itself again through 
a call for sanctions.48 This awkward positioning stands in strong contrast to 1932, 
when the Swedish consensus was that everything possible should be done to 
openly support the League’s collective security mission. By 1937, Swedish expec-
tations toward the League were low.49 
It is worth noting that this cautious approach of the UD was not unchal-
lenged. Internally, there were still a number of internationalist parliamentarians 
with rather strong anti-Japanese opinions who wanted to see a more resolute 
Swedish position in Geneva—most of them Social Democrats. The political left 
felt a strong repugnance to Tokyo’s imperialism that stood for everything they 
detested. In addition, the fear among unionized workers of low-wage Asian 
competition had made Japan even more unpopular. Even the Prime Minister 
voiced support for a condemnation of Japan’s methods of warfare. Meanwhile, 
on September 28, 1937, the League adopted a resolution against aerial bombard-
ment, which saved the UD’s approach as Sweden was not pushed to stand out 
through an initiative of its own. 
On September 30, Sweden was elected to one of the subcommittees of the 
23-member committee, which had been appointed by the League in 1933 to 
handle the conflict over Manchuria. This became another awkward affair for 
Swedish diplomats. “Of course we did not lift a finger to get into the subcom-
mittee, yet we were nominated,” reported Westman. The decision to accept the 
nomination was taken only after consulting with Östen Undén who agreed to 
represent Sweden in the committee. Undén had not yet given up his activism and 
wanted to take a resolute stance. Aware of the severity of the situation, he pushed 
the subcommittee to show its teeth by calling for a declaration that would state 
clearly that Japan had resorted to force on Chinese territory and, therefore, that 
it had violated the Covenant of the League. Had that proposal been accepted, 
Japan would have been thrown immediately back into the spotlight as a violator 
of Article XVI. But nobody, not even the Soviet delegate, seemed willing to go 
that far. The British spokesman retorted that the situation in China was compli-
cated and it must not be forgotten that Japan had treaty rights to keep soldiers 
on Chinese soil. With no support from any Great Power, Undén was arguing for 
a lost cause. The paradigmatic positions of 1932 remained unchanged.50 The fol-
lowing resolution of the subcommittee, adopted in a plenary session on October 
  
 
Fading protest 73 
6, did not contain any demands for sanctions. Its only “strength” was that it did 
not create a compromise with the Japanese standpoint. Members were asked to 
refrain from action that could diminish China’s ability to resist Japanese actions.51 
Thus, the League could claim that at least morally it supported China, which 
mirrored the UD’s preferences. On the other hand, the resolution also included 
a paragraph that stipulated further deliberations under the provisions of the Nine-
Power Treaty of 1922, which meant that Sweden, as a signatory of the treaty, 
would have to appear in the limelight again—a rather unwelcome development 
to the prudent UD.52 
A conference without a compass 
During the preparations for the conference, it was once more Undén who was 
the most optimistic voice at the UD. He had outlined a policy proposal about 
the opportunities for Sweden to positively influence world affairs and refuted the 
negative attitudes that he had heard from the Norwegian foreign minister.53 He 
still had faith in the idea of collective security. That was, however, a minority 
view. Most of his colleagues were decidedly less enthusiastic. Not even Foreign 
Minister Sandler thought much of the conference. Hans Beck-Friis, the head of 
the Political Section at the UD, even hoped the conference would make a distinc-
tion between the original signatories and countries that had acceded to the treaty 
afterwards—like Sweden. That way, the Swedish delegation would have been 
justified in taking a passive attitude on all political issues. To him, the only advan-
tage of the conference was the chance to discuss commercial navigation in the Far 
East.54 In all fairness, Sweden was not alone in its lackluster attitude. Several small 
states had given their representatives instructions not to take initiatives.55 The 
signals from France and Britain were anything but positive and some commenta-
tors were already hinting at the conference becoming a second Non-Intervention 
Committee, which was the policy of the European states not to intervene in the 
Spanish Civil War. That policy ended up directly benefitting the aggressor—and 
later dictator—Francisco Franco.56 
This time, Undén was not appointed to head the Swedish delegation to the 
conference. Following the Danish example, Stockholm nominated its envoy to 
Brussels, the career diplomat Gustaf von Dardel, to the job. He was accompa-
nied by only one aide from his legation (the secretary C.F. Wachtmeister). In 
contrast, three of the Great Powers sent their foreign ministers: Anthony Eden 
(Britain), Yvon Delbos (France), and Maksim Litvinov (Soviet Union).57 In the 
case of France and Britain, they were accompanied by over a dozen high-ranking 
statesmen and diplomats. Even the United States sent one of its most skilled 
negotiators, ambassador to the League of Nations, Norman Davis, together with 
three more diplomats to Brussels.58 Sweden’s meager contribution was thus a 
clear message that it was not even contemplating to take a meaningful initiative. 
The conference suffered from bigger problems than Swedish disinterest. 
When it opened on November 3, 1937, the most important seat at the table was 




the League of Nations, an organization to which it did not belong anymore and 
that had several times adopted resolutions that Japan deemed unfriendly. Against 
all expectations, Britain, France, and the United States took a firm stance. They 
stated that the conflict in the Far East was a relevant question for the treaty pow-
ers and for all the world. They also observed that China was showing its prepar-
edness for discussions whereas Japan was refusing to do the same. According to 
their resolution draft, the treaty powers were urged to hammer out a “joint pol-
icy” against a country that did not recognize its international obligations, which 
was a thinly veiled threat against Japan. For once, the small states were caught 
off guard. Contrary to their previous behavior, this time it was they who tried to 
soften the language. Sweden put forward a suggestion that the word “joint” be 
deleted from the declaration. This did not satisfy the Norwegians who thought 
the declaration was too far-reaching even with this revision. In the end, Norway 
and Denmark abstained from voting. Sandler ordered von Dardel to do the same. 
The Scandinavians assured that they were fundamentally in agreement but did 
not have the same “political interests in the Far East as certain other powers.”59 
In spite of the three abstentions, the declaration was adopted on November 16. 
Fifteen countries voted for and one (Italy) voted against.60 
Stockholm’s U-turn did not go unnoticed. Just a few weeks earlier, Undén 
had worked energetically to achieve a resolution that would have brandished 
Japan’s actions as illegal, but now Sweden seemed to have given up its attempts 
at being a “moral Great Power.” It did not take long before the Chinese reac-
tion arrived: Nanking accused the Swedish delegate of being pro-Japanese, and 
the envoy of the Republic of China protested in Stockholm. By way of the lega-
tion in Shanghai, the Swedish Government attempted to assuage the Chinese. It 
conveyed the message that Sweden fully supported the Brussels resolution but 
the only reason it had not voted affirmatively was that it did not belong to the 
inner circle of treaty powers. It was a transparent excuse, especially since a num-
ber of other small countries—Belgium, for instance—had voted for the declara-
tion.61 There were even negative reactions from the League secretariat in Geneva, 
despite its officials being supposed not to take a political stance. F.P. Walters, an 
influential figure in the League bureaucracy, approached Envoy Westman with 
the question of what was behind the new Swedish standpoint. He did not get a 
clear answer.62 
For the last round of conference negotiations that dealt with the question 
what actions the committee should take, the UD instructed von Dardel to pas-
sivity in all situations—except when that could be construed as tacit consent for 
action. Whenever needed, the envoy was supposed to cite the necessity of con-
sulting with Stockholm.63 Certainly this policy—or lack thereof—was dictated by 
Sandler and not Undén. The Scandinavians could breathe a sigh of relief when 
it turned out that the proposed final declaration did not translate into concrete 
sanctions against Japan. Even the Norwegian representative voiced nothing more 
than a few objections to some formalities. Sandler, who in a conversation with 
Delbos had stressed the importance of “adaptation to realities,” described the 
document as “totally harmless.”64 The second Brussels declaration was adopted 
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without any complications (except for the isolated Italian negative vote) and, on 
November 24, the conference was adjourned indefinitely.65 
Sweden had kept such a low profile during the entire conference that von 
Dardel did not deliver even a single speech.66 Naturally, Chiang Kai-shek’s 
government did not conceal its immense disappointment. Envoy Hu Shize, 
in Switzerland, blamed the Scandinavian passivity on bad influence from 
Norwegian politicians and remarked sardonically that the “common policy” of 
the Scandinavian delegates had confined itself to booking return tickets back 
home.67 The Japanese press, on the other hand, commented with surprise and 
joy, with Ambassador Kurusu Saburō going as far as reporting that the lack of 
response from the Scandinavians was an important factor behind the failure of 
the conference.68 Domestically, Sweden’s official stance met with little resistance. 
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning held that it would have been madness to 
support British declarations that were not meant seriously.69 Whether it was pru-
dence, cowardice, or just realism, the bitter fact remained that also this attempt at 
conflict management had spiraled into a complete fiasco. Instead of finding a way 
of supporting the Republic of China, the conference ended up signaling to the 
world that Great and Small Powers alike accepted the situation in the East and 
that nobody was willing to help. 
Sweden and the new order in Asia 
In the late 1930s, the wind was blowing in the direction of the Axis Powers. The 
League of Nations formally dissociated itself from the Treaty of Versailles, many 
states—including Sweden—recognized Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia which had 
occurred in violation of the Covenant. Meanwhile, Germany and Italy recognized 
Manchukuo. Other nations, most prominently Great Britain, were expected to fol-
low suit, although London never did so, due to the sudden onset of tension with 
Japan in 1939. Likewise, Sweden never recognized Manchukuo but after 1937, 
the center of Swedish diplomacy in China, Shanghai, fell behind the Japanese 
lines. Envoy Johan Beck-Friis was recalled in 1939. Foreign Minister Sandler 
decided not to appoint a successor, which meant that for five years, Swedish inter-
ests would be safeguarded by temporary chargés d’affaires. Stockholm decided 
not to open diplomatic relations with Wang Jingwei’s National Government, or 
any regime under Japanese tutelage.70 
Nevertheless, Japan’s actions did cause a rethinking of some of Sweden’s colo-
nial-era policies. The famous radio address of Premier Konoe, on November 3, 
1938, in which he announced a “new order in Asia” triggered a debate about 
the future of the unequal treaties that were still in force—especially the trade and 
navigation pacts concluded with China in the decades after the Opium War. The 
wish to revise and eventually abolish the old treaties had been a perennial Chinese 
foreign policy objective. Ironically, with Tokyo laying claim to all of East Asia, 
that had now become Japanese policy, too. In Sweden, a top-secret investiga-
tion on possibilities to scrap the treaty with China had been carried out as early 






























principle that foreigners were not subject to local law. The investigation con-
cluded that the time for revision had not yet come, but after Konoe’s speech, 
Swedish decision makers abandoned the colonial mindset nevertheless.71 When 
Sweden concluded a new trade agreement with Siam (Thailand), in 1938, it was 
negotiated on the basis of full equality.72 
In Swedish newspapers and journals, the debate on Far Eastern affairs contin-
ued. The Japanese Government kept an eye on public opinion in Scandinavia but 
seemed to have refrained from all forms of political propaganda—in stark contrast 
to Germany, which used different forums to actively influence popular opinion. 
There was not even a diplomatic protest from Tokyo after the Swedish delega-
tion had voted in favor of the League’s resolutions of 1937. Tokyo most likely 
considered the League at that point as insignificant and did not think of dialogue 
with Sweden on these matters worthwhile.73 
Crisis management: protecting Swedish interests in the warzones 
In terms of consular diplomacy, the warfare in China created new challenges to
Swedish diplomats on the ground. Similar to natural disasters, during wartime,
too, governments are obliged to protect their citizens, and they usually attempt to
safeguard their interests. In the early days of the conflict, Sweden only had to save
a few residents in the Chinese coastal provinces where danger was most imminent.
But soon, more Swedes in the inland districts (mostly missionaries) were in dire
need of protection. They got caught in the crossfire between Chinese and Japanese
troops and their property got destroyed in air raids. Also, the business communi-
ties in the treaty ports saw their economic prospects deteriorate sharply as the
security situation worsened. During the battle for Shanghai, a Swedish sailor died
and lots of Swedish property was destroyed or damaged. The situation did not
improve much once the Japanese forces had secured their positions. Foreigners
were treated with suspicion and one Swedish businessman, K.G. Söderblom, was
even arrested on charges of espionage.74 Emergency measures by the Swedish
Government included selective evacuations (a general evacuation of all Swedes was
never contemplated), protection of property, and, sometimes, diplomatic protests
against belligerent actions, with which Sweden was not alone. Japan’s military
measures in China soon came into conflict with the interests of other European
and American neutrals. The sea blockade of China, for instance, was against inter-
national law, and Western Powers were adamant not to have it. They protested
the blockade and secured their concessions in China with their own navies, which
became another source of conflict. For instance, when the Japanese Navy attacked
and sank a US gunboat, the USS Panay, on December 12, 1937, alongside three
US merchant ships on the Yangtze River, Washington protested ferociously. The
case was highly sensitive because the Panay clearly displayed the US flag, which
made an accidental attack improbable. At the same time, until today, there is no
evidence that the sinking was the result of a Japanese Government-sanctioned
strategy. Speculations remain that the attack came at the hands of rogue officers
in the Japanese Navy aiming at provoking a confrontation.75 Since Tokyo did not
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condone military actions against neutrals, the Gaimushō swiftly apologized and
agreed to pay indemnities, averting more bad blood with the United States.76 
Stockholm, in contrast, was usually careful not to get caught in the crossfire 
nor anger Tokyo too much with its protests. When Japan proclaimed that its 
navy would inspect vessels of third (neutral) nations on the high sea to make sure 
that they did not carry contraband, Sweden replied in a diplomatic note that it 
did not view these wartime measures as anything new.77 The UD probably still 
remembered that this was the same policy that Britain had implemented during 
its blockade of Germany in World War I. Over the next three years, Sweden took 
pains to follow the Japanese instructions to avoid political clashes over seized ves-
sels. That came at the price of the free movement of its merchant fleet.78 
Another problem emerged in September 1937, when Japan demanded a list 
of Swedish cultural institutions (schools, churches, and hospitals) in China. At 
first, Stockholm hesitated to provide such information, fearing a negative impact 
for these establishments. In a note from October 4, the Foreign Ministry only 
answered that Swedish property had already been damaged in Shanghai and that 
the Cabinet reserved the right to claim indemnities. In turn, Tokyo disavowed 
itself from any responsibility for damage that might occur if it was not informed 
about the location of Swedish property in advance. In view of the real threat 
of bombings or looting, the UD, in the end, decided to send some lists to the 
Japanese that indicated Swedish establishments in war zones, but without detailed 
maps. The UD emphasized that since international law prohibited aerial bom-
bardments of civilian institutions, there was no need for Japan to know the exact 
geographic position of churches and schools.79 It also declined to give a complete 
inventory, since this could be interpreted as Sweden expecting a Japanese victory 
of the war. 
Lastly, although dangers to Swedish citizens and their property came mainly 
from Japan, the UD was aware that transgressions from the Chinese side could 
not be ruled out either. Especially since international law demanded that neutral 
states practice impartiality, Minister Sandler made a point of equal diplomatic 
practice toward both sides. A note with a warning of possible Swedish claims 
for indemnities was sent to both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments in 
March 1938. However, the nature of the aggressive war meant that most cases 
occurred only with Japan. In theory, this behavior did not favor any belligerent 
but in practice Sweden’s diplomatic protests mostly benefitted China. Whereas 
disputes over war damage with Japan were not infrequent, wartime relation with 
the Republic of China was generally unproblematic. Only rarely did Swedish dip-
lomats intervene toward Chinese authorities.80 
Trade 
Commercial diffculties begin: from pulp to guns 
1937 had started surprisingly well for Swedish business with East Asia, booming 
until summer. Export and import orders from Japan and China hit record levels, 
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keeping the Ostasiatiska Kompaniet so busy that, for a while, it had to charter 
foreign vessels to keep pace with demand. But when fighting in China ensued, 
Sweden’s trade interests were hit hard. Especially the collapse of Shanghai’s for-
eign trade and Japan’s decision to introduce licensing of all import goods came 
as a shock. The flow of Swedish wood pulp to East Asia and of soy products 
back home was directly threatened. The waters off the Chinese coast were no 
longer safe and freight costs rose steeply as risk compensation fees for sailors had 
to be raised and insurance premiums went up. Ostasiatiska Kompaniet was par-
ticularly hard hit as it was in the midst of expanding its fleet. The M/S Nippon 
and M/S Ningpo were to be deployed shortly—the proud result of considerable 
investment.81 The outbreak of warfare impacted shipowners negatively across the 
board. Swedish vessels in Chinese waters had to be painted scarlet red to avoid 
accidental bombing by the Japanese air force. In August, China announced that 
certain parts of the Yangzi River would be closed to foreign ships. Japan retali-
ated by proclaiming a blockade against all Chinese vessels between the 23rd and 
32nd latitudes. The blockade was soon extended to include the whole coastline 
and Japan reserved the right to detain ships with uncertain nationality, which 
meant that European and American vessels had to reckon with inspections at 
sea.82 Assurances from Tokyo that the peaceful commerce of neutral countries 
would not be hindered were generally greeted with skepticism and proved, sure 
enough, empty as even after the conquest of the Yangzi River valley only Japanese 
ships were allowed to navigate freely. In August 1938, the M/S Ningpo was cap-
tured by a Japanese destroyer and the crew was interrogated. The episode drove 
home the point that Japan firmly established itself as regional hegemon. 
However, prospects were not all rosy for the Empire. For one, Japan was 
running out of foreign currency. Soon, it required trading companies to accept 
half of all payments in yen. This was another unwelcome development for the 
shipowners who had little use for Japanese currency. Tokyo even demanded that 
import goods ought to be transported on Japanese keels and threatened to with-
draw import licenses if the advice was not heeded. At the same time, the Japanese 
shipping line Nippon Yūsen Kaisha (NYK) wanted a larger share of the foreign 
market and insisted on access to Scandinavian ports. On November 19, 1938, 
an agreement was concluded between the NYK and the Ostasiatiska Kompaniet 
(together with the Danish and Norwegian counterparts), to grant the Japanese 
firm up to six departures per year. Already at the end of the month, the inhabit-
ants of Gothenburg could watch the “Yasukuni-maru” loading 1,500 tons of 
rayon pulp at their harbor.83 
The controversial arms trade with China also continued after 1937 and threat-
ened to sour relations between Stockholm and Tokyo further. The Chinese 
imported gunpowder and especially the much sought-after Bofors anti-aircraft 
guns. The weapons export was legitimized by the League of Nations resolutions 
of 1933 and 1938, which stated that China had the right to access foreign arma-
ment industries, since it was not in breach of the Covenant. For Sweden, this was 
a convenient rhetoric to justify uninterrupted income from the lucrative arms 
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Reich and Soviet Russia principally sold weapons to China, American compa-
nies sold to Japan, and Great Britain to both sides simultaneously.85 Besides, 
Sweden also assisted China with medicine, healthcare articles, and surgical equip-
ment.86 The self-interest characteristic of Swedish companies went both ways. 
On September 4, 1937, Sandler had a talk with Japanese Envoy Kuriyama and 
discussed the naval blockade of China when the delicate question about weap-
ons exports to Chiang’s regime surfaced. In reply to Kuriyama’s inquiry whether 
Swedish vessels supplied arms to China, Sandler assured that there were no such 
transports as far as he knew. That was a very evasive answer since Sandler was 
aware that most Swedish arms were simply transported on board German ships. 
The envoy did not ask further questions but according to the notes of the UD, 
Sandler was prepared to defend Sweden’s right to give export licenses to the 
weapons industry.87 The Japanese side was well aware that Sweden contributed to 
China’s defense, but it was also clear that its companies sold a range of important 
articles to the Japanese armaments industry: iron and steel products, including 
ball bearings.88 Tokyo, therefore, never requested the end of Swedish trade with 
its enemy, since, if applied impartially, this would have damaged Japan’s interests 
too. In September 1939, the arms trade with China came to an end nevertheless, 
after Sweden’s national emergency laws reserved arms and munitions for domestic 
defense. Orders from foreign customers were annulled. Besides, the sea journey 
to Asia became hazardous after the British and French colonial empires entered 
the war in Europe. In February 1940, the Ostasiatiska Kompaniet declared that 
they intended to send Swedish gunpowder to China on the steamer Formosa, but 
just a few weeks later, the extension of the war zone and the laying of a mine bar-
rage in Skagerrak paralyzed Swedish sea traffic. The last known Chinese request 
for Swedish arms arrived there on September 27, 1940.89 
Trade with Japan 
Despite the deterioration of the situation on the high seas, Swedish policymakers 
remained optimistic in the beginning about global trade. A 1938 report by the 
export trade commission even held that outside of Europe, the United States, 
Argentina, and Japan would be Sweden’s most important export markets.90 The 
hopeful assessment for Japan was mainly based on record trade numbers of the 
previous year when export numbers had more than doubled. In reality, however, 
trade was shrinking. On the one hand, traditional Japanese exports like textiles 
were not important to the war economy after 1937, and were produced at lesser 
quantities, which also meant that less textiles were available for export.91 On the 
other hand, import hurdles multiplied after the warfare with China started, mak-
ing it harder for Swedish goods to reach consumers in the East. Japan used to 
be a market where Swedish business was able to operate rather freely, without 
restrictions like quotas or currency controls, but the warfare upended these con-
ditions. Not only did Japan start limiting imports through a new licensing system 
but there was a sharp shift in the relative importance—and hence of orders— 





Figure 4.1 Swedish imports and exports to Japan 1937–1941. Source: Data from 
Honma, Nippon keizai tōkeishū 1868–1945, 35–47. Note: In million yen. 
cardboard and pulp (worth SEK 24.6 million), “base metals and products made 
from them”—mostly ball bearings (SEK 17.3 million)—and “machines and 
tools” (SEK 4.5 million).92 In October, the currency restrictions almost put an 
end to imports of timber and its derivates, as well as to cellulose imports for 
paper manufacturing. As the nationalization of Japan’s productive industries pro-
gressed, imports of nonessential goods were halted to prioritize the needs of the 
armament industry. As a result, Swedish–Japanese trade value in 1938 fell by 50 
percent. Statistical figures reveal the extent of the commercial decline in East 
Asia: 143,000 tons of goods had been consigned to China and Japan in 1937. 
In the following year, this amount plummeted to under 38,000 tons. Although 
imports increased somewhat, an overall slowing of trade set in, and, in 1939, the 
grounding of Swedish vessels could not be avoided. In addition, the outbreak 
of the European war meant further troubles to Swedish shipping companies. In 
spring 1940, the Skagerrak Barrage put an end to “normal” transoceanic trade 
(including Japanese shipping to Scandinavia).93 
Since Sweden was not the only country hit by these changes, a business maga-
zine reported as late as 1939 that out of all European economies, Sweden was 
still the fourth-largest exporter to the Japanese market.94 This was not least due 
to its most important contributions to the war industry, which were ball bearings. 
They are used in weapon-manufacturing machines, as well as in cannons, machine 
guns, tanks, submarines, and fighter planes.95 Demand was strong and the already 
dominant position of SKF on Asian markets allowed the company to build a 
de facto monopoly on the product by undercutting local market prices—a prac-
tice that Envoy Widar Bagge once called “Japanese methods” that was coupled 
with generous credits to the company’s customers.96 But SKF was an exception. 
Overall, Swedish companies struggled in the emerging nationalistic environment 
in which mercantilist ideas celebrated a comeback. Envoy Bagge summarized the 
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(…) currency restrictions were further tightened for all goods which are 
not necessary for military purposes STOP Imports are largely discontinued 
STOP Relevant shipments do not take place unless a currency permit is avail-
able. (…) STOP Prospects should continue to be good for Swedish silk, pulp 
and cellulose products as they are necessary for the Japanese industry.97 
Ideological nationalism had reached the business world. Bagge’s restrained opti-
mism for Sweden’s core exports turned out to be too optimistic. Even wood, 
pulp, and paper commodities quickly fell prey to the new restrictions and almost 
vanished in trade statistics from 1938 onward. And Japanese authorities were not 
only hell-bent on reducing the chronic trade deficit but also to stimulate domes-
tic production of machines and indigenous technology to achieve autarchy within 
the “Yen-bloc” of Japan, Manchukuo, and occupied China. Lucky for Swedish 
companies, these goals were never fully attained, allowing for at least some busi-
ness to continue. The Japanese Government also realized that too drastic a limita-
tion on imports might hurt the acquisition of raw materials and thus hurt wartime 
production.98 
As many Japanese customers canceled purchase orders, Swedish exporters had 
to get used to spending more and more time at government ministries in Tokyo 
to cultivate relations with key decision makers. This meant regular visits to the 
Trade Bureau of the Gaimushō or trips to the Finance Ministry, which could 
grant import licenses and currency permits. This posed considerable strain on the 
companies, which had been used to business practices of the private sector, but 
not to negotiations with Japanese public administrators. On top of that came the 
language barrier. Western corporate leaders were often not able to communicate 
in Japanese. Their Japanese counterparts were usually conversing with them in 
English. Thus, once important trade matters came under the influence of military 
officers who did not master foreign languages, great difficulties arose for ship-
ment or price negotiations.99 Gadelius, for instance, delegated sensitive issues 
to native employees who were put in charge of contacting the authorities. In its 
archives, there exists an unusual memorandum about a salesman, Aoki Tosezō, 
who claimed that he went to the Ministry of Finance, wearing his military uni-
form and threatening harakiri if he was refused a currency permit, which he 
needed to secure imports of Sandviken’s piano wire—a product used in Japanese 
machine guns.100 In order to eliminate such problems, various kinds of solu-
tions were contemplated. Gadelius, again, is a good example of the adaptability 
of some foreign firms. Between 1932 and 1938, the firm increased its machine 
exports to Japan nine-fold. When Tokyo introduced its import restrictions, the 
trading house circumvented the protectionist quotas by moving its production to 
Japan itself. The purchase of a factory in Kamata (between Tokyo and Yokohama) 
made it possible to produce a multitude of goods licensed from Swedish manu-
factures locally without forfeiting profit.101 
In the chilly climate of nationalistic trade negotiations, statistics became a bat-
tlefield and since bilateralism was becoming a new ideal, it also became more

















too much imbalance. This was one of the reasons behind the decision of Sweden’s
statistical bureau to alter the calculation basis of its trade statistics in 1936. In the
case of transactions with Japan and China, the effect was a marked rise in imports.
Articles were now classified according to country of origin rather than country
of purchase. This obviously helped Sweden rebuff criticism that it sold too much
and bought too little in East Asia. A substantial amount of the imports from those
countries was mediated through third nations. As for Japan, the rearrangement
of statistics meant that the import value would be SEK 14.8 million compared to
10.6 million according to the old model. This way of reckoning made it necessary
to make corresponding changes in the export statistics. Exports would now be
registered on the basis of country of consumption, rather than country of sale, but
here the value was almost the same as previously, standing at SEK 26.5 million
instead of SEK 26 million. The reshuffle of statistics had a particularly dramatic
effect on the imports from China. Under the new system, their value rose from
SEK 1.5 million (1935) to SEK 28.2 million (1936), a twenty-fold increase!102 
Even before 1937, Tokyo had frequently advocated for trade reciproc-
ity but after warfare in China broke out, its diplomats started to threaten that 
their government would limit imports from Sweden if Stockholm did not buy 
more goods from Japan. Swedish representatives usually countered that prices 
of Swedish articles were already low and profit margins slim and that the qual-
ity of Swedish products would be difficult for Japan to substitute by anything 
else.103 Stockholm’s diplomats used this argument also to pacify their Japanese 
counterparts when they demanded that Swedish trade with the enemy govern-
ment in Chongqing stopped. When Envoy Johan Beck-Friis in Shanghai met 
with the Japanese ambassador, Tani Masayuki, he simply claimed that Swedish 
exports to China were of little value. Exports to Japan, on the other hand, were 
“abundant and highly beneficial to Japan.”104 These arguments stuck at least par-
tially. Although sales fell after the all-time high of 1937, they soon stabilized 
at approximately the same level as during the good years before the warfare in 
China. During 1938, products for over SEK 26 million were sold to Japan, while 
Swedish imports accounted for SEK 15.6 million—which was more than its com-
merce with the much closer and bigger Soviet Union.105 
Trade with Manchukuo 
The Manchurian breakaway state had serious internal problems. The legitimacy of 
the government in Hsinking (Changchun) was questioned inside and outside the 
country. In several parts of Manchukuo, armed resistance movements sprang up 
against Japanese rule. Meanwhile, the authorities and foreign advisors were carry-
ing out hectic modernization programs. New infrastructure was planned for this 
rather neglected northeastern corner of China. Heavy industry expanded. At the 
same time, foreign firms arrived one after another, thinking about Manchukuo 
in terms of market prospects. To them, the Empire was a promising field for 
investment and sales.106 In 1937, the General Export Association of Sweden con-
templated an “information and propaganda tour” across the country. Almost all 
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Swedish companies—SKF, Gadelius, Kjellberg, and Ekman—set up representa-
tion offices in Manchukuo. As we have seen above, in these circles it was common 
to praise the Empire for “order” and “progress,” whereas they complained about 
the “bandits,” with whom they meant local resistance fighters.107 
In 1937, according to estimates from Stockholm, the value of Swedish exports 
to the new state amounted to around SEK 1 to 1.5 million. Almost certainly 
this figure was too low because many Swedish articles arrived after stopping first 
in Japan. The legation in Tokyo talked about a strong upswing in trade, and 
Gadelius alone claimed that they had delivered cellulose machines for SEK 2 
million to five different Manchurian paper mills.108 Of course, these numbers 
were not official because, “officially,” there were no economic relations between 
Sweden and Manchukuo. But just as Manchukuo existed de facto, the state was 
dealt with by the trading companies de facto, which lead to the awkward situation 
that Manchukuo trade numbers had to be subsumed in the figures for China. 
Naturally, that was not a satisfying situation for companies that relied on ade-
quate statistics. In 1936, the General Export Association petitioned the National 
Board of Trade to make the commerce visible, but it took the parliamentarian 
treaty committee two years to agree. Even so, the committee had to be careful; 
it emphasized that a separate statistical column for Manchukuo would not con-
stitute its diplomatic recognition. It was a delicate balancing act between trade 
and diplomacy but, luckily, there had been similar cases: Algeria and the Canary 
Islands, for example. Therefore, beginning in 1939, trade with Manchukuo 
appears openly visible in Swedish statistical abstracts. The Tokyo legation had 
guessed that actual trade amounted to about SEK 4 million, a belief that was now 
confirmed.109 Just as with Japan, imbalance persisted in the Swedish trade with 
Manchukuo—but in reverse to Japan: due to the demand for soybeans Sweden 
bought much more products from Manchukuo than it sold. As we have seen in 
the last chapter, Stockholm used this argument when negotiating with Tokyo.110 
In terms of exports, Sweden’s main client in Manchukuo was the mining 
industry, followed by the chemical and heavy industries. The Manchurian min-
istries and various army institutions were responsible for further orders. Early 
in 1937, a five-year plan was announced by the Emperor’s government. From 
that moment, Swedish firms experienced a swift rise in commissions. Among the 
most popular items were machines for paper and cellulose manufacturing, fol-
lowed by mining drills and measuring instruments.111 Although the introduction 
of import restrictions in September 1937 signaled bad news for business, all in 
all, the policy did not herald dramatic change. Soon, managers Björn Prytz and 
Gösta Guston from SKF had concluded a ball-bearing agreement with Hsinking. 
They also tried to help other Swedish enterprises to get preferential treatment— 
that one, however, in vain.112 
In 1938, the German Reich and a number of other nations recognized 
Manchukuo. This weakened the bargaining strength of countries that did not 
entertain diplomatic relations with the puppet state. Swedish firms were now often 
excluded from deals if there were German competitors. The imperial authorities 












Krupp Company and others. The Swedes were also in an inferior position to large 
American enterprises that could arrange cashless compensation deals. However, 
all foreign firms complained about the red-carpet treatment given to Japanese 
businesses.113 Generally speaking, Western corporations in Manchukuo practiced 
business as usual and competed fiercely, remaining rather unconcerned about 
politics and warfare. 
Summary 
A major change in Swedish relations with East Asia came in July of 1937, when 
the Marco Polo Bridge incident sparked full (but undeclared) warfare between 
China and Japan. The Japanese army attacked Chinese military positions and 
started assaulting the Government of Chang Kai-shek, raiding cities and attacking 
the capital Nanking, which fell on December 13, and subsequently subjugated 
to some of the worst atrocities of the war. These developments were closely fol-
lowed in Sweden, but public perception was mixed, ranging from utter indigna-
tion that even produced attempts at a private boycott movement, all the way 
to tacit approval by the business community and anti-colonialists. Although the 
League of Nations made another attempt at pacifying the belligerents, Japan 
simply refused to participate. The League condemned Japanese actions as viola-
tions of both the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, but the only 
concrete effect that this had was that Japan’s Privy Council cut the remaining 
ties to nonpolitical organs of the League on November 2, 1938.114 It was dur-
ing this episode that Swedish foreign policy changed noticeably not only toward 
Japan but toward collective security in general. While its diplomats in Geneva 
initially still tried to convince the League of a meaningful stance that might imply 
sanctions or even military aid to China, the unwillingness of Great Powers to 
even consider labeling Japan as a perpetrator against Article XVI wiped away the 
remaining internationalist sentiments in the UD. In the following conference 
in November, under the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty, Sweden’s lack 
of engagement and enthusiasm bordered at sabotage. Within two months, the 
UD had shifted from engagement to apathy which was an expression and con-
sequence of a major foreign policy realignment to “strict” neutrality, as we shall 
see in the next chapter. 
Apart from the obvious failure and humiliation of the Swedish internation-
alist position, the most impactful problems that the new situation created had
again to do with trade. Not only because the markets in China disappeared, or
fell under Japanese control, but because the Japanese blockade of the Chinese
coastline made trading routes unsafe. Shipping became dangerous to the point
that Swedish companies had to offer war risk allowances to sailors on dangerous
routes. Similarly, Swedish missionaries and merchants in China came under pres-
sure from both the Japanese and Chinese sides. Many had to be evacuated in 1938
and 1939. Trade with China naturally suffered from these conditions. Exports fell
from SEK 15.4 million in 1937 to SEK 8 million a year later and to SEK 6 million
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was only because the official statistics were still counting Manchurian soybean
as a product of China. The actual total sum of imports for 1939 was SEK 5.2
million. That was only a third of what Sweden at the same time imported from
Manchukuo (SEK 15.6 million). Trade with Japan also took a sharp downturn.
Whereas 1937 had been the most outstanding year for exports, with SEK 47.8
million, the number plummeted back to SEK 26.3 million in 1938. This was not
solely the effect of war-related trade hurdles. In 1937, the Japanese parliament
enacted laws to eliminate trade deficits and spur domestic production of vital
goods that would decrease the Empire’s dependence on foreign products. Japan’s
industries came under tight control, resembling a nationalization process. This
meant that Swedish trading companies had to adapt not only their merchandise
but their entire business practice, negotiating more with Japanese ministries than
with private-sector partners. In the wake of this wind of economic nationalism,
the products that survived the wrath of the regulators were those that were dif-
ficult for Japan to replace. Ball bearings, for example, on which SKF had a near
monopoly and high-quality machinery. Those were needed in even higher quanti-
ties due to the warfare in China.116 That, on the other hand, seriously impeded
Swedish interests there. Ever since the beginning of open warfare, Bagge had to
protest to the Gaimushō in the name of Swedish companies and the consulate in
Shanghai, when Japanese attacks struck their property or when Japanese forces
confiscated them. Usually, his protests were of little help.117 The good years for
Swedish trade with East Asia were over. 
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5 Staying relevant 
Total war in Europe 
International politics 
Sweden and Japan: outside the European war but inside the global 
turmoil 
Before resigning in August 1939, Japanese Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichirō
famously characterized the world as fukuzatsu kaiki—complicated and inscru-
table. It was an appropriate description of the years before Pearl Harbor. For 
instance, until the end of Hiranuma’s eight months’ stint at the helm of the 
Japanese Government, some Swedish observers still hoped for a renewed 
Japanese–British alliance, as during World War I. They were bitterly disappointed 
when a standoff between the two Empires in the Chinese coastal city of Tientsin 
made it clear that Britain and Japan had ended up on opposite ends of a Great 
Power conflict.1 By that time, tensions had already risen to the boiling point in 
Europe, where Danzig had become the focus of a new crisis involving Germany, 
Poland, Britain, and France. On September 1, 1939, Hitler attacked Poland. As 
a result, London and Paris declared war on Berlin. The position of Japan in this 
constellation was unclear. On the one hand, Germany and Japan were signatories 
of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but that was, above all, an alliance against the Soviet 
Union, not against Britain or France. On top of that came a stinging betrayal 
from the perspective of Tokyo, because Hitler had reached an agreement with 
Stalin on August 23, right before the attack on Poland. The infamous Molotov– 
Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact reversed everything Japan assumed its fascist 
ally in Europe was standing for. Germany’s realignment with the sworn enemy, 
which Japan was fighting unofficially in Nomonhan (Khalkhin-Gol), created an 
unfavorable power constellation in Asia that deeply alienated Japan, leading to a 
significant rethinking of its foreign policy. 
Furthermore, with its warfare in China, Japan antagonized not only Britain 
and the USSR but the United States, too. At first, the United States maintained 
regular commercial relations but in mid-1938 Washington began with a “moral 
embargo” on the export of implements of war to Japan and on July 26, 1939, 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull notified the Japanese ambassador that the United 
States would terminate the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.2 The 
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legal embargoes that culminated in a freeze of Japanese assets and an oil embargo 
on August 1, 1941. Toward the Chinese side, Roosevelt used Japan’s euphemism 
of a Chinese “incident,” since this allowed him, conveniently, not to apply the 
neutrality laws that Congress had been creating since 1935. Most importantly, it 
meant that the cash-and-carry clauses of the neutrality acts would not apply, and 
that the United States could maintain normal trade with China. Nevertheless, 
the disdain of the US public toward arms trade, after the publication of H.C. 
Engelbrecht and F.C. Hanighen’s bestseller Merchants of Death (1934), and the 
subsequent work of the Nye Committee, which exposed the large gains of the 
armament industry, put political taps on the Roosevelt administration in terms of 
supporting China with weapons. Whereas, from 1933 to 1935 the United States 
had sent 339 planes to Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists, the number dropped to 
zero in the first two years of the Sino-Japanese War. Only when the United States 
and Japan became outright enemies, in 1941, US weapons exports to China 
increased again significantly.3 Lucky for Chiang, there were other options. The 
most important support came from Hitler and Stalin. Since ties with Germany 
dated back to the Weimar Republic, China was still able to obtain an agreement 
in April 1936 that provided it with 60 percent of its arms imports, in return for its 
wolfram and some other ores. Only some months after all-out warfare with Japan 
started, Hitler chose to end his support for Chiang. Thereafter, it was Stalin who, 
until 1941, filled the void by providing planes (1,235), artillery (1,600), machine 
guns (14,000), rifles (50,000), as well as thousands of specialists like military 
advisors, pilots, and engineers to sustain Chiang’s resistance.4 
In Europe, too, the situation became inscrutable. Right after the attack on
Poland, Stockholm declared its neutrality. In a much-publicized statement,
Premier Per Albin Hansson assured that Sweden’s defense was well-prepared,
which was a very optimistic assessment of the actual situation. Similar to the
belligerency in China, during the first months of war in Europe, many Swedes
thought of themselves as detached observers of a Great Power conflict that did
not concern them much—a feeling that would not last for long. On November
30, 1939, the Soviet Union attacked Finland, which started the Winter War
(November 30, 1939–March 13, 1940). To most Swedes, this was entirely dif-
ferent from China or Poland. There was a strong opinion in favor of assisting
the Finns, but the government was divided. Whereas Foreign Minister Rickard
Sandler wanted active intervention, many of his colleagues were in favor of a more
cautious policy. On December 12, the government resigned and was replaced by
a national coalition made of all parliamentary parties, save the Communists. Per
Albin Hansson continued as prime minister, but the post of foreign minister was
taken over by a nonpolitical career diplomat, Christian Günther, who had previ-
ously (1934–37) served as state secretary at the UD—one of the highest-ranking
civil positions at the ministry—and later as envoy to Norway. To the disappoint-
ment of the Finns, Sweden did not intervene. However, in contrast to the other
theaters of war, Stockholm allowed not only exports of arms and ammunition to
its Nordic neighbor, but also volunteer troops to go East. This was also the only





it was “non-belligerent,” a status that had not been defined under international
law and in many cases (like Italy) was a first step toward entering the war at a
later stage.5 
The Winter War ended in March 1940, but the situation in Northern Europe 
became even more dramatic when the German Reich invaded and occupied 
Denmark and Norway the following month. A result thereof was the so-called 
“Skagerrak Barrage,” a German-made minefield on the ocean, between the 
Norwegian Kristiansand and the Danish Hanstholm—the gateway from the 
North Sea to the Baltic Sea. That cut the Swedish merchant fleet in two almost 
equal parts: one on each side of the dangerous barrier. From then on Swedish 
ships would sometimes be given safe conduct through this military obstruction, 
after permission from both, German and British authorities, but foreign trade 
was severely hampered. Many of the ships that had remained on the oceans (43 
percent of the Swedish tonnage) had to be leased to the Allied Powers, while 
the domestic economy became heavily dependent on continental commerce. 
Until 1944, Germany and German-controlled areas accounted for 85 percent of 
the Swedish foreign trade. In exchange for iron ore from Lapland the Germans 
would provide coal and fertilizers.6 
The situation for Stockholm intensified further in June 1940, when France 
surrendered, and the Soviet Union absorbed the three Baltic States. It did not 
take much imagination to realize that Sweden’s independence, too, was in dan-
ger. An unmistakable sign of that was an increase in German pressure to allow 
transfers of its soldiers from occupied Norway back home through Swedish terri-
tory. After only short negotiations, Hansson’s government saw no other alterna-
tive than granting permission. Officially, the soldiers were on leave and they had 
to pay for the transport on the Swedish State Railways, but the act was a clear 
breach of the laws of neutrality.7 An even more serious episode in this respect 
occurred after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, in summer 1941. Berlin now 
started demanding that Sweden allow the transit of one of its army divisions 
(Engelbrecht division) from Norway to the battlefield, threatening that a rejec-
tion of the request would be interpreted as an “unfriendly act.” The ultimatum 
triggered intense discussion within the coalition government where one faction 
vehemently rejected further concessions and others, including Prime Minister 
Hansson, were more inclined to accept the request. At this point, King Gustaf 
V actively influenced the discussion by threatening to abdicate if the German 
demands were not met. At least this was how the prime minister interpreted the 
King’s declaration afterwards. In the end, the government allowed the transit.8 At 
the same time, the German (and Finnish) invasion of Soviet Russia was greeted 
with certain enthusiasm in military circles that harbored sympathies for Germany 
(as well as for Japan). They were expressed by the Commander-in-Chief, General 
Olof Thörnell.9 Overall, public opinion was divided between pro-Axis, pro-Allied, 
and “neutralist” perspectives.10 Many predicted a victory for the Axis, which led 
to increased self-censorship in the public sphere. Even debates in the parliament 
became more timid than usual. Only some newspapers like Göteborgs Handels-
och Sjöfartstidning remained outspoken. Despite various personal appeals—even 
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from King Gustaf V—this newspaper continued its rhetorical attacks on the Reich 
and the National Socialist regime. The German legation, showing little regard for 
Swedish freedom of the press, protested vociferously, which convinced Minister 
of Justice, K.G. Westman, to prohibit the distribution of the paper over “national 
security concerns.”11 
Less friction in bilateral relations 
Paradoxically, the tense international situation led to a calmer moment in 
Swedish–Japanese bilateral relations. Ever since the Mukden Incident, the two 
countries had been locked in an uneasy relationship defined by mutual suspicion. 
Diplomatically, in Geneva, they had walked separate ways, while trade continued 
and even flourished. This schizophrenia continued well into 1939. For instance, 
when the news about the termination of the US–Japanese trade treaty reached 
Stockholm, media reports were enthusiastic, interpreting the action as a form of 
punishment of Japan. The Social-Demokraten viewed the step as the beginning 
of the long-awaited sanctions against an aggressor state—something that would 
not come true in a meaningful sense until two years later.12 Those views were 
certainly popular. As we have seen in the previous chapter, only die-hard eco-
nomic liberalists, ultra-right wingers, and occasional anti-colonialists would still 
maintain that Japan was not to blame for the warfare in China. At the same time, 
however, nobody in Sweden demanded that their government abolished its own 
treaty with Japan. Newspapers had fallen silent on Sweden’s interactions with 
the Empire. In fact, at the dawn of the European war, diplomacy with Japan, if 
anything, seemed to improve again. Stockholm even received another goodwill 
visit from Fujiwara Ginjirō, who constructed a garden for the Japanese teahouse 
in Stockholm. He met with Prime Minister Hansson and was granted an audi-
ence with King Gustav V. Moreover, Fujiwara’s visit was surrounded by positive 
publicity in the Swedish press. When a new Japanese envoy, Matsushima Shikao, 
arrived in late 1939, his task to foster friendly relations was not hopeless, despite 
the tense international situation. He hinted that the hostilities in East Asia were 
generating certain frictions but still summarized Swedish–Japanese relations as 
“exceedingly good.”13 After all, Sweden’s attitude had become—if not more 
amicable—at least less confrontational toward Japan. Of course, there were no 
illusions about the injustice of the situation. Bernhard Karlgren, a sinologist and 
great connoisseur of East Asian affairs, summed up the Swedish assessment about 
Asia in a booklet on “Japan’s path and goal” (published in 1940). Manchukuo 
was obviously still a satellite of the Empire and Japan’s actions in China were not 
only illegal but a severe military miscalculation, Karlgren wrote.14 
Nevertheless, Stockholm grudgingly accepted that “might could make right.” 
The protest movement of 1938 and the unsuccessful calls for a boycott were 
merely the last signs of civil society’s moral conscience that rejected the use of 
violence against civilians. But the ferocity with which Swedish diplomats used to 
oppose Japanese actions in Manchukuo during the League of Nations sessions 





Figure 5.1 Number of times Japan is mentioned in major Swedish newspapers 
1930–1946. Source: Data obtained by searching the database “Svenska 
Dagstidningar” [Swedish Newspapers] at the Royal Library of Sweden 
Stockholm, for the period 1930–1946. 
force—something that only a few years earlier had supposedly been “outlawed” 
through the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg–Briand Pact. The once 
enthusiastic supporters of collective security had evidently lost the debate. Almost 
everyone in Sweden (except for Carl Lindhagen) had to admit that national 
defense must be given priority. That was true for the government and the media 
landscape. At the same time, Japan’s warfare in China barely still made headlines. 
In fact, Japan as a topic, was fading from Swedish newspapers, starting from 
1937—a trend only broken by the beginning and the end of the Pacific War.15 
As Swedish support for the League of Nations faded away, its public and pri-
vate condemnation of Japanese actions rescinded, resolving the schizophrenia in 
favor of normal relations with Japan. There are some indications that Japanese 
statesmen tried to assuage Swedish perception through public diplomacy like the 
gifting of the teahouse and its garden, but all in all, the shift in national atten-
tion had little to do with Japanese actions. Rather, it was the logical outcome of 
a rapid change in the international environment, which reshaped Swedish pub-
lic debate and foreign policy. With the League system mortally ill, the coun-
try returned to its traditional neutrality policy, which also gradually “tamed the 
Swedish hound” from the Japanese perspective. To understand this shift, we need 
to go back to the moment when Swedish foreign policy strategy changed from 
collective security to neutrality. 
National politics 
The return of Swedish “strict” neutrality 
Although Sweden’s “traditional neutrality” went back to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and to World War I, its neutrality was not anchored in inter-
national law in the same way as those of other European neutrals. The permanent 
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neutralities of Belgium, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland were codified by treaty 
agreements. For them, it would have been “illegal” to join an alliance. For 
Sweden, that was different. Not even domestically there were arrangements that 
compelled the government to remain neutral in the wars of others. Neither the 
Constitution nor legislative acts existed to that extent. For Sweden, neutrality was 
purely a matter of foreign policy. Albeit, by the 1920s, it had long gained cultural 
importance and become a source of identity.16 That might explain why Sweden’s 
departure from neutrality for the sake of the League’s collective security approach 
had been more of a slow and silent good-bye than an outright rejection of previ-
ous principles. Parliament and government never declared that their neutral tradi-
tion was to be replaced by a different foreign policy doctrine. Rather, neutrality 
was phased out quietly as Sweden transitioned into a stakeholder of the League 
system. This is best illustrated by comparison to Switzerland which, as a prerequi-
site to join the League, had demanded—and received—written guarantees that it 
would be allowed to continue its policy of permanent neutrality.17 The unspoken 
phasing out of Swedish neutrality is also underscored by the silence that fell over 
the topic. There had not been any substantial discussions in parliament on neu-
trality for 15 years. Only the developments in Abyssinia made a reconsideration 
unavoidable. 
The question whether neutrality should again become a pillar of Swedish for-
eign policy was intimately tied to the success of the League. In this context, there 
never was a real consensus among or within political parties on the role of the 
League. From the beginning, there was a divide between an “idealist” school of 
thought which believed in the value of collective security, international disarma-
ment, and sanctions, and a “realist” school, which considered such a security as 
neither attainable nor desirable. The Social Democrats and the left wing of the 
Liberal Party were the major political forces behind the first approach, while the 
latter was chiefly the viewpoint of the Conservatives and the Farmers’ League.18 
The conservatives found themselves in a minority position during most of the 
interwar period. Hence, Sweden’s international policy had mostly been shaped 
by politicians who pursued close adherence to the League’s idealistic goals. 
However, the brutalization of the League’s principles by Japan (1931) and Italy 
(1936), as well as the tepid reactions of other Great Powers, led to a deep disap-
pointment among that group. After all, the energetic engagement of Swedish 
diplomats in Geneva for binding mechanisms and even interventions against 
aggressor states had been fueled by the belief that small states would be among 
the primary beneficiaries of the League’s collective security mechanism. During 
World War I, small neutrals had been among the first countries that were dragged 
into the fight. Great Powers considered the laws of neutrality as secondary to the 
immediate necessities of their belligerent enterprises. Especially the experiences 
of Belgium and Luxemburg, whose internationally guaranteed neutral rights had 
immediately fallen prey to German war tactics, had had a chilling effect even 
on those neutrals who survived the war unharmed. As a direct result, Europe’s 
staunchest neutrals—Sweden and Switzerland—joined the League of Nations as 








their neutralities, as the Covenant of the League required an extremely strong 
commitment to a global alliance of states that would defend each other through 
sanctions and even by military means. Article XVI of the Covenant unequivocally 
enshrined the “one for all, and all for one” principle into a binding international 
security treaty.19 However, 15 years later, European small states had to learn 
painfully that the promises of collective security were much harder to enforce in 
reality than the letter of the law had made it seem. No sanctions had been levied 
against Japan, and only insufficient measures were taken against Italy, failing to 
deter it from its aggressions against Abyssinia. In early 1936, Swedish politics 
was, therefore, confronted with two interlinked questions that arose from the 
League’s failure to secure its weaker member states. First, should Stockholm con-
tinue to adhere to League sanctions? And, second, if the League was really failing 
then how would Sweden take care of its security from that point onward? 
An answer to both questions emerged only slowly. At first, no party in the 
Riksdag debates of early 1936 seriously questioned Swedish adherence to League 
sanctions, except for the tiny Socialist Party. Social Democrats like Rickard 
Sandler and Östen Undén, as well as the leader of the Conservative Party, Gösta 
Bagge, initially supported continuous adherence to the sanctions against Italy. A 
rupture with the League and Sweden breaking its word internationally was out of 
the question.20 Especially Sandler and Undén tried to convince their colleagues 
that the failure of the League was anything but certain. A reform of the League 
for more effectiveness was what Sweden should be striving for, not a disengage-
ment from it and certainly not fatalism about its future. 
This line of argument slowly collapsed the more successful Italy became in 
its ruthless conquest of Abyssinia and the less the Great Powers seemed willing 
to enforce the Covenant, as exemplified by the Hoare–Laval Plan. Most signifi-
cantly, the Social Democrats gradually changed their standpoint, with a notice-
able turn toward less international activism. Some of them had accepted that the 
“hungry” states had legitimate claims and should be appeased. By this, their views 
were not unlike those of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. They dis-
tanced themselves from Versailles and, indirectly, from Geneva. Another group of 
Social Democrats started arguing more cautiously that even if Sweden went back 
to a neutral foreign policy, it would only be a temporary retreat from the idealist 
goals of the League. They hoped the League would regain its strength when the 
time was right, that is, when Britain and France were sufficiently armed. Finally, 
there was a faction that detested appeasement and thus gave in to the realist view 
that national self-reliance was the only possible way forward to defend Swedish 
interests. The remaining internationalists, as we have seen, were inspired by the 
anti-fascist struggle in Spain and would also join the boycott movement against 
Japan. In this, they had full support from the Swedish Communist Party.21 
In early May 1936, Haile Selassie, the Emperor of Abyssinia, went into exile to
escape Mussolini’s advancing troops, which could have been a trigger for League
sanctions. However, since Germany had reoccupied the Rhineland two months
earlier, there was no hope that France would agree to an oil embargo on Italy.22 
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strongly in Stockholm. Gösta Bagge was the first one who, despite his previous
support for sanctions, started to argue that the only reliable source of Swedish
security would be one that did not depend on external forces. Instead, he wanted
to strengthen Sweden’s military defense and reinvigorate its nearly forgotten neu-
trality policy. During Sweden’s parliamentary debate of May 26, 1936, Bagge
exclaimed almost timidly that “with the development of the new Great Power
combinations and alliances, Sweden must have the opportunity to fall back on its— 
yes, I say it—traditional neutrality policy in situations when this becomes inevita-
ble.”23 He was not in favor of taking Sweden out of the League—only the Socialist
Party members wanted that—but the conservative leader suggested reforms that
would make League membership compatible with neutrality, mainly by weakening
Article XVI, and free Sweden officially from the sanctions obligations which had so
miserably failed to produce any results for Abyssinia and China.24 
Naturally, Foreign Minister Sandler opposed Bagge’s views, arguing that a 
policy reversal to neutrality would entail breaking with League sanctions and 
doing so would mean to either negate the conflict in Abyssinia altogether or 
withdraw from the League—neither of which he thought was feasible.25 Undén, 
too, criticized the conservative leader: 
It often seems to be an easy and comfortable policy to recommend our exit 
from the League of Nations and refer to neutrality policy and defense. But 
neutrality policy (…) is not a formula that applies to all times, regardless 
of other developments. The [same] neutrality policy as carried out during 
the World War may not be feasible during a future war because of technical 
developments of war[fare] and the development of economic relations.26 
However, as the spring of 1936 faded away, so did the confidence of the Social 
Democrats. In his closing statement, Foreign Minister Sandler subsumed the 
mood of the idealist school that had to come to terms with the potential failure 
of the League: 
Although I understand that neutrality may be necessary once again, surely no 
one can seriously argue that neutrality can be the final goal, (…) for, gentle-
men, to exercise neutrality means, in fact, that one has failed in the task of 
war prevention, which must be the prime goal of the statesmen, and even 
if that task proves to be overwhelming from time to time, it can, of course, 
never be abandoned.27 
On June 19, the Hansson government collapsed over an unrelated issue concerning
the pension system. In terms of foreign policy, that did not change much because
Sandler’s successor in the short-lived (three months) government of the Farmers’
League, K.G. Westman, was of similar views as the conservatives. He believed that
“as long as Sweden remains in the League of Nations, our country should consider
the policy of neutrality in its old sense and its old content as the basis for its foreign






























superstructure.”28 In his brief term as foreign minister, Westman was presented with
the first chance for Sweden to seriously voice its dilemma and reservations inter-
nationally. On July 1, a group of neutrality-inclined states—Sweden, Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland—issued a joint declara-
tion with a strong warning against any further erosion of the League’s principles,
arguing for the necessity of finding practical ways to handle its inefficiencies. “We
do not think it right,” the small states wrote, “that certain articles of the Covenant,
especially the article dealing with the reduction of armaments, should remain a
dead letter while other articles are enforced. (…), we feel that every effort should be
made to ensure the success of the experiment represented by the foundation of the
League as an attempt to establish an international society based upon law.”29 The
expression of hope for reform was accompanied by a warning that “we would place
it on record that, so long as the Covenant as a whole is applied only incompletely
and inconsistently, we are obliged to bear that fact in mind in connection with the
application of Article 16.” This was, of course, the neutrals’ final way of demanding
action from Great Powers or, in the absence of such, be absolved from all future
demands to join sanctions or military measures by the League. However, only five
days later, on July 6, the Coordination Committee of the League recommended
to lift all sanctions against Italy and thereby, de facto, recognized Mussolini’s fait
accompli in East Africa. It was the opposite of what the neutrals had demanded and
marked the end of their activism in Geneva. 
After this failure to rescue Abyssinia, debates in the Riksdag on the future of
Sweden’s neutrality policy became a staple on the agenda. That included the ques-
tion of Swedish volunteers in the Civil War in Spain and Sweden’s position toward
the League. Even after the return to power of the Social Democrats on September
28, 1936, the tune of the Swedish Government changed for good. So much so
that even Rickard Sandler, who had become foreign minister again, declared on
November 7, 1937, in a speech to a student association of Uppsala University
that Article XVI no longer had any binding power because “a law, which does not
equally apply to everyone and at all occasions, has, at present, ceased to be a law.”30 
Two months later, Sweden, together with the Netherlands and Switzerland,
declared officially that it did not intend to adhere to Article XVI anymore.31 
The end of the decade had reversed the collective security approach of the 
internationalists. Although Sweden briefly tried to forge a group of like-minded 
Nordic neutrals who would form a block against the emerging power politics 
on the continent, that initiative never went beyond the planning stage.32 By the 
time Hitler attacked Poland, Sweden was on its own. And although much sup-
port was rendered to the Finnish side in the Winter War, Sweden remained either 
nonbelligerent or issued declarations of neutrality whenever new theaters of war 
emerged.33 The dream of collective security was over, for good. 
The inception of Japanese “strange” neutrality 
Japan, too, was caught in an escalating nightmare—one, however, of its own 
making. At home, the Empire came under pressure as popular support for the 
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war started waning when the economic burden of the occupation started to bite. 
Parliament had to grant an extra war credit of ¥2.5 billion in autumn 1937— 
which was a vast sum, considering that ordinary annual expenditures amounted to 
¥2.8 billion. To cope with the fiscal situation and the perceived need for austerity, 
the government banned anything that it considered “luxury” and started lauding 
frugality as a virtue. More people were employed in the armaments industry and 
a movement for spiritual mobilization was formed. In 1938, new legislation gave 
the government emergency powers, eliminating the remnants of political plural-
ism. Parliament was reduced to a rubber stamp council and the economy was put 
under tight state control. In order to prevent lack of currency, a licensing system 
was introduced for all imports. Working hours were extended and unions merged 
with employer associations under the name of “patriotic industry federations.” 
In short, the war effort put an end to the liberal trends of Japanese business. 
Plans for an economic bloc, consisting of the Japanese Empire, Manchukuo, and 
China, could not compensate for this fact. Real wages and living standards began 
to fall and in 1939, the first energy and food shortages appeared. Inflation was 
on the rise and had to be counteracted with a price and wage freeze.34 At the turn 
of the decade, when Japan awaited its 2,600-year anniversary (on February 11, 
1940) the country was living in a state of economic siege for which it had no one 
to blame but itself. 
The spring of 1939 unexpectedly opened a new front in Northeast Asia. After 
months of border skirmish at the Manchu–Mongolian border, the Kwantung 
Army suddenly found itself in an all-out battle at Nomonhan with Mongolian 
and Soviet forces. Through a series of miscalculations, based mainly on the 
assumption that the Red Army was too weak to fight Japanese troops, the battles 
escalated to another “war in all but name.” Japan kept referring to the situation 
euphemistically as another “incident”—but what an “incident” it was. More than 
20,000 men were killed on both sides, 100,000 troops remained engaged for 
four months, and the affair had the potential of pushing the Soviet Union to 
(officially) declare war. That would have been disastrous to Tokyo for several 
reasons, not at least because a “real” war might have triggered the export restric-
tion mechanisms of US neutrality laws. It did not come that far because Stalin, 
too, had little appetite for drawing Hitler’s attention to the fact that a substantial 
part of his Red Army was needed in the East. Japan and the USSR therefore both 
downplayed the severity of the battles. 
Meanwhile, Japan’s armed forces were at odds about the military future of 
the empire. The navy had become convinced that the forward strategy for Japan 
should be Southeast Asia and that confrontations with Britain, France, and even-
tually the United States were inevitable. The army, on the other hand, had set its 
eyes on North Asia, to which Nomonhan had become an important test. In early 
1939, politics in Tokyo still seemed to favor the army’s approach, as the govern-
ment was committed to fighting Bolshevism together with Germany. The Anti-
Comintern Pact between Berlin and Tokyo had been in force since November 
25, 1936, and should have provided a united German–Japanese political front 




exceedingly empty. Not only did it lack German commitment, but it became a 
liability when Hitler changed his objectives. As the political fallout in Europe 
grew hotter, he wanted Japan to commit to his bellicose rhetoric against Britain 
and France, not against the USSR, and he wanted it in writing. In diplomatic cir-
cles, it was reported that during negotiations with Ambassador Ōshima Hiroshi in 
Berlin, Hitler had even threatened to suspend the Anti-Comintern Pact if Japan 
did not agree to a closer military alliance.35 But the internal and external disagree-
ments over who the actual “enemy” of the Axis Powers was led to a paralysis in 
Tokyo and, eventually, to a separate German–Italian agreement, the “Pact of 
Steel” (March 22, 1939). In this document, Rome and Berlin pledged that if 
“one of them becomes involved in military complications with another Power or 
other Powers, the other Contracting Party will immediately step to its side as an 
ally and will support it with all its military might on land, at sea and in the air.”36 
Tokyo never joined this enforced alliance, not least because the German pressure 
caused more friction among the Liaison Conference (the inner circles of the cabi-
net). The army and the war ministers were now in favor of a closer alliance while 
the navy became cautious over commitments that could draw their resources into 
a European war.37 Thus, the paralysis in Tokyo over the right approach toward 
Germany remained. 
A tremendous diplomatic blow to Japan followed on August 23 when, at the 
height of the fighting in Nomonhan, Hitler concluded a Non-Aggression Pact 
with the USSR. The timing was no coincidence. Stalin, who had also an offer for 
an alliance with Britain and France on his table, was influenced at least partially 
by the Japanese challenge in the Far East to choose Germany as his European 
bedfellow due to the latter’s standing with Japan. A two-front war would have 
been life-threatening to the USSR, which is why Stalin explicitly demanded that 
Berlin used its ties with Tokyo to bring about a betterment in Japanese–Soviet 
relations. That quickly happened after it became clear to Japan that Soviet mili-
tary forces were now free for deployment in the East. Tokyo agreed to a cease-
fire, effective from September 16, 1939, a day before the Red Army marched 
into the eastern half of Poland.38 To Japan, the German–Soviet rapprochement 
was an immense betrayal of the letter and spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact. 
So much so, that Japanese media questioned if friendly relations with Germany 
could even be continued.39 The crisis brought down the cabinet of Hiranuma 
Kiichirō (January 5–August 30, 1939), which was succeeded by the government 
of Abe Nobuyuki (August 30, 1939–January 16, 1940). In his inaugural speech, 
General Abe openly contemplated disavowing the pact with Germany.40 The de 
facto defeat at Nomonhan and the Non-Aggression Pact altered Tokyo’s assess-
ment of the Soviet Union. Not only was Stalin a more formidable military enemy 
than anticipated, but his diplomacy had left Japan isolated from its European 
allies. As a result, the Abe government could not even contemplate supporting 
Germany once fighting did break out in Europe. On September 5—shortly after 
Britain and France had declared war—Abe issued a brief statement that “in the 
face of the European war (…) Japan does not intend to be involved in it; she will 
concentrate her efforts upon the settlement of the China affair.”41 A day later, the 
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Gaimushō submitted a note to diplomats of the four belligerent countries as well 
as the US and Italy, reiterating that Japan would not interfere in the hostilities 
but that it also expected that all states “should refrain from creating incidents 
that would force Japan to abandon its policy of non-intervention.”42 This was a 
thinly veiled threat at the address of Moscow, London, and Paris. To settle the 
“Chinese affair,” it was essential that European and American support for the 
Chiang Kai-shek regime in Chungking stopped and that “incidents” like the ones 
in Nomonhan could be averted. 
Abe’s statements prudently avoided the word “neutrality.” The legal impact 
which that might have had under international law was nothing the government 
was willing to imply. The Gaimushō understood the technicalities of neutrality 
proclamations rather well as Japan had used them in the past.43 The Gaimushō
had, in fact, conducted two studies on their implications in 1939.44 It would have 
committed Japan to an impartial attitude (a backbone of previous Japanese neu-
tralities) at a time when Tokyo’s ties with Germany, the Soviet Union, Britain, 
and the United States were strained, and a maximum of policy flexibility was the 
cabinet’s desired course of action. The example of the United States, which since 
1936 had enacted four neutrality laws that prohibited trade in war materials with 
belligerent countries, was a model that Japan did not want to follow. Besides, 
President Roosevelt, on September 3, had just declared that the United States 
would maintain “true neutrality.”45 For the sake of the remaining Axis collabora-
tion, Tokyo could not be seen as following the US example. From the standpoint 
of international law, that was not even necessary. To enjoy the rights of a neutral 
power, a declaration of neutrality was not a precondition. The absence of a state 
of war automatically made the relevant laws applicable—which was a detail that 
contemporary observers did not miss.46 Not to declare “strict neutrality” (like the 
United States or Sweden) nor acting as Germany’s ally was, therefore, Japan’s 
best choice at the moment because it left all options open under the “noninvolve-
ment” policy. For nearly two years, the government and national media did not 
grow tired of reiterating Japan’s dual foreign policy goals of “noninvolvement” 
in Europe and “primacy” in Asia. 
The outcome of these developments was that by the end of September 1939, 
the fault lines of a new international system of the European war emerged. Some 
countries were fighting, others were not, but no nation remained untouched. 
Small neutrals had to fear an attack by either side and larger neutrals (like Italy, 
Spain, the USSR, and the United States) were courted to join the fighting 
on “their” ideological side. In fact, for the first two years, Sweden and Japan 
found themselves in somewhat similar positions: suspicious but friendly toward 
Germany, latently threatened by the USSR, and, most importantly, not at war. 
Despite the differences in their international goals and military postures, Sweden 
and Japan both ended up on the “neutral end” of the European war. Even the 
Tripartite Pact (September 27, 1940) did not fundamentally alter the situation. 
The treaty created a defensive alliance between Rome, Berlin, and Tokyo, but was 
to Japan more of an instrument to deter the United States rather than an alliance 




war either because it demanded military assistance only in case of an attack on one 
of the treaty partners but not in case of an offensive campaign (which Hitler and 
Mussolini continuously did). Interestingly, the Swedish press was rather realistic 
about the meaning of the pact, concluding that it was probably neither impactful 
nor long-lasting. Most newspapers, in fact, were more surprised at Tokyo “join-
ing” the Axis Powers whom they still considered to be only Rome and Berlin.47 
In 1940, Japan’s cabinet was reshuffled twice. On January 16, Abe handed 
the premiership to a navy man, Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, who, like Hiranuma 
Kiichirō, could not hold himself at the helm of the government for long. His 
tenure ended on July 21 over the opposition of the military to his pro-Anglo-
American and anti-German politics. When his Army Minister, Hata Shunroku, 
resigned and no army general was willing to replace him, Yonai was forced to 
resign because the constitution required active-duty members from the army and 
navy in the cabinet (effectively giving both institutions veto power over the exec-
utive). A civilian government was born the next day under the well-respected but 
indecisive Konoe Fumimaro.48 Konoe had been a relatively moderate prime min-
ister from 1937 to 1939, but his reappointment did not herald a return to a con-
ciliatory foreign policy. Not only was he involved in the founding of the Taisei 
Yokusankai (the Imperial Rule Preservation Association)—a party to replace all 
parties—he also continued a close relationship with the military and appointed 
nobody less than Matsuoka Yōsuke to serve as foreign minister. Matsuoka was the 
man who had delivered strident attacks against the Chinese position at Geneva 
and who ultimately took Japan out of the League in 1933, the diplomat whom 
Japanese media had praised for “hurdling” around those pesky small states. He 
reversed the course of the Yonai cabinet and started working toward a closer 
alliance with Germany. One of his first measures was a very visible purge in the 
Gaimushō. The Swedish minister to Tokyo reported that “shortly after he took 
office, Foreign Minister Matsuoka had no less than five ambassadors, nineteen 
ministers and eleven consul-generals replaced by men who were judged more 
apt to follow the new signals. Also in the domestic administration, officials with 
English- and American-friendly attitudes have been replaced in a number of cases 
with new staff.”49 It was under Matsuoka’s tenure that the navy finally abandoned 
its opposition to a military alliance with Hitler, giving Matsuoka the green light 
to negotiate the Tripartite Pact.50 However, a more impressive stunt—and bear-
ing greater importance to Swedish–Japanese relations—was his surprise success 
in negotiating a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. Signed by Matsuoka and 
Stalin in Moscow on April 13, 1941, the pact aimed at imitating the German– 
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and, from the Japanese side, was believed to be a step 
toward a Berlin–Rome–Moscow–Tokyo axis.51 Not only did the Neutrality Pact 
markedly improve the political climate between Japan and the USSR, opening the 
way for a shipping and payment agreement, but it also freed up Japanese troops 
for redeployment in China. To Matsuoka’s dismay, however, the liaison confer-
ence decided against increasing military pressure on Chiang Kai-shek. Instead, 
it opted for opening a new front in Indochina, even at the risk of provoking 
war with Britain and the United States.52 This navy-led expansion into Southeast 
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Asia was not born under a lucky star, as Hitler again proved to be an unreliable 
and unpredictable ally. On June 22, he invaded the Soviet Union, breaking the 
Non-Aggression Pact—to the utter surprise of the dumbfounded Matsuoka. It 
was another frontal blow by the European ally to the cabinet’s military strat-
egy that inversed all calculations on the Japanese side. With the whole idea of a 
Pan-Eurasian Axis shattered, Matsuoka now shifted to support the army’s view 
that his Neutrality Pact should be abandoned, and the opportunity seized for an 
attack on the Soviet Union. This time Konoe did not agree,53 and some politi-
cians in Kasumigaseki even argued that it was the Tripartite Pact that should be 
abolished, not the Neutrality Pact.54 Again, neither action was taken, and the 
Empire continued its uneasy partnership with the Reich while also maintaining 
the neutrality policy toward the Soviet Union. 
Despite Matsuoka almost sabotaging his own treaty with Stalin, the Neutrality 
Pact proved surprisingly stable. Designed to be renewable and last a minimum of 
five years it was broken only on August 9, 1945 (the day the second atomic bomb 
obliterated Nagasaki), when the Soviet Union entered the Allied war against 
Japan. In effect, this meant that between December 1941 and August 1945, 
Japan and the Soviet Union were simultaneously neutral toward each other, while 
fighting their respective allies at the other end of the conflict.55 The Swiss envoy 
to Japan, Camille Gorgé, called this in his memoirs “the strangest neutrality one 
has ever seen”56—an expression which, unsurprisingly, became popular among 
historians as well.57 For Swedish–Japanese relations the Neutrality Pact had its 
own significance. It meant that a land corridor connected their trade for as long 
as Stockholm could be reached through the Baltic Sea. That was a not unimpor-
tant detail when considering that for the next five years, Sweden’s two main inter-
ests concerning Japan—trade and diplomacy—would both rely on accessibility. 
Diplomacy 
From multilateralism to bilateralism 
To formulate a new foreign policy (and diplomacy) after the collapse of the 
League system, the Swedish Government had to balance the opposing wishes 
of the country’s loudest pressure groups. On the one hand, the export industry 
claimed to represent prosperity and welfare by offering employment for Swedish 
workers and wanted as much economic engagement as possible with all actors 
inside and outside of Europe. On the other hand, leftist groups prioritized ideol-
ogy and kept demanding distance from law-breaking states. Unlike in the early 
1930s, the latter did not gain the upper hand this time. Internationalism and 
collective security were now associated with serious risks. Even stalwarts like 
Östen Undén began to accept the inevitable; the necessity for a new security 
strategy and a reformulation of Swedish diplomacy. Early in 1938, he received 
the unenviable task of clarifying the Swedish standpoint in Geneva where a com-
mittee for the reform of the League was in session. He reminded the members 




when the League had condemned aggression. But no nation had taken any action 
despite the resolutions adopted in autumn 1937. The sanctions system, he con-
cluded, was “de facto suspended.”58 His address was an implicit accusation of the 
Great Powers that they had not lived up to their responsibilities, although that 
also became a boomerang since, as everyone knew, the Swedish Government 
had been anything but active in Brussels (see previous chapter). Instead, Sandler 
began seeking a regional solution to the security problem. In April 1938, he 
announced that Sweden would be considering security in a Nordic framework.59 
The reformulation of Sweden’s security strategy away from the League and 
toward neutrality was, of course, highly problematic as it was neither clear nor 
desired and burdened by the past. To maintain at least a thin veil of policy con-
sistency, its diplomats had to mask the new approach creatively. An example was 
Sweden’s position toward the League’s condemnation of Japan after the Brussels 
conference. On the one hand, the UD desired not to take sides, while, on the 
other hand, it had previously committed itself to solidarity with the conference 
declaration. In addition, since fall 1936, Sweden had been a nonpermanent mem-
ber of the League Council, which gave more weight to its voice. Therefore, it had 
to pay lip service to the League’s position. On top of that, as late as January 1938, 
the UD circulated instructions to its diplomats that the Swedish position on 
Japan and China remained unchanged.60 It continued viewing Japan as being at 
fault, which meant that its diplomats could not officially claim a form of “political 
neutrality” in the affair. But any further alienation of Japan was also not desired. 
This required serious diplomatic juggling. For example, when Japan’s envoy to 
Sweden, Kuriyama Shigeru, during a conversation with the acting foreign min-
ister, K.G. Westman, pleaded for Swedish neutrality in the League, Kuriyama 
received an unexpected reply. Westman pointed out that since the situation in 
China was merely an “incident” (which was the Japanese position) and because 
neutrality was a status that only applied during war, the question of Swedish 
neutrality, in this case, was irrelevant.61 It was a position that Kuriyama could 
not possibly reject but that relegated Swedish policy to a legalistic technicality. It 
must have left a shallow taste on Westman’s tongue. 
The weakness of the League became even more evident at the annual assem-
bly in autumn 1938, when more rift came to the fore. Sweden and several other 
states explained their lack of confidence in the sanctions system just to be met 
with a critique about “defeatism” by Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov of the 
USSR. Sandler for his part did not want to give support to the Chinese view of 
the situation.62 A sudden and unexpected League decision, on September 30, to 
demand sanctions against Japan was not heeded by any member. It is doubtful 
if the decision was even discussed at the UD in Stockholm. In May 1939, the 
Chinese envoy informed Sandler that China was going to demand the formation 
of a committee for the coordination of sanctions. But the UD replied that the 
preconditions for such cooperation were absent and that Sweden would not back 
the proposal.63 At the end of July, the Chinese Foreign Ministry sent a request to 
Sweden and other members of the League Council. It asked for an investigation 
of the Japanese aerial raids against civilian targets, which showed that nothing 
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had happened since the resolution of autumn 1937.64 The situation would not 
change for China as the question was still under discussion when Hitler attacked 
Poland, which marked the end of the League’s work dealing with the Far Eastern 
conflict. No more deliberations were possible after the war in Europe started. 
In December 1939, the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union because 
of its attack on Finland after which the League was never convoked again until its 
dissolution in 1946.65 The collapse of the League and the rejection of Sweden’s 
proposal for a Nordic neutral bloc meant that Stockholm’s diplomacy became 
inherently bilateral, since there was simply no multilateral forum left. It is worth 
noting, however, that the trend toward more bilateral diplomacy in Asia had 
already started earlier, the outbreak of the war in Europe merely marked the 
endpoint of that dynamic. For example, while Envoy J.E.E. Hultman was 
side-accredited to the Republic of China (meaning that he was also serving as 
Sweden’s envoy to Nanking) the increasingly complex situation led Stockholm to 
diversify its diplomacy by appointing two separate successors, in late 1936. Johan 
Beck-Friis was sent to Shanghai, which was soon to be occupied by Japan, while 
Widar Bagge became the envoy to Tokyo. After September 1939, nearly all of 
Sweden’s diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan became bilateral, with only few exceptions 
of inter-neutral collaboration.66 As an effect of this “bilateralization,” Swedish 
diplomats in Tokyo gained in importance as front-line observers and negotiators. 
We should, therefore, pause for a moment to consider what the Swedish mission 
looked like and how it was organized. 
A new minister 
The head of the Swedish legation during the height of the war years was Widar 
Bagge. Born on April 30, 1886, he, like his predecessor Hultman, was a career 
diplomat who had been going through the required stages at the UD to become 
a senior diplomat, starting with the position of attaché, in 1919. His first postings 
abroad in junior positions were to Helsinki (1921–1922), followed by London, 
Brussels, and Rome (all in 1922). After that, he was sent back to Helsinki (1924) 
where he reached the rank of first secretary in 1925. He was then sent for the 
first time to Tokyo in 1928, where he started working as first secretary on May 
24. The year of his arrival was also the time when the legation’s head changed 
from Ewerlöf to Hultman. Bagge, therefore, worked for three years under the 
man whose position he would ultimately inherit nearly a decade later. His work 
in Tokyo was only interrupted by a short posting to Shanghai as consul general 
(May 23–September 1, 1930). He returned to Stockholm in early 1931, where 
he became the head of the trade division. He worked there for three years with 
two short postings abroad, one as chargé d’affaires in Warsaw (June–November 
1934) and as counselor to the legation in Paris (September 1934). Bagge returned 
to Tokyo in January 1937, to assume the new position as envoy extraordinary and 
minister plenipotentiary, which made him Sweden’s most senior diplomat in East 
Asia. He would hold that position until his departure on April 13, 1945, before 

















September 1945, although at that time the chargé d’affaires at the legation, Erik 
von Sydow, was Sweden’s most senior diplomat in Japan. Bagge’s last posting 
before retiring from the foreign service was that of envoy to Cairo (1945–1951), 
after which he worked as a representative for the Swedish multinational Atlas 
Copco (until the age of 80) and finally moved to Paris where he died in 1970.67 
Bagge was, in many ways, an untypical diplomat. He was not married and 
never had children. While many World War II diplomats and statesmen kept 
diaries or later wrote memoirs about their experiences, Bagge did not create such 
private records—or if he did, they did not survive.68 Only the reports, telegrams, 
and letters he wrote in his official capacity are available today to reconstruct his 
experiences in wartime Japan. It also seems that he did not enjoy the limelight 
very much. Even pictures of him are rare. The following two photographs were 
discovered only after extensive research in Swedish newspaper archives.69 
Little is known about Bagge’s personal life. Although he was not a socialite in
private, professionally he was not badly connected among his diplomat colleagues
and his Japanese hosts.70 Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador, mentioned him
as one of the few foreign members of the prestigious Fujizawara club house (a golf
club), a place “where one could meet and play with Japanese political leaders and
other prominent Japanese without seeming to arouse the suspicions of the security
police. (…). Amongst the most assiduous visitors to Fujizawara was Prince Konoe,
who plays an excellent and steady game of golf (…).”71 Those were certainly the
moments when Bagge tied friendships with Japanese politicians. His connection
with Prince Konoe, for example, would prove influential in later years.72 Bagge was
known among the Japanese elite as a friend to Japan and Japanese sources describe
Picture 5.1 Widar Bagge in 1936. Source: Svenska Dagbladet, “Widar Bagge blir 
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Picture 5.2 Widar Bagge in 1945. Source: Svenska Dagbladet, “Minister med 
Parisplanet” [Minister arriving with the Paris plane], July 14, 1945. Note: 
With Joen Lagerberg, Swedish minister to Italy. 
him as a Japanophile. Shigemitsu Mamoru, for example, in his memoirs shows not
only appreciation for Bagge’s long service in Japan but describes him as someone
who “knew Japan well and had a high reputation for sincerity.”73 
A few more descriptions about Bagge are recorded in the diary of Camille 
Gorgé, the Swiss minister to Japan. With all due diplomatic nicety about a col-
league of equal rank, Gorgé noted that Bagge “enjoys sailing on his flat boat, the 
type that is required here for regattas. If you visit him at his place, he looks more 
like a natural science professor than an athlete. You wouldn’t think much of his 
musculature. But don’t trust that impression! Outdoors, on the shores of the lake, 
he has the light-hearted ease of a young sailor. To untie a rope entangled by the 
wind, I saw him jump around on the boat like a gymnast.”74 In another instance, 
Gorgé described Bagge as rather fearless in the face of threats. On December 
16, 1944, when an earthquake shook the legation while the Swiss were dining 
with guests “everybody hurriedly stood up, fearing that parts of the ceiling might 
fall on their heads, except for Mr. Bagge, the Swedish minister, who remained 
immovable on his place.”75 However, one observation about Gorgé’s recollec-
tion of Bagge deserves to be pointed out, which is that Bagge figured relatively 
little in the Swiss minister’s diary when compared to other diplomats. Despite the 
fact that in the last years of the war the Swedish legation became the only other 
neutral mission to represent Allied interests in Japan alongside Switzerland and 
that the two mission heads collaborated frequently on issues that concerned them 
both, there is an ominous lack of description about these moments in Gorgé’s 
personal diary of over 500 pages. Nor did the Swiss diplomat ever mention Bagge 












Spanish minister, Santiago Mendez de Vigo y Mendez de Vigo, whom Gorgé 
constantly refers to as “my dear friend.” No such bonds seem to have existed 
between Gorgé and Bagge. It is likely that the Swede kept a professional distance 
to his peers in the diplomatic corps. 
The Swedish mission 
The Swedish legation was small and constrained in its resources when Bagge
arrived in early 1937. He only had one legation secretary at his disposal and one
chancellor to take care of an equally small Swedish community of around 100 peo-
ple.76 On the other hand, the legation was supported by a relatively large consular
network. No less than five honorary consulates were operating in the Japanese
Empire. A comparison with two other wartime neutrals illustrates how large this
was: Switzerland operated not a single consulate in Japan at the time and Spain
operated only one.77 Sweden, in contrast, had hired four honorary consuls on the
Japanese mainland and one in Dairen, on the Kwantung Leased Territory. The
personnel position of the Swedish mission in 1937 is illustrated in Table 5.1.78 
The consulates were designated as “honorary” because they were not staffed 
with career diplomats from the UD, but with businessmen who were named 
consuls and furnished with the necessary insignia of the Swedish state to ful-
fill clerical work, mainly the facilitation of trade. Some honorary consuls were 
not even Swedish citizens. Frederik Ringer, in Nagasaki was a British national. 
Born in Japan, he was a merchant who served also as the Norwegian consul, all 
while being the general manager (and one of the owners) of the trading company 
Holme, Ringer & Co. Similarly, Ernest William James in Kobe was also a British 
citizen, endowed with a large fortune (Picture 5.3).80 
The consul in Yokohama, Gösta Guston, on the other hand, was a Swedish 
national and, as we have seen in the previous chapter, an outspoken personality 
Table 5.1 Personnel of the Swedish mission to Japan in 1937 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Minister Plenipotentiary Widar Bagge 
First Secretary Tor H. W. Wistrand 
Legation Chancellor Johan J.W. Hjortzberg-Nordlund79 
Honorary Positions 
Honorary Consul Kobe Ernest W. James 
Honorary Consul Yokohama Gösta B.T. Guston 
Honorary Consul Dairen Walter H. Winning 
Honorary Vice Consul Frederik E.E. Ringer 
Nagasaki 
Honorary Vice Consul William H. Sainton 
Shimonoseki 
Note: At the beginning of Bagge’s term. 
Source: Sweden. Utrikesdepartementet. Kungl. utrikesdepartementets 
kalender, 1938, 70. 
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Picture 5.3 Ernest William James. Source: Photographer Unknown, “Picture of 
Ernest William James” in meiji-portraits.de by Bernd Lepach. Note: 
Despite his British nationality, he served as Sweden’s consul in Kobe. 
when it came to further Swedish trade interests. However, he left his position 
in late 1938 and, therefore, did not work much with Widar Bagge. Guston was 
replaced first ad interim by G.A. Neville, the manager of the foreign trading 
company Nickel & Lyons Co., Ltd, and on May 12, 1939, permanently by R.G. 
Bell, the owner of another trading company.81 The biographies of the honor-
ary consuls show how the Swedish consular network depended on the expatri-
ate community of different countries. Many consuls were not Swedes but either 
worked for Swedish companies or had close ties with them. This made the posi-
tions relatively easy to staff, which contrasts with the situation for career diplo-
mats, where replacements were less frequent and more tedious to achieve. In 
1940, a new legation secretary arrived in Tokyo, Erik von Sydow, but only as 
a replacement for Hugo Wistrand, who was transferred to Berlin. The legation 
was only enforced from the outside in 1945, through Olof Ripa, who became 
second secretary, shortly before Bagge left the legation. Ripa stayed after the 
departure of von Sydow, becoming the last Swedish diplomat in Tokyo, during 
the American occupation, with the title of “Diplomatic Representative to the 






Keeping relations alive 
Although Sweden and Japan were both not involved in the early stages of the war 
in Europe, Bagge was soon confronted with problems that threatened to become 
serious obstacles to Swedish interests. Swedish–Japanese sea traffic started to dete-
riorate in early 1940, which coincided with the German occupation of Denmark 
and Norway in April and the Winter War between Finland and the USSR. With 
three out of five Nordic countries under (quasi-)foreign control, many observers 
in Japan believed Scandinavia was no longer of any practical importance in inter-
national relations. According to Bagge, the Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s largest 
daily newspapers, had written that war events made Japanese diplomatic presence 
in Sweden unnecessary.83 At first, Bagge reported only about newspaper articles 
that argued in this direction but it was an increasing popular opinion. In early 
January 1941, the Japanese minister to Sweden, Matsushima Shikao, was one of 
the diplomats whom Foreign Minister Matsuoka reposted: in his case to Berlin, 
as a special diplomatic representative for tripartite negotiations. Problematically, 
Matsuoka did not name a new envoy to Stockholm, which became a headache to 
the UD since it meant another hurdle for bilateral relations.84 Some even worried 
it signaled Japanese doubts that Swedish independence would last in a German-
occupied Europe. Bagge held it for “undoubtedly important, from a Swedish 
point of view, that a Japanese minister is again accredited to Stockholm as soon 
as possible (…).”85 He quickly paid a visit to the foreign minister to point out 
that the Japanese media was mistaken in forsaking Scandinavia, and to emphasize 
that Sweden would still be central for trade with Nordic countries once shipping 
restarted.86 Matsuoka assured that Matsushima’s reposting to Germany was a 
necessity and had nothing to do with Japan’s appreciation for Sweden. The delay 
in sending a new envoy, the foreign minister argued, was solemnly due to a short-
age of adequate personnel for the position.87 However, either the Gaimushō was 
running severely low on skilled diplomats or Matsuoka’s words were not entirely 
truthful. Until the end of his tenure, in summer of that year, he did not appoint a 
new envoy, nor did Matsuoka’s successors see any diplomatic value in doing so. It 
took the Japanese side nearly two years to send a replacement. In the meantime, 
there were only three Japanese stationed in Sweden with diplomatic status.
Table 5.2 Japanese diplomats in Sweden in 1942 
Position Name 
Chargé d’Affaires Kōda Jōtarō 
Military Attaché Onodera Makoto 
Deputy Military Attaché Higuchi Fukashi 
Source: Swedish Academy of Science, Sveriges 
Statskalender för året 1942 [Sweden’s State Calendar for 
1942], ed. Vetenskapsakademin (Uppsala: Almquist & 
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The Gaimushō did not even appoint a consul to the city of Stockholm dur-
ing this period. The only additional staff was an honorary consul working in 
Gothenburg. That person was, however, a Swede (Tor E.J. Broström) who had 
been filling that administrative position since 1934.88 And the military attaché 
and his deputy were not sent to Sweden by the Gaimushō but by the authorities 
of the army. That there was only a single representative of the Gaimushō—the 
chargé d’affaires—strongly suggests that it did not have much interest in Sweden 
as an outpost of trade and diplomacy. For two long years, Stockholm remained 
largely neglected despite the fact that Sweden became a Protecting Power for 
Japan after 1941. The Gaimushō obviously judged that one chargé d’affaires in 
Stockholm and a Swedish minister in Tokyo were enough for the management 
of bilateral relations. 
In Tokyo, Bagge was confronted with another problem: the security of his
compatriots and his own legation. In July 1941, he cabled to the UD that “con-
sidering the uncertain situation” the secret archives of the legation had become
a liability and that he wished to destroy them.89 Although there was no danger
to the diplomats per se—the Gaimushō had always respected international norms
like diplomatic immunity—whether the military police, the Kenpeitai, would keep
to the same standards was a different question. Should there be a fallout between
Sweden and Japan, his legation might be in danger. Although no such event
occurred, Bagge’s fears were not unfounded. Enemy embassies and legations were
indeed searched before they were sealed by the Kenpeitai once the war with the
allies broke out later that year. Even without that foresight, signs of the deterio-
rating security situation for Westerners in Japan were clear to the expatriate com-
munity. Bagge reported that the dangers for all foreigners in Japan had risen over
the past year. Although Sweden was not part of the Anglo-American bloc, with
whom war was becoming ever more likely, that was no guarantee for the safety of
Swedish citizens from the Kenpeitai. “The possibility of Japan’s entry into the war
carries special risks for its white inhabitants in view of the strong increase in xeno-
phobia.”90 Especially pressure against British nationals had been mounting with
the worst incident occurring on July 27, 1940, when 12 Britons (all distinguished
businessmen or professionals) were arrested across the country in a coordinated
stunt against what was feared to be espionage activities. Both of Sweden’s British
consuls, Frederik Ringer of Nagasaki and Ernest James of Kobe, were among the
arrested, on charges of violating the law on military secrets.91 James was released
from custody after five days, but Ringer remained detained for over a month. He
was released eventually but died later that year (whether his death was connected
to the incident cannot be judged from the available records).92 Another detainee,
Melville James Cox, a Reuters journalist, died in custody after falling from the
third floor of the Kenpeitai headquarter two days after the arrest.93 The Japanese
police reported the incident as a suicide, while British investigations found that
Cox probably succumbed to intense mental pressure during the interrogation and
leaped to his death. There were no indications for direct foul play.94 Nevertheless,
among members of the foreign community in Tokyo, Kobe, and Osaka, many
























community that marked the deterioration of the personal security situation and
led to the departure of many in the expatriate community. Even long-term resi-
dents like James, who had been born and raised in Japan, decided to leave the
country. Politically, Japan had become a hostile place.
Naturally, these developments were of great concern to Bagge. However, 
pressed with the question if Sweden should take action diplomatically, he advised 
against an official Swedish statement. Neither an evacuation of the Swedish col-
ony nor a repatriation recommendation was warranted, in his opinion. He assured 
his ministry that he was in close contact with the Swedish companies to ensure 
that they took care of the safety of their employees and that companies would 
check the validity of employee passports but he also argued that “total evacuation 
(…) seems excluded considering the financial interests of the companies.”96 The 
circumstances were not ideal, but they were not a life-or-death matter in his opin-
ion. Maintaining Sweden’s commercial position was more important than escap-
ing the suspicions of certain circles in Japan. At the same time, he recognized how 
serious the situation had become, which is why he left the choice of remaining or 
leaving Japan to the concerned individuals. Consequently, a set of questions was 
sent to the 100 people of the expatriate community to inquire about their wishes. 
By September 1941, only 13 Swedes (which included two children) wished to be 
repatriated. Everybody else preferred to stay.97 
Trade 
Keeping commerce alive 
International developments had spared Sweden from being dragged into the war
in Europe and, simultaneously, deterred Japan from entering the fight on Hitler’s
side. The situation had also silenced Swedish criticism on Japanese actions in China,
setting a course for Swedish–Japanese relations to continue on a “business as usual”
basis. Once it was clear that Japan would seek a neutral position, Japanese and
American newspapers predicted a considerable economic upswing, because dur-
ing the First World War neutral trade also initially increased.98 Although this could
have heralded a new era of economic collaboration between Stockholm and Tokyo,
obstacles soon emerged. The first visible trace thereof is the almost complete lack
of trade records for the years 1940–1945 in the Swedish statistical yearbooks. The
only official information available is import figures for 1944 and 1945, according
to which Sweden received goods of a value of SEK 634,000 and SEK 277,000,
respectively. Although these numbers mean that trade between Sweden and Japan
never completely ceased, it represents only 5 percent of the SEK 10 million worth of
goods imported in 1939. Japanese statistics are equally spotty although they record
trade for a longer period into the war. For goods exported to Sweden, data was
recorded up until 1941. Surprisingly, data on imports from Sweden was collected
for every year until 1945, which is an astonishing testimony to Japan’s administra-
tive capacity when it came to import controls even while its empire was falling
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Figure 5.2 Swedish imports and exports to Japan 1939–1941. Source: Data from 
Honma, Nippon keizai tōkeishū 1868–1945, 35–47. 
Between 1939 and 1941, the value of Swedish goods to Japan declined roughly 30
percent annually.99 
Bagge was naturally trying to forestall the trend but 1940 turned out to breed
ever new trade hurdles. Port calls of Swedish ships to Japanese harbors halved.
The sea link between Sweden and Japan suffered from the dangerous situation in
European waters. The land route via Siberia, Moscow, and Tallinn to Stockholm
had, therefore, gained importance, but in August, the Soviet Government started to
require certificates of origin for the transport of Japanese goods. Those could only
be obtained through the Soviet embassy in Tokyo but “not without difficulties,” as
Bagge put it in a report in September 1940.100 He requested the UD to negotiate
minimum fright contingents and install a local agent in Vladivostok to help expedite
cargo clearance of Japanese goods traded by Swedish companies.101 That strategy
seemed to work for the first few months with encouraging signs from the Japanese
side as well. Bagge received the principal agreement by the Japanese finance min-
ister that the export to Sweden of non-vital goods would still be allowed in the
upcoming months. Trade numbers for the running period were still healthy. He
reported that between August 19 and October 23, he had legalized documents for
the transit of 3,030 tons of cotton, wool, and knitted goods for a total value of ¥ 6.4
million.102 Considering that the UD had declared in February of the same year that
it would use a one-to-one exchange ratio (one crown for one yen), that was a very
high two-month average of exports, even in comparison to 1939.103 Around half
of the transports were done via Siberia and the other half by ship.104 But the trend
did not last long. Already in early January 1941, cargo transport through Siberia
was suspended because of Soviet measures that required routing traffic solely to
the German Königsberg (Kaliningrad) and Japan Railway’s lower capacity for that
route. This would have culminated in additional taxes and applications for waybills
that made the transport all but impossible. The Swedes had to wait for the con-
clusion of Soviet–Japanese transit agreements as well as themselves negotiate with










































The sea route suffered, too. Whereas for 1938, a total of 47 Swedish ships
called at the port of Yokohama and the following year still 40 were registered,
the number fell to 25 in 1940 and not a single port call to Yokohama in 1941.106 
Not only did the sea passage become more dangerous due to the war in Europe,
but it also became much more cumbersome. Britain started patrolling the sea,
demanding that neutral cargo must obtain its “navicerts” to be allowed to pass.
A navicert—short for navigational certificate—was a document akin to a passport
for neutral trade, which testified that the cargo on neutral ships was not destined
for an enemy port. The navicert system was a British attempt at beating Germany
by policing the high sea with its extensive maritime power. Different from pass-
ports, navicerts could not be issued by the country that wanted its goods to be
traded but only by the British Government through its diplomatic representations
abroad. Those could refuse the issuance if trade with the enemy was suspected or
if goods had been (unilaterally) declared contraband.107 Thereby, navicerts became
an instrument to expand the policy of sea blockades against enemy nations—a pol-
icy that was an infringement on international law but had worked well for Britain
already in the First World War.108 To seafaring neutrals like Sweden, it was a heavy-
handed infringement on the right to trade with both belligerents. However, since
Great Britain with its extensive fleet controlled large portions of the Atlantic and
the Pacific Oceans, there was little that could be done against the unilateral policy.
Therefore, Bagge had to continuously apply for navicerts. The process could take
weeks as it necessitated proof of the final destinations of the goods (separate cargo
needed separate navicerts) and they were frequently rejected.109 During 1940
and 1941, Bagge and the UD repeatedly protested the withholding of navicerts
for Swedish ships from or to Japan, usually to little avail. Many trade initiatives
came to a late end because even when they were successfully negotiated between
Swedish and Japanese stakeholders, their shipment could become impossible. The
largest setback in this regard was the attempted export of Swedish nickel and cad-
mium of 125 tons and 12 tons, respectively, in October 1941. The sale had been
in preparations for months, just to fail to receive British navicerts.110 It was a clear
sign for London’s distrust of Tokyo, which had not yet become a participant of
the war. From May 1940 onward, refusals of navicerts for all Swedish–Japanese
trade became the norm.111 In short, export and import became more and more
difficult as the political situation and the security on the traffic routes deteriorated.
Almost every shipment had to be negotiated with at least two or three actors like
Japan, the USSR, Britain, Germany, and sometimes also Japanese railway com-
panies. Goods had to pass through territories on land or sea which they con-
trolled and demanded licenses for. However, the Swedes did not give up. As late
as March 1941, Bagge reported to the foreign ministry that there was “significant
Japanese interest” for the import of Swedish pulp, paper, and steel for a value of
¥ 7 million through Mitsubishi Corporation. He argued that his ministry should
use this opportunity to demand from Japan imports of equal value.112 He was
most likely eying for an increase in soybean imports from Manchukuo. However,
trade reciprocity went both ways. To grant an import permit for these products,
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import goods from Japan of equal value. It was not acceptable to the Japanese side
that the old trade deficit with Sweden would continue, even when it was the big
Japanese firms, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, that requested these goods.113 
Furthermore, the worsening political situation between Japan and the United
States led Japan to openly consider the abolition of US dollars to pay for Japanese
goods on world markets and instead switch to German Reichsmark for trade with
Europe. Sweden’s largest exporter, SKF, had already started negotiations with its
trading partners to settle bills in German currency but Bagge came up with a dif-
ferent idea: a genuine Swedish–Japanese clearing system. The move was supposed
to eliminate the need for a third intermediary currency and, thereby, remove the
uncertainty about the availability of money. Bagge proposed to clear exchange
directly through a Swedish-crown denominated account for Japan at the Enskilda
Banken, a private bank, and a Swedish-owned yen account at the Yokohama Specie
Bank (YSB).114 Bagge’s proposal found open ears on both sides, especially the YSB
was eager to move the plans forward. On the Swedish side, adjustments were made
that excluded Enskilda Banken. But, in the end, the deal was implemented between
the YSB and Sweden’s central bank, the Riksbank. With the consent of Gunnar
Hägglöf, the head of the UD’s trade department, the agreement came into force
on May 28, 1941.115 However, world affairs once again overturned strategic plan-
ning. Operation Barbarossa—the German invasion of the Soviet Union—started
less than a month later, on June 22, turning Japan’s military ally, Germany, into
an enemy of the USSR. Despite the fact that Japan, as we have seen, remained
neutral toward the Soviet Union, the upheaval that the German attack created
was tremendous. All trade to and from Europe stopped for weeks.116 Goods from
the Japanese mainland, as well as exports from Manchukuo, could not be trans-
ported via Siberia because the Königsberg had become enemy territory to the
Soviet Union and the Estonian port of Tallinn was now a warzone. Only the lim-
ited sea link offered some possibilities for goods to leave or enter Japan, but those
consignments were traded in German Reichsmark, Argentinian Pesos, or Swiss
Francs.117 The Swedish–Japanese clearing system had, in this regard, only a lim-
ited impact. Especially in later years, the currency of Switzerland, the Swiss Franc,
was more popular than the Swedish crown in Japan because it had a wider use in
international transactions, owing to the dominance of the Swiss National Bank in
international finance and the fact that the Swiss Franc was also the house currency
of the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements, which operated through-
out the war.118 However, the direct clearing system between Sweden and Japan
remained an option for the settlement of payments when both sides accepted the
other currency from which Swedish trading companies could benefit occasionally.
Summary 
By the time Hitler attacked Poland, the Swedish attitude toward Japan had come 
full circle. It had moved from a relationship defined mainly by trade interests before 
1930, to one of “trade under protest” during the early years of Japan’s expan-










anarchy was becoming the norm again. Developments at the League of Nations 
were pivotal for that shift. After the failure of sanctions against Italy and Japan, and 
a joint declaration of European neutrals, Swedish foreign policy became increas-
ingly cautious. The new global situation with antagonistic Great Power blocs and 
diminishing respect for international treaties was indeed alarming, leading to calls 
for a return to Swedish neutrality. At the beginning of the 1930s that policy had 
only few friends among Swedish politicians. It was commonly emphasized that 
neutrality was incompatible with League membership.119 However, the winds 
changed between 1936 and 1939. After a period of internal struggle, all gov-
ernmental parties agreed to support the return to Swedish neutrality, effectively 
abandoning the collective security approach through the League. At the same 
time, Japan, too, opted for a neutral policy in the ensuing European war, under 
the guise of “noninvolvement.” Deterred by the Soviet Union in Nomonhan 
and surprised by Germany’s sudden Non-Aggression Pact with Stalin, Tokyo 
chose to focus on its warfare in China while maintaining normal relations with 
all others. In comparison with Sweden, the Japanese approach came with the 
important difference that the Empire kept the option open to join the war in the 
future. Under these circumstances, Swedish–Japanese trade could have continued 
as usual after 1939, but it was eventually slowed down by external circumstances. 
The dangers of the high seas in connection with Britain’s insistence to control 
commerce to and from Europe through navicerts and the difficulties to obtain 
permits from the Soviet Union for transit through Siberia resulted in a decline in 
trade. Inside Japan, the situation became more dangerous to Swedish citizens due 
to the rise of attacks against Westerners. But neither Minister Widar Bagge nor 
the UD believed that the situation warranted an evacuation. Only 10 percent of 
the Swedish colony left the Empire before the attack on Pearl Harbor. All in all, 
during the first two years of the War in Europe, Swedish–Japanese relations took 
a clear turn toward bilateralism, with an increasing role of Swedish diplomacy in 
trade questions. It was a trend that would become more pronounced during the 
dramatic years of the War in the Pacific. 
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6 Fully engaged 
Total war in the Pacific 
International politics 
A new war in the Pacifc 
The recent developments in Japanese–American relations have unfortunately 
been such as to cause considerable concern on both sides of the Ocean. It 
is needed now, more than ever, to bring about a better understanding of 
each other’s position in order to secure the interests and well-being of our 
two nations, thereby preserving the peace of the Pacific and maintaining the 
traditional friendship between us.1 
With these words the new ambassador to the United States, Nomura Kichisaburō, 
greeted President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 14, 1941. More than a
year after the war in Europe had started, the political climate between Tokyo and
Washington was deteriorating fast, and both sides knew it. Nomura, a retired admi-
ral of the Imperial Navy who had served as foreign minister in the Abe cabinet,
would hold negotiations with Roosevelt and his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, to
find a formula for an understanding on Pacific and European affairs. Compared to
Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s negotiations in Moscow that resulted in the Neutrality
Pact with Stalin, Nomura’s aims in Washington were much broader, aimed at
obtaining strategic objectives on several fronts. At the core of the initiative lay the
desire for a negotiated settlement of Japan’s imperial ambitions. They included
US help in persuading Chiang Kai-shek’s surrender in China, a new trade agree-
ment with the United States, access to raw materials, the eventual neutralization
of the Philippines, and principles of nonintervention in Europe.2 Naturally, such a
wide-ranging “memorandum of understanding” was a Herculean task, consider-
ing that the United States was in the midst of abandoning its traditional neutrality
toward Europe. Roosevelt enacted the Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1941, and
was already engaged in planning the post-World War II order with Great Britain,
outlined in the Atlantic Charter of August 14. Neither was Nomura’s task helped
by the intransigent stance of Matsuoka, who rejected substantial concessions to
the Americans, arguing for negotiations from a position of strength.3 But after
Germany’s attack on the USSR, on June 22, Matsuoka’s approach lost rapidly in
























reshuffled yet again. With the approval of the Emperor, the army, and the navy,
Konoe Fumimaro dissolved the cabinet just to form it anew with mostly the same
members, save Matsuoka, who was replaced by Admiral Toyoda Teijirō. It was a
peculiar political maneuver. Never before had a Japanese Prime Minister directly
succeeded himself. The whole reshuffle was only necessary to dismiss the impulsive
and Germanophile foreign minister without signaling an American-friendly turn,
which in fact, it was.4 Konoe hoped to achieve more in his negotiations with the
United States through a new direction at the Gaimushō. 
Unfortunately, the new cabinet did not have more success with Washington.
To avoid the semblance of weakness, the new foreign minister declared that his
tenure would not break with the goals of his predecessor. At the same time, the
relentless pressure of the Japanese army in Indochina against the French also sig-
naled no shift in Japan’s position. In meetings with Ambassadors Grew and Craigie
in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda was conciliatory, assuring the American and
British representatives of Japan’s benign intentions in Southeast Asia. But neither
Washington nor London thought this was much more than lip service.5 On July
26, Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the United States. Toyoda’s efforts toward
Ambassador Grew did not pay off, nor did the overtures of Prime Minister Konoe
for a summit meeting with President Roosevelt. The Americans did not buy into
the Japanese narrative. On August 1, Roosevelt extended the sanctions to include
an oil embargo, which was a particularly sensitive point to Tokyo as 80 percent of
its oil was coming from the United States and its reserves would not last for much
more than two years. Oil was the Achilles heel of the Japanese Empire.
On September 4, Envoy Widar Bagge telegraphed a highly pessimistic account 
to Stockholm, calling Grew’s hopes for a solution without a military confronta-
tion “utopian.”6 Even though Bagge recognized Konoe’s last-minute stunt to 
broker an understanding with Washington, he viewed the unwavering demand 
of the military for a “New Order” in East Asia as incompatible with US foreign 
policy. His observations were not mistaken. Only two days later, at a secret impe-
rial conference, the use of force against the United States was decided should 
Nomura’s talks fail to produce results. Shortly thereafter, Hull declined Toyoda’s 
offer for a summit meeting. Within a month, Konoe’s options were exhausted, 
leading to his resignation on October 16. He was succeeded by the former war 
minister and active-duty general, Tōjō Hideki, a hardliner with little sympathy for 
diplomatic overtures. In the evening hours of December 8, 1941, Bagge sent a 
short telegram to Stockholm: “the Japanese foreign ministry has officially notified 
the legation about the state of war between Japan, the USA, Great Britain, and 
the British dominions.”7 In the morning hours Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor. 
National politics 
No more debates 
News of the unprovoked attack and the following chain reaction—a wave of 
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Left-wing publications almost unisono interpreted Japan’s move as another aggres-
sion but this time one that would spell the Empire’s end. Norrskensfamman, the 
main paper of the Communist Party, even wrote polemically that Japan “will 
not survive this adventure. The samurai are on their way to commit harakiri.”8 
The Social-Demokraten similarly predicted that Japan’s inferior naval forces could 
only outmaneuver the Anglo-Saxon navies in the short run, but that the attack 
was, overall, a “desperate move.”9 The conservative Svenska Dagbladet, too, 
believed that this was foolish (although not unexpected) and that in contrast 
to the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, this war would turn out completely differ-
ent, since Dagbladet viewed the United States as undefeatable.10 Also the liberal 
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning believed that the only chance of success for 
Japan was through a quick series of victories, as a protracted war would be unwin-
nable.11 The only paper that expressed a faint shimmer of optimism for Japan was 
the strongly German-friendly Aftonbladet, which framed the attack as the result 
of misguided US policy and that no one could know the outcome of the war but 
that it would be a chance to eliminate the “Russian peril” from Europe. That was 
not much more than wishful thinking as the Japanese had now clearly decided to 
fight the United States, not the USSR. In fact, Tokyo and Moscow would remain 
neutral toward each other’s wars until August, 1945. 
Most newspapers noted that this was the beginning of a true world war as the 
implications of the attack reverberated immediately to Europe, where the other 
Axis Powers declared war on the United States and vice versa. Swedish commen-
tators tried to estimate what the impact of the monumental event would be for 
their country, but only a few of them mentioned Sweden’s direct interests like 
the trading companies. Most analysts tried to estimate the secondary impact in 
terms of the shift in the balance of power in Europe, where now a new reality with 
direct US involvement would begin. Also, the tone and aim of these publications 
stand in contrast to those of earlier events—the outbreak of hostilities in China 
in 1931 and again in 1937, when editorials were still asking about what Sweden 
could or should do. The idea of a boycott movement, or the calls for Swedish 
condemnation, or action at the League were, as we have seen, actively discussed 
back then. In 1941, demands for Swedish involvement in the management of the 
crisis were ominously absent from the papers. Commentators and readers seem to 
have come to the conclusion that world events in Asia were now clearly beyond 
the reach of Sweden. Consequently, the most prominent call to action was that 
for a more robust Swedish neutrality.12 
Politically, interest in Asian affairs was on an all-time low in Stockholm. So 
much so that the Utrikesutskottet, the Foreign Policy Committee (UU), barely 
took note of the new war. Far Eastern matters were discussed for only few min-
utes and solely in the context of what the situation meant for trade and Sweden’s 
role as a Protecting Power. It was mostly Foreign Minister Günther informing 
parliament of a few facts on the ground. Neither during its meeting on December 
9, 1941, nor on February 17, 1942, did the UU discuss Swedish reactions to the 
new theater of war, it merely took note of the entry of more belligerents into an 





structural reasons. In a situation where four out of five political parties were in the 
government, parliamentary power was weak. During 1941–1943 neither the UU 
nor the Advisory Council of Foreign Affairs were convoked often. Nevertheless, 
as a way of contrast a comparison with a “real” security threat is instructive. In 
the UU protocol of February 1942, Germany is mentioned on 180 pages, while 
Japan appears only nine times. Also the Riksdag debate of the same day did not 
include talks about Japan or the new War in the Pacific, in a meaningful way. The 
only mention of Japan was in the context of what kind of weaponry the Empire 
had used, and which of them seemed to be effective in air-battles. The expan-
sion of World War II to dozens of new countries was to no practical concern of 
Swedish law makers. It was the national situation and European developments 
that occupied the legislature.14 Also in 1943, Japan was discussed only on the 
margins, as on November 3, when it was briefly mentioned that the Empire con-
trolled the bulk of world rubber exports.15 On a national level, Japan had become 
a footnote to Sweden’s foreign policy debate. 
The marginalization of East Asian affairs is no surprise, since the situation in 
Scandinavia was bleak. Germany had occupied Denmark and Norway. Finland 
had joined the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and Iceland was under 
British control. Public debate in Sweden was still muffled, daily necessities were 
rationed, and many men had been drafted to the military to guard the borders. 
In this situation it was not Japan but national security that was naturally the top 
priority of the early 1940s. Intelligence, for example, became essential, but genu-
ine Swedish intelligence services had only been formed in 1938—unknown to the 
public until 1943. The military intelligence, the so-called Section U, was headed 
by Colonel Carlos Adlercreutz—problematically a man with close relations to the 
military attachés of the Axis Powers. The second organization was the Allmänna 
Säkerhetstjänsten, the General Security Service, which enjoyed extensive powers. 
Over a few years, it opened 50 million private letters and wiretapped 11 million 
telephone calls. Thus, culminated the period of national alert (beredskapsåren).16 
That was also no coincidence, as Stockholm had come to play a role as a meeting 
place for spies and secret missions of foreign powers. On neutral soil it was not 
only possible to collect and exchange sensitive information, but all belligerents 
also disseminated their propaganda—even Chinese and Japanese newsletters were 
distributed to a handful of concerned Swedes.17 
After el-Alamein and Stalingrad it was evident that the war had reached a turn-
ing point. This was soon mirrored in official Swedish policy. Late in 1942, Colonel 
Adlercreutz was replaced and the police headquarters began to receive Danish, 
Norwegian, and Anglo-Saxon guests, in contrast to earlier days when German 
police officials had been in the majority. In the summer of 1943, the government 
in Stockholm finally announced that German soldiers would not be allowed to 
cross Swedish territory on their way home from Norway anymore. From now on, 
Swedish neutrality policy tilted in favor of the Allies. In October 1944, all exports 
of ball bearings to the German Reich were suspended—although ball-bearing 
steel was still sold.18 Swedish immigration policy, too, became more lenient. In a 
humanitarian action in October 1943, Sweden received more than 7,000 Danish 
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Jews, shortly before their planned deportation to Germany. Even more spectacu-
lar was an agreement that Folke Bernadotte reached with Heinrich Himmler, 
under which a large number of concentration camp inmates could be evacuated 
to Sweden. That happened in parallel to the most well-known Swedish wartime 
effort to rescue Jews, achieved in Budapest by Raoul Wallenberg, the grandson of 
Sweden’s first envoy to Japan. He worked for the American War Refugee Board 
but was subsequently arrested by the Red Army and never returned from intern-
ment.19 A similar fate awaited the hundreds of Baltic and German ex-soldiers who 
had escaped to Sweden by boat. The Hansson government extradited them to 
the Soviet Union. That sparked a furious moral debate in the newspapers, but it 
took until 1994 before the Swedish Government officially apologized to the last 
Baltic survivors.20 
Diplomacy 
Sweden as a Protecting Power 
In contrast to the small impact that Pearl Harbor had on political discussions in 
Stockholm, it had an immediate effect on the UD—especially on its diplomats. 
The war in Europe, coupled with Sweden’s neutrality and its diplomatic capacity 
with legations and consulates in most countries and territories of the world, had 
already led to a number of requests for Sweden’s so-called Good Offices. The 
institution of Good Office was (and still is) a diplomatic practice in which one 
state lends its civil administrative capacity to another state. Good Office services 
can be rendered for different reasons, but especially when nations break relations, 
it is common that both ask third states to help them in civil matters toward the 
state with which direct relations are terminated.21 The reason for that is simple: 
even during intense conflicts (like wars) there are moments when enemies have 
common interests that can be resolved through negotiation. But to do so, they 
need intermediaries. The protection of citizens on enemy soil, the repatriation 
of diplomats and civilians, or the care for prisoners of war (POWs) are exam-
ples for shared belligerent interests. For instance, in the case of Japan, British, 
American, Dutch, and other enemy diplomats were immediately interned in their 
embassies and were in need of help to communicate and, eventually, return to 
their home countries. Simultaneously, the same was true for Japanese diplomats 
like Ambassador Nomura in the United States. The country rendering Good 
Office services is then also referred to as a “Protecting Power.” Two aspects are 
important to note on this issue: firstly, Good Office/Protecting Power services 
are rendered with the full knowledge of both parties. This is only natural because 
the receiving state has to consent to the representative function of the third state. 
Usually, this is not a problem as all belligerent states want their interests pro-
tected and therefore grant the same treatment to their enemies. Reciprocity in 
diplomacy is a basic principle that is adhered to even during war. Consequently, 
Sweden did not commit an unfriendly act when assisting a state on the territory 
of its enemy. Secondly, Sweden did not become a part of the diplomacy of the 
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protected state and did not commit an unneutral act by doing so. Sweden only 
took over clerical functions toward the citizens of the states it protected but did 
not itself become part of a foreign government’s diplomacy, even when Sweden 
transmitted messages and notes between the two enemy states. 
Sweden already had had some experience in handling requests for its Good 
Offices. In the nineteenth century it did so once, protecting Sardinian–Italian 
interests in Austria (1859–1866), and during World War I, Stockholm first 
safeguarded Bulgaria’s interests in Great Britain from 1915 onward and later 
accepted 16 more Protecting Power mandates. Among those were the protec-
tion of Chinese interests in German-occupied Belgium and Japanese interests in 
Russia.22 Therefore, Sweden was a well-established and well-prepared Protecting 
Power when the war in Europe started. One week after Germany attacked Poland, 
the UD created an office which was tasked exclusively with handling Protecting 
Power mandates under the name Section B. The activities of the B-Section were 
referred to as the “representation of foreign interests.” For example, Sweden 
was immediately asked to become the Protecting Power for Poland and South 
Africa in the German Reich, and for Germany in France and Egypt. In diplomatic 
parlance, Sweden “represented the interests” of these countries in the respective 
enemy territories. 
With the spread of war, Swedish engagements as Protecting Power also grew. 
At its busiest, the Section B employed 20 people in Stockholm and approxi-
mately 150 people abroad at the legations and consulates. Sweden’s adminis-
trative capacity was crucial for the orderly execution of the mandates. In 1943 
alone, the Section B received and sent about 15,000 documents and telegrams 
and used up a budget of SEK 5 million.23 However, it needs to be stressed that 
Protecting Power mandates also had a formalistic side. In some instances, bel-
ligerents appointed a Protecting Power in territories where they had little to 
no interests, as a pro-forma arrangement, which resulted in little work for the 
Protecting Power. On the other hand, there were also instances when political 
Figure 6.1 Number of Swedish Protecting Power mandates for country 1939–1945.
Source: Lists in UDA, 2210.03.1, P19, A. See appendix. 
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issues prevented Sweden from becoming a Protecting Power officially but when 
its diplomats were still able to help foreign citizens. The Section B referred to such 
cases as “informal” or “de-facto” mandates (underhandsuppdrag). For example, 
because Japan often refused to accord diplomatic rights to occupied countries, it 
did not recognize Sweden as the representative of Norwegian and Greek interests 
when their governments in exile approached Stockholm for help in Japan. At 
the same time, however, the Gaimushō did not object to the Swedish legation 
functioning as a point of contact for Norwegians and Greek subjects in Japan and 
protect them de facto. Bagge also initiated requests at the UD whether and how 
to help Norwegians in Hong Kong when it became clear that the Gaimushō had 
refused Argentina as Norway’s Protecting Power there (in April 1942).24 Also 
Luxembourgian subjects were among the ones the consulate checked on regu-
larly, starting from July 1942.25 The nonrecognition of enemy governments in 
Table 6.1 Countries/Territories in which Sweden 
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exile was primarily meant to delegitimize those governments. It was not followed 
consistently, however. Japan did accept Sweden’s representation of the interests 
of the Dutch Government in exile, which probably had to do with the relatively 
important status of the Dutch East Indies, where Japan had sought the protec-
tion of its interests by Switzerland. 
Sweden accepted Protecting Power mandates both formally and informally, 
leading to a total of 135 mandates between 1939 and 1945.26 Roughly a third 
of these mandates were directly or indirectly the consequence of Japan’s entry 
into the war.27 In addition, Japan was the country for which Sweden held the 
most Protecting Power mandates. Stockholm accepted 25 mandates for Japan, as 
can be seen in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1. Vice-versa, Japan was also the country 
in which Sweden protected most foreign interests, with a total of 13 mandates 
(Table 6.2).28 
Protecting Japan—and her enemies 
On December 10, the Gaimushō handed the Swedish legation in Tokyo a list of 
territories where it wished to receive Swedish protection of Japanese interests. 
They included the possessions of the British Empire in East and Southeast Asia: 
Burma, Ceylon, and the northwestern parts of India (Baluchistan, Punjab, and 
Kashmir),29 but also the US islands of Hawaii. That was a peculiar request since 
Japan had turned to Spain for its representation on the US mainland. The reason 
for the exception in Hawaii was one of practicality because Spain did not operate 
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descent. That was more than a third of the Hawaiian population.30 Many of them 
were already second or third generation emigrants who felt more Hawaiian than 
Japanese but for others, the ties to Japan were still intact. Japan also had a large 
consulate in Honolulu, infamously staffed with several spies who had sent infor-
mation about Pearl Harbor’s military base to the Japanese Navy.31 Those were 
important reasons to have a genuine and effective Protecting Power on the island 
with the capacity and willingness to intervene on behalf of Japan. Sweden was a 
natural choice for that, since it had been operating an honorary consulate there 
since the 1850s. By 1941, the unsalaried position was filled by a US–Swedish 
dual national, Gustaf Wilhelm Olson. Having emigrated to the United States in 
1888, and worked for hospitals and hospital associations for decades, Olson was 
65 years old at the time of his appointment and well qualified especially for the 
humanitarian aspect of the work for Japanese internees.32 
Protecting Power mandates can be confusing. In the case of US–Japanese
relations and the neutral go-betweens, one more factor complicated the situa-
tion, because belligerents did not have to ask the same neutral state to serve as
their common Protecting Power. Japan was represented by Spain in the United
States but since Washington did not trust Francoist Spain, it asked Switzerland
to do the same job in Tokyo. That meant that Sweden was the third neutral
involved in US–Japanese wartime diplomacy, responsible only for Japan’s inter-
ests in Hawaii. This had implications on a topic that immediately appeared on
the records of the legation: the question of how to evacuate the diplomats and
civilians of the Empire’s new enemies who were now so unfortunately stranded
in Japan. Already by the beginning of January 1942, the Swiss announced a
plan to organize a prisoner exchange on the neutral territory of Lourenço-
Marques (Maputo), the capital of Portuguese Mozambique at the southeastern
coast of Africa. The largest stakeholders in this civilian exchange program were
the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, because they had the most people
on each other’s soil. Since Sweden was Japan’s Protecting Power in Hawaii, it
had to join the negotiating table. In addition, the decision of Washington and
London to coordinate their efforts for exchanges added another layer of dif-
ficulty because Britain’s Protecting Power in Japan was Argentina at the time
(London switched to Switzerland only in May 1942). Adding four neutrals to
the discussions between three belligerents meant the involvement of seven gov-
ernments in highly sensitive negotiations. It was a confusing situation with a lot
of potential for misunderstanding.33 Minister Bagge had to coordinate on a daily
basis with his Swiss and Argentinian counterparts to drive the discussion on the
exchanges forward.34 The only thing he could do to simplify the situation was to
make sure that Sweden left all the sensitive negotiation to the main Protecting
Powers. He held that “although Sweden protects Japanese interests in Hawaii,
the principles of the evacuation must be prepared through Swiss mediation.”35 
Switzerland was leading the negotiations in Tokyo and Bagge followed them
closely. Over the next year, the Swedish legation cabled regular information on
the state of evacuation ships and the negotiations between the United States and





Picture 6.1 The Gripsholm anchoring in Barcelona. Source: ICRCAA, V-P-
HIST-00985-22. 1944. International Committee of the Red Cross, 
“War 1939-1945.” Barcelona. German-allied exchange. Departure of the 
hospital ship “Gradisca” which passes near the Swedish boat “Gripsholm” 
having in its board British and American prisoners.” 
A particularly important issue that was handled by Stockholm was the provi-
sion of ships. Because Switzerland had only few ships sailing under its flag and 
none of them big enough to accommodate the more than 1,000 passengers that 
the exchange plans envisioned, the Swedes organized a cruiser of theirs—the 
Gripsholm. The splendid ship was painted in the colors of the Red Cross to signal 
to all submarines and war ships that it was a hospital ship under international 
diplomatic protection.
In Tokyo, Minister Bagge started working immediately on the interests of the 
nationals under his protection. The Dutch were the first to solicit Sweden’s help 
after their government in exile had declared war on Japan alongside the United 
States and Britain. Like the Anglo-American embassies also the legation of the 
Netherlands was sealed off and its diplomats were made prisoners in their homes. 
Bagge was able to speak to the Dutch minister on December 10 and transmit 
information about the meeting via Stockholm to the government in exile. A day 
later, the Swedish legation forwarded the first telegram of Belgian Ambassador 
Forthomme to Stockholm since his Foreign Ministry (also in exile) had decided to 
break diplomatic relations with Japan—one step short of declaring war. The same 
was true for the Norwegian and the Mexican legations. Their governments broke 
relations on December 9, which for their diplomatic missions in Tokyo meant 
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declared war. The Japanese Military Police, the Kenpeitai, refused to differentiate 
between enemy states and nations without diplomatic contact. Communication 
with their governments was interrupted and their buildings were isolated.36 
Over the course of a few days, the Swedish legation took over also the pro-
tection of nationals from Belgium, Bolivia, Honduras, and Mexico. Bagge was 
allowed to visit the heads of the missions that were under his protection but only 
occasionally—much less than he would have wanted. He protested the restric-
tions at the Gaimushō, but often to little avail as even the Gaimushō was not 
always able to alter the behavior of the Kenpeitai. This was all the more reason 
to evacuate enemy diplomats and civilians as soon as possible. After months of 
negotiations, Bagge’s American protégés from Bolivia, Honduras, and Mexico 
were included in the first exchange ship to the United States, and the Europeans 
from Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Greece were on the second ship for 
the British exchange a few days later. British Ambassador Craigie, who was in the 
second batch of evacuees, recalls in his memoirs distinctively the joy of meeting 
again the colleagues with whom no contact had been possible for nearly eight 
months.37 To alert potential evacuees of the possibility to be repatriated, the lega-
tion posted several notices in Japanese newspapers. An example of such a notice is 
the following extract from the Japan Times of May 25, 1942 (Picture 6.2). 
Picture 6.2 Evacuation notice by the Swedish legation in the Japan Times. Source: 
Japan Times, May 25, 1942 (BA, 230033.2, F2b, I). Note: Posted by the 





New diplomats for Swedish jobs 
Literally overnight, the Swedish legation in Tokyo acquired a broad range of 
new responsibilities. To Minister Bagge, it was clear that this situation would 
result in a significant increase in the workload for his staff. Before the end of 
the year, he requested more diplomatic personnel—a Swedish diplomat from 
Moscow, if possible, as that person would be able to travel to Tokyo relatively 
quickly. Additionally, Bagge asked his ministry for a free hand in hiring local staff, 
Japanese or foreign.38 It was a reasonable request. The diplomatic correspond-
ence between the legation and Stockholm became twice as extensive for the four 
years of the war. Compared to earlier days, when only one or two telegrams 
per week were exchanged between the legation and the UD, after December 7, 
daily telegrams—often pertaining to several issues—became the norm. Already 
on December 11, Bagge hired two new (Swedish) consuls. Ivan Troedsson, a 
civil engineer, was appointed to the consular district of Yokohama and Tokyo, 
and Lorens Wirén, a businessman, became the successor of James in Kobe and 
Osaka. Troedsson, although named consul for Yokohama, had his workplace in 
the legation in Tokyo, not in the Yokohama consulate. The latter office was 
staffed with a new vice-consul in January 1942—the Swedish national Nils Kallin. 
He had been one of the local directors of SKF and was only 35 years old at the 
time of his appointment.39 He took over the entire administrative affairs of the 
consulate, that is, the dossiers that Guston (and others) had been working on 
before him.40 However, the content of his work was drastically different from 
that of his predecessors. The multiplication of all the humanitarian and legal cases 
he had to deal with increased communications from the consulate to the lega-
tion from a few letters each month to daily correspondence with Bagge. Kallin’s 
workload was soon too much for one person, which prompted Bagge to expand 
the mission staff through administrative positions. In May 1942, he appointed 
Gunnar Wester, also a Swedish national, to support the Yokohama consulate as 
a secretary.41 The minister also hired new legation staff. On January 1, 1942, Mr 
A. Olofson, another Swede, entered the service. Between February and April two 
more Swedes joined Bagge’s staff. First Ulf Wendbladh and then Nils E. Ericson, 
the representative of Carl Ekman & Co., whom Bagge had known and worked 
with for many years. The legation also hired a Japanese typist (Mrs Uchiyama), an 
errand boy (K. Oyama), and a chauffeur (K. Kawahara). Together with Ericson 
and Wendbladh, they were assigned to work in the newly established Section 
B of the legation, which mirrored the Section B at the UD.42 The only per-
son who was removed from his position was a Japanese interpreter, Mr Kokubu, 
whom Bagge reported was “undoubtedly working as a special agent of the police 
(…).”43 Bagge knew that this was nothing extraordinary and happened in other 
legations too, but the circumstances compelled him to replace the employee with 
a new interpreter, Mr Hashimoto. 
What stands out regarding the new arrivals at the legation is that almost exclu-
sively Swedish and Japanese nationals were taken in. The times when honor-
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Swedish passport could guarantee some recognition by Japanese military and 
civilian personnel. That is not to say, though, that Bagge did not try to extend the 
diplomatic umbrella to other nationals. There were cases in which he tried to hire 
people into his services to protect them from repercussions. Mr George-Adis was 
the earliest example of that tactic. George-Adis had been living in Yokohama for 
nearly two decades but did not have a valid passport that could certify his nation-
ality. He claimed to be Greek but since he spent his youth in Romania, the Greek 
legation did not believe him and refused him a passport, making him effectively 
stateless.44 After Bagge had failed to convince the Greek minister to recognize 
George-Adis, he tried to hire the unlucky man into his legation under the highly 
dubious pretext that he was in need of an interpreter for Greek–English transla-
tions—never mind that the Swedish legation was not in charge of Greek inter-
ests. The military authorities denied the request.45 Bagge was, however, able to 
hire other foreigners. A Danish national, Mr E.F. Johansen was working for the 
legation until mid-May 1945, when he was arrested by the Japanese police after 
Denmark had been liberated by the Allies from the German occupation.46 Also 
a Portuguese citizen was in Bagge’s service, Mr R. da Silva, as well as a Korean 
office boy.47 By May 1943, 18 months after Pearl Harbor, the mission staff had 
grown to 20 people, out of which 11 were Swedes. But even that was not enough. 
Bagge requested to receive at least one more official from Sweden to support the 
career diplomats in Tokyo. The UD proposed to send a senior official to take over 
the Section B. However, by that time, Bagge had already given this position to 
Ericson, whom he judged to be perfectly equipped for the task because he had 
been living in Japan for 20 years and spoke Japanese fluently. Those qualities, 
Bagge insisted, were absolutely necessary for the head of the Section B whose 
duties consisted of regular POW-camp visits and delicate negotiations with local 
Japanese civilian and military officers. The pragmatic solution to the problem was 
to convert Ericson into a full-fledged diplomat. Bagge requested a diplomatic 
passport for him, through which Ericson became a legation secretary.48 
New jobs for Swedish diplomats 
There were many instances when Bagge’s advocacy for his protégés clashed 
with Japanese authorities. To be fair, however, it must be said that the outbreak 
of the war with the Allied Powers caused a considerable amount of confusion 
also among Japanese agencies. The question of how to proceed with Protecting 
Powers who represented enemy interests had probably not been studied ahead 
of the war. It took the Gaimushō three months to release official guidelines per-
taining to the rights and duties of Protecting Powers. Japan promised therein 
to adhere to common practices, granting diplomatic representatives (agents of 
embassies, legations, or consulates) the following rights: 
1. Visit the diplomatic personnel of the represented country. 

























3. Assist the diplomats of the Protected Power in matters concerning their pri-
vate life. 
4. Inquire about the status of enemy civilians, including interned or arrested 
subjects. 
5. Manage financial affairs of the Protected Power, including that of interned 
and arrested subjects.49 
All five clauses were accompanied by the condition that, in accordance with inter-
national law, the Gaimushō and concerned Japanese agencies had to be informed 
before any of these steps were taken and that permissions by them had to be 
granted beforehand.50 The regulations clarified much. For example, that the 
property of enemy legations remained in their possession—despite the state of 
war. Enemy buildings, real estate, and bank accounts were not seized by Japanese 
forces, only sealed off for the time of the war. Bagge was, therefore, also charged 
with the caretaking of foreign assets. Bank accounts were often not released for 
his use but the private funds of diplomats and the cash that legations and consu-
lates held on their premises could mostly be transferred to the Swedish legation. 
Bagge kept accounts for the countries under his protection and credited them 
whenever financial assets of theirs could be secured. 
The protection of buildings was more difficult. In the beginning the stranded 
enemy diplomats took care of their own premises because they were interned 
therein but after the evacuations in summer 1942, Bagge had to find other solu-
tions. First, he arranged for the former Japanese staff of the defunct diplomatic 
missions to occupy and take care of the buildings. But especially for the Dutch 
legation, this arrangement did not work well. Bagge, therefore, moved his own 
staff into the Dutch buildings with von Sydow and Ericson designated to live 
there. Physical presence was the best form of protection.51 
In a similar way, visits to POW camps became an important part of the
Swedish mandate in Japan which, according to the regulations, could only be
accomplished by Swedish nationals with diplomatic status. From February 1942
onward, representatives of Bagge’s legation visited internment camps roughly
three to four times a month. The most visited site was the Den’nenchōfu camp
near Tokyo, but also the camps in Urawa (also near Tokyo), Nagasaki, Kogane,
and Kobe were visited frequently. Nils Ericson, the head of the Section B, and
Consul Troedsson were most often in charge of the inspections. They were
supported by Consul Wirén and the secretaries Gawell and von Sydow, and
sometimes also directly by Minister Bagge. After all visits, reports were written
about the situation in the camps. Three examples of 1942 are reproduced in the
appendix of this book. Over the course of the first 16 months, the Swedes made
about 50 camp visits.52 Considering that Japan was running hundreds of POW
camps and prisons in the country, the visits were not as plentiful or extensive
as they would have needed to be to provide a comprehensive assessment of the
situation of all POWs. In addition, the Gaimushō did not concede to neutral
inspections of camps outside Japan proper (with few exceptions). Requests for
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quickly denied.53 A regulatory gray area were the camps located in the over-
seas territories of the Japanese Empire—that is the territories that were part of
the Japanese Empire already before the outbreak of hostilities on the continent.
Camps in Formosa (Taiwan) were one example, the other was civilian internees
on the Kwantung Peninsula. Consul Kjellin, Sweden’s representative in Dairen,
reported that although he did not have an official mandate as part of the Swedish
Protecting Power
(…) as I am one of the few neutral foreigners living here, I have considered 
it a humanitarian duty to try to assist the British citizens interned here in dif-
ferent ways and to help them with food, tobacco, etc. The local authorities 
have also been accommodating in this respect and given me permission to 
visit the interned persons.54 
Some limited impact outside Japan was possible, but certainly only with the
benevolent consent of local Japanese authorities. It is also unclear how long
such unofficial activities could be sustained. Beyond this one letter from Kjellin,
there are no more reports pertaining to the situation of interned foreigners in
Dairen. 
Beyond diplomats and POWs, the legation’s new responsibilities extended also 
to the caretaking of enemy civilians. The first such case pertained to seven Dutch 
businessmen in Kobe who, right after the outbreak of the war, were arrested and 
imprisoned. They were directors of trading companies or bank managers. Like 
their British colleagues, a year earlier they were accused of espionage, a charge 
that allowed Japanese authorities to imprison subjects indefinitely and without 
trial. Bagge reported that the charges were “in my opinion, only pretext, the real 
purpose is to take hostages.”55 The best that he could do was to launch repeated 
complaints toward the Gaimushō and try to evacuate these civilians through the 
exchange ships as soon as possible. In the meantime, he would look after their 
physical well-being for as long as their confinement lasted. 
These jobs were new and incomparable to the time before Pearl Harbor when 
the legation was working almost exclusively on economic questions. The contrast 
was also felt in the consulates. The work of the consuls in Yokohama used to 
consist mainly of granting visas, indexing Swedish trade at the ports, and assist-
ing Swedes in case of illness or accidents. But by 1942, the new vice-consul 
in Yokohama, Kallin, was suddenly ordered to take care of the Dutch, Belgian, 
Mexican, and later also the Bolivian consulates in his district. Bagge instructed 
him to secure the consular archives and their belongings and report about the 
treatment of the former consuls. Kallin also started visiting the Negishi intern-
ment camp as soon as February 25. Dutch and Belgian nationals were imprisoned 
there and needed the help of their diplomatic representative to pass messages to 
their home governments and families or to request better treatment in case of 
illness or financial hardship.56 Kallin made regular cash payments to the foreign 
nationals (interned or free) under his care to allow them to buy food and clothes 

















Soon, Kallin also started filing legal claims toward the Japanese authorities in the 
name of the people and companies he represented. In late March, he intervened 
in the name of the Dutch “Japan–China Trading Company” against the capture 
and sale of a steamship that was seized in the port of Yokohama when the war 
broke out.57 Captured civilian enemy vessels were subject to confiscation and liq-
uidation by Japanese prize-courts. Kallin and his boss Troedsson helped in such 
cases the defendants to protect their property—even if the chances of success 
were scant.58 
In short, the jobs of the entire Swedish mission had become exceedingly
diverse. Bagge and his staff became heavily involved in issues of other nations
while, at the same time, Swedish diplomats at home and abroad lent their Good
Offices to Japan. That was not self-evident—the UD could have rejected the
requests of either side. But Bagge and UD decided that a refusal to serve as
Protecting Power was not a suitable course of action. In one of the first telegrams
to Stockholm, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Bagge explicitly recommended
to the UD that Sweden should accept the responsibilities for Japan since “the
fulfillment of such tasks might result in benefits in other respects (…).”59 He was
hopeful that the Japanese authorities would extend their goodwill to Sweden
in matters of trade. His superiors seemed to have shared his opinion. None of
Japan’s requests was rejected.
Swedish–Swiss collaboration and the Neutral Committee of the 
YMCA 
The closest diplomatic friend to the Swedish legation was the Swiss mission. 
Although they were not the only two neutral legations left in Tokyo—Argentina, 
Portugal, Spain, the USSR, Afghanistan, and the Vatican also still had diplomats 
in Japan—there are several episodes indicating that Bagge and his team collabo-
rated particularly closely with the Swiss. Vice-Consul Kallin, for instance, wrote 
to Bagge in July 1942 that he recommended seeking out the opinion of the Swiss 
minister before advancing on a matter concerning Axis and neutral legations in 
Tokyo. The question was how neutral states among themselves should coor-
dinate to achieve concessions from the Gaimushō. Kallin did not mention the 
Spanish, the Soviets, or any other neutral, only the Swiss seemed relevant to him 
to coordinate inter-neutral interest.60 
A more important case was the collaboration of the Swedish and the Swiss 
legation to inspect POW camps in Formosa (Taiwan) in the fall of 1943. It was 
one of the few cases in which the Gaimushō sanctioned the inspection of camps 
outside the mainland. Because Formosa had been part of the Japanese Empire 
since 1895, the military permitted a joint Swedish–Swiss inspection of six POW 
internment camps there between September 21 and October 2, 1943.61 Why the 
visit was done by two representatives from different neutral countries is not clear. 
It might have had to do with the death of the Swiss delegate, Robert Bossert, 
who perished on a mission to Formosa a year earlier.62 Sending two diplomats 
might have been a security measure for the personnel. The collaboration seemed 
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to have been fruitful on a different level. Ericson, head of the Section B, con-
cluded in his final report that 
[t]he arrangements for a joint visit by the Swiss and Swedish delegates 
seemed before our start somewhat dubious but I am now of the opinion 
that the advantages were many and that further visits to camps inside Japan 
Proper ought to be made jointly. No doubt the Swiss delegate who proved 
to (sic.) an experienced and valuable companion, and I are to a great extent 
able to supplement each others informations (sic.) and impressions.63 
Evidently, the collaboration between the Swedish and the Swiss legations pro-
duced results. On the other hand, there was little alternative left. Japan’s enemies 
used the Good Offices of either Sweden or Switzerland. They were the only pos-
sible partners. This point also transpires from the legations telegraphic records. In 
1942, Bagge referred to the Swiss Government, the Swiss minister, and the Swiss 
legation on 22 separate instances. Spain, Portugal, and the Soviet Union were not 
mentioned a single time.64 However, that does not mean that collaboration was a 
simple task for the two legations. On the contrary, joint initiatives had to be care-
fully planned and executed if they were to succeed since the political environment 
in Japan was highly suspicious of neutral interventions. The best example for the 
delicate situation was the way in which the legations had to deal with the Young 
Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), the only other international humanitarian 
organization besides the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that 
was left in Japan. 
The YMCA was founded in 1844 in London. It grew into a worldwide 
organization to promote Christian values and offer young men sports and mental 
health-related activities.65 A century later, it was well established and, like the 
ICRC, headquartered in Geneva. National committees existed all around the 
world, including Japan. In March 1942, the international YMCA contacted the 
Swedish legation to ask for their help in organizing relief work for POWs in Japan 
and the occupied territories. The legation, willing to assist, forwarded the request 
to the national Japanese YMCA, which was headed by Saitō Sōichi, a well-known 
public intellectual, devout second-generation Christian, and a strong supporter 
of peaceful relations with the United States. He was among the last delegates of 
the YMCA in the United States in 1941 and the second Japanese man to visit the 
United States again after the war in 1948. On the other hand, he also had a track 
record of defending Japanese actions in Manchukuo and criticized the interna-
tional YMCA heavily for its siding with the League of Nations. Under his lead-
ership, the Japanese YMCA withdrew from the international YMCA in 1941.66 
His ambivalent nationalist stance proved to be a major hurdle for the success of 
the relief efforts initiated by the Geneva-based mother organization. A legation 
report on the issue stated that 
lengthy discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military 




YMCA were not only helpless in the matter of dealing with the authorities, 
but also that they were more inclined, perhaps forced by the prevailing situ-
ation, to become active for benefit of the Japanese soldiers.67 
Saitō had made such a bad impression on the legation that Bagge and his staff 
decided that to save the initiative, a neutral committee had to be formed to carry 
out the task. It was inaugurated on June 22, 1942, under the patronage of both 
the Swedish and the Swiss legations in the configuration seen in Table 6.3. 
The actual work of the committee was handled by Ericson, since the staff 
who carried out the committee’s missions was the Section B.68 Through this 
arrangement, the Section B gained a second identity as the Office of the “Neutral 
Committee of the YMCA.” The Swiss stayed on the sidelines of this initia-
tive. Although the Swiss envoy, Camille Gorgé, lent his name to the Neutral 
Committee, giving it a more international footing, he and his staff were scarcely 
involved in the actual work. Their only real collaboration happened through K. 
Bernath who, together with Ericson, formed the “working committee” to guide 
the actions. The absence of the Swiss minister and especially of the Swiss ICRC 
delegate, Fritz Paravicini, from the real work of the committee had two reasons. 
On the one hand, the Swiss were already deeply engaged in other relief actions 
through the ICRC. It, therefore, “seemed to be a reasonable and rational division 
of work, if the Swedish Legation undertook to assist the YMCA.”69 In contrast to 
the ICRC, the Neutral Committee of the YMCA decided not to engage in any 
efforts relating to the treatment of POWs. On the contrary, to forestall negative 
reaction by the Japanese authorities and not to confuse the two mandates, the 
Neutral Committee of the YMCA explicitly decided not to check on the situation 
of POWs in the camps. They were only trying to deliver relief goods for the men-
tal and physical recreation of the prisoners. They distributed books, sports gear, 
gardening tools, and musical instruments to POW camps, to allow the prisoners 
to engage in activities that would help ease the intense stress and deprivation that 
they were under. This was not only in line with YMCA goals but ensured that the 
Table 6.3 Composition of the Neutral Committee of 
the YMCA 
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Neutral Committee would not duplicate the work of Paravicini and the ICRC, 
who oversaw the delivery of foodstuffs, medicine, and clothing. Secondly, the 
YMCA initiative came with a risk to other activities that the two legations had 
to carry out. The Swiss legation was especially sensitive to this, as it did not want 
to jeopardize its relationship with Japanese authorities. At the beginning of the 
YMCA initiative, when the military showed nothing but rejection and suspicion 
toward the committee’s requests 
the Swiss Legation appeared rather uneasy about the effects these negotia-
tions might have on their work as a protective (sic.) power and for their work 
with the ICRC, and even felt it advisable to withdraw one of their members 
from the YMCA Neutral Committee, in order not to risk having his work 
among civilian internees impeded.70 
The Swiss had to be careful because their own mandates were already delicate. 
Supporting yet another initiative to help Japan’s enemies by lending Swiss per-
sonnel would certainly seem even more objectionable to Japanese bureaucrats 
who did not trust neutral activities in the first place. After all, the fear of espio-
nage and the distrust toward foreigners was at its absolute height in those years. 
Only after some months the Neutral Committee achieved first successes, when
the resistance of the Ministry of War to the distribution of relief goods started fad-
ing. Ericson was finally able to approach the War Prisoners Information Bureau
and initiate confidence-building measures. Bagge’s personal involvement in this
phase was crucial. Through repeated dinner invitations of the Bureau’s chief, Major
General Hamada, he built the necessary trust to receive permits for his staff to visit
POW camps and carry out the YMCA mandates. Nevertheless, difficulties always
remained since even with Major Hamada’s consent local authorities could block
camp visits at the last minute. “The military authorities have had to be treated
with the utmost discretion and at the least sign of disapproval a back out has had
to be effected (sic.).”71 In the end, the efforts and the great care with which the
missions were carried out paid off to some extent. By the end of 1943, Ericson and
Bernath reported that more than 16,000 books and magazines had been distrib-
uted; ¥25,000 were spent on musical instruments; and roughly the same amount
went to sports equipment, indoor games, and other recreational articles. To put
these numbers in perspective: the highest-paid monthly salary for the Swedish staff
working at the office of the Neutral Committee at the time was ¥800.72 
The Neutral Committee was also able to work in the other direction. Several 
thousand Japanese books were sent to Japanese internees in the United States 
and Canada, to support the YMCA relief efforts there. The committee also tried 
to expand its operations to other territories by soliciting the help of Swedes and 
Swiss outside the Japanese mainland. In Shanghai, the Swede Gustaf Asker was 
appointed local representative of the Neutral Committee. In Hong Kong, it was 
F. Kengelbacher, a Swiss, who accepted the position, and in Bangkok and Manila, 
Swedish consuls F. Enstedt and H. Janson did the same. Unfortunately, only the 








The others did not receive the consent of the local Japanese authorities to enter 
the camps, nor were they acknowledged as YMCA representatives. The impact 
of the international network of the Neutral Committee was, therefore, limited.73 
Nevertheless, the episode demonstrates the willingness of the Swedish legation 
to utilize any possible chance to extend its humanitarian work beyond the narrow 
margins of mainland Japan. 
Japan’s late appreciation for Swedish intelligence 
In Stockholm, diplomatic developments moved more slowly. The unsatisfactory 
situation with only one Japanese chargé d’affaires from the Gaimushō and one 
military attaché from the army continued well into 1942. Although the Swedish 
Government wished for a stronger Japanese representation, neither the UD nor 
Bagge had any leverage to move the Japanese side. The only thing Envoy Bagge 
could do was to keep mentioning the unfortunate situation whenever he met with 
high-ranking Japanese officials. It was only after a meeting with Prime Minister 
Tōjō Hideki, in late October 1942, that he finally met with serious interest in the 
reappointment of a senior diplomat.74 Okamoto Suemasa was named minister 
extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Sweden. He was the former general consul 
to Shanghai and had resided in Calcutta when the war with the Allies broke 
out. He was interned by the British authorities in India but came free in August 
through the very prisoner exchange program in Lourenço-Marques that the neu-
trals had organized.75 Okamoto was nominated envoy to Sweden by the Emperor 
on November 26, 1942, assuming his post the next month.76 
This appointment was an interesting development because it coincided with 
the creation of the Ministry of Greater East Asia on November 1, 1942, which 
absorbed the Gaimushō’s East Asia and South Sea Bureaus—a move that cut the 
Gaimushō’s personnel in half and undermined its standing within the cabinet. 
That at this moment the diplomatic connection to Sweden was strengthened, is 
not self-evident. Whether the decision was based purely on Prime Minister Tōjō’s 
intuition, or if it was part of an emerging strategy toward the European neutrals 
cannot be judged from the available sources. However, as time went by, the pre-
vious Japanese disdain for Stockholm turned into its opposite. The more the war 
in the Pacific and Europe deteriorated, the more personnel the Gaimushō, the 
army, the navy, and even the air force sent to the Scandinavian outpost. By early 
1945, Sweden hosted 15 Japanese diplomats—a remarkable change compared to 
three years earlier.
With the arrival of Okamoto in late 1942, the Gaimushō started using 
Stockholm more proactively as an outpost for spying activities. Okamoto began 
sending intelligence reports back to Tokyo. In the beginning, they contained only 
his personal observations, generalities about the opinions of Swedes, and assess-
ments about meetings he had with high-ranking officials like Gunnar Hägglöf, the 
head of the foreign trade section.77 However, over time, his assessments became 
more refined. The lack of adequate sources precludes a precise description of the 
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Table 6.4 Japanese diplomats in Sweden in 1945 
Position Name Date Assigned 
Minister Plenipotentiary Okamoto Suemasa 1942 (Dec.) 
Attaché Satō Kazutoshi 1942 
Attaché Takeuchi Goichi 1943 
Second leg. Secretary Tsuchiya Jun 1944 
Third leg. Secretary Uryū Matao 1944 
Third leg. Secretary Hattori Gorō 1944 
Attaché Tō Ken’ichi 1944 
Attaché Andō Ryūichi 1944 
Attaché Abe Ken’ichi 1944 
Military Attaché Onodera Makoto 1941 
Deputy Military Attaché Itō Kiyokazu 1944 
Deputy Military Attaché Satō Tatsuya 1944 
Deputy Military Attaché Inaba Masaki 1944 
Naval Attaché Mishima Iori 1942 
Deputy Air Attaché Kigoshi Yasukazu 1944 
Source: Sweden. Vetenskapsakademin. “Sveriges Statskalender” 
[Sweden’s State Calendar]. Uppsala och Stockholm, Almquist & Wiksells 
Boktryckeri A.B., 1945, 68. 
by US intelligence is that he used his acquaintance to high-ranking diplomats 
and well-connected individuals in Stockholm to produce reports not only on 
Swedish affairs but on the security situation of the Soviets, the Germans, and the 
United States, too. For example, he speaks of one of “(…) my agents here who 
has contacts in Russia (…)” to inform his ministry of an alleged meeting between 
US Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinov.78 
On another occasion, Okamoto telegraphed back to Tokyo that he had talked 
with “an authority on Russia here who has connections with the Soviets (…)” 
to report about the situation of Soviet military preparations for the next German 
attacks.79 The minister was trying to find ways to extend the reach of his intel-
ligence assessments through local informants. 
Another source of Japanese spying was the military attaché, Onodera 
Makoto. Until 1940, Japan did not station military attachés in Stockholm, as the 
Scandinavian post used to be located in Helsinki, staffed by Officer Nishimura 
Toshio. But with the onset of the Soviet–Finnish Winter War, Helsinki became 
too dangerous and all Japanese diplomats were evacuated. Nishimura relocated to 
Stockholm and, in early 1941, was replaced by Onodera who had had some expe-
rience in the Baltic region through an earlier posting in Riga (1936–1938). He 
started working in Stockholm in February 1941.80 Within months he had rebuilt 
connections to former friends and informants from his time in Latvia. His wife, 
Onodera Yuriko, chronicled in her memoirs the life of her husband and her fam-
ily in Sweden. According to her, Onodera received important intelligence from 
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Hungarian, German, Estonian, and Polish informants.81 For instance, his Polish 
partners provided information about developments in Moscow and London. 
He forwarded reports based on his Polish sources to Tokyo under the head-
ing “BU-Info.” The records of United States counterintelligence reports, the 
so-called Magic Summaries, reveal that the US codebreakers were able to catch 
some of that information but not all. One of the summaries, written on August 
24, 1943, states that 
[t]here has come to hand a ‘BU Intelligence’ report (…) dated May 8 (…). 
Note: ‘BU Intelligence’ reports all seem to come from the Japanese military 
attaché in Stockholm and to cover information purporting to come from 
London and Moscow. The British believe that the information is supplied by 
agents. As yet there are not enough ‘BU’ reports available to permit depend-
able evaluation.82 
Onodera’s Polish connection was maintained throughout the war without his 
spies being uncovered. Although some of his reports were picked up by British 
and US intelligence services, not enough of them could be intercepted. Minister 
Okamoto, on the other hand, like many Japanese diplomats, left a visible trail of his 
activities. He did not believe that the Japanese cypher code had been broken and 
continued to send his reports via telegraph to Tokyo, which the Allies intercepted 
with ease. The Magic Summaries speak a clear language. Before December 1942, 
there were only little and sporadic news about Japanese activities in Stockholm, 
but once Okamoto commenced his activities Stockholm appears regularly in the 
reports. 
Two insights can be deduced from these episodes. Firstly, it was the devel-
opment of the war in Europe that increased Tokyo’s interest in Stockholm. 
Otherwise, Minister Bagge would not have had to fight for nearly two years to 
receive a new minister plenipotentiary for Sweden. Secondly, Swedish authorities 
obviously had little objections to receiving such an extensive number of Japanese 
diplomats, since they could have blocked the arrival of them by withholding their 
accreditation. Hosting 15 Japanese diplomats meant more than adhering to eti-
quette, it signified consent to Japan’s newly found use for Sweden. But then 
again, why would the UD oppose that development? It granted the same rights 
to all belligerents. In 1945, Germany and the USSR both had 21 accredited 
diplomats in Stockholm, the British were represented with 29 and the United 
States with 45. More importantly, the UD was not opposed to closer relations 
with Japan, as those could be used for Swedish interests in East Asia. As a neutral, 
Sweden only had to provide a level playing field. 
Trade 
The quasi-nationalization of Swedish commerce 
Unsurprisingly, the events after Pearl Harbor did not help Swedish–Japanese 
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Figure 6.2 Swedish imports and exports to Japan 1942–1945. Source: For the Swedish 
data, see Centralbyrån, Statistisk årsbok 1946, 167. For the Japanese data, 
see Honma, Nippon-keizai, 40–41. Note: The graphic shows a mix of two 
datasets with imports in Swedish crowns and exports in Japanese yen. The 
official currency exchange rate between 1941 and 1945 was near parity. 
On international exchange rates, see Eidgenössisches Statistisches Amt, 
Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz 1943 [Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland 
1943] (Basel: E. Birkhäuser & Cie, 1944), 210–211. 
Sweden maintained limited levels of exports at a value of roughly ¥3 million. 
That was only a third of the export value for 1941 and only a fraction of the ¥49 
million that Japan used to import from Sweden in 1937. Figure 6.2 shows the 
low levels of trade that can be found in the official statistics. Import data for the 
years 1942 and 1943 are missing in the Japanese and the Swedish data.83 Even 
the existing numbers need to be interpreted with caution. It is possible that the 
Japanese figures are somewhat undervalued, especially for the first two years of 
the war. From Bagge’s telegrams, it can be judged that Swedish exports were 
worth several million crowns. In March 1942 alone, there were still ball bearings 
worth SEK 2.3 million in the port of Yokohama and another SEK 2 million worth 
of SKF goods in transit in Siberia.84 
The commodities that Sweden still wanted to import from Japan were rub-
ber, soybean, tin, and tungsten.85 Japan on the other hand wanted to make use
of Swedish raw materials like nickel and cadmium, and the country’s ball bear-
ings and piano wire, all of which had military use. Swedish wool and yarn were
also still a welcome commodity.86 Both sides agreed that negotiations should
be held but under the cloak of secrecy. The Swedish Bureau of Foreign Trade,
under Gunnar Hägglöf, was aware that trade with Japan would not only meet
fierce resistance from the Allied side but would probably also be unpopular
among the Swedish workers who made the goods.87 Nevertheless, negotiations
continued for several reasons. For one, Bagge was constantly afraid of Swedish













Ever since summer 1941, he reported about the danger of expropriation or
undervalued payments, especially of nickel shipments.88 One of them—69 tons
of nickel and cadmium—had arrived at Yokohama in late November 1941,
but was blocked in the port for months, which left Bagge to negotiate back
and forth for the release at an advantageous price.89 These efforts were com-
plicated by Japan’s economic development that went into a steep inflation.
Bagge reported that the price level had increased four-fold compared to 1937.90 
Modern economic estimates of Japanese war inflation levels range around the
same estimates, between a two- and six-fold increase compared to 1936 levels.91 
The volatility of the general price level made the Swedish negotiations thornier
and more difficult. 
Without doubt the most significant change in trade relations occurred due to a 
radical transformation of Japan’s mode of production. From early 1942 onward, 
the country’s main industries reached a level of integration with the national 
government that made the two nearly indistinguishable. Markets were eliminated 
and all trade was refocused on the needs of the war economy. The largest national 
companies like Mitsubishi and Mitsui were ordered by the government to execute 
trade in compliance with its wishes. Bagge reported in February 1942 that 
the Finance Ministry has given Mitsubishi an exclusive mission on behalf 
of the Japanese government to act as buyer of the goods. The legation is 
negotiating with the Foreign Ministry on the selling principles while a final 
contract and a delivery is made to Mitsubishi that will have all the details 
about the goods and is working in cooperation with the Planning Board and 
the military authorities who will have the right to decide.92 
This nationalization of Japan’s industry changed the way of trade with Sweden 
distinctly and put Bagge at the center of business interactions. As the official 
representative of the Swedish state, he had the strongest bargaining position. 
Trading companies like Ekman, Gadelius, and SKF did not matter anymore. 
Bagge could receive much higher price concessions when he intervened on their 
behalf. With a certain sense of pride, he reported in March that “regarding the 
nickel question (…) of last October, Gadelius could not even get half of the price 
I did.”93 In the same telegram, Bagge describes clearly that the trading companies 
were in no position to take care of their core business anymore: 
[T]he legation considers itself able to save considerable values otherwise 
threatened by war risks. The firms seem to have small qualifications in this 
respect and have not by themselves taken any initiatives in this direction 
which would have eliminated war risk responsibility. In the current situation, 
interference from the firms in the sales procedures would be inappropriate 
and harmful. However, the firms, in their own interest, will be contacted by 
the legation in order to keep the prices up. That is for instance of importance 
for band- and frame-saw steel. For this purpose, Gadelius has been consulted 




Fully engaged 149 
Indeed, over the next three and a half years the legation remained at the center 
of business interactions, negotiating prices and quantities of goods imported and 
exported. Some trading companies complained about this interference from the 
side of the legation but Bagge was convinced that under the new circumstances 
individual foreign firms needed state intervention on their behalf. He argued his 
case as follows. 
It is desirable that stranded goods are sold as soon as possible, considering 
the risk of confiscation and damage. If this task was entrusted to the private 
firms, they would not be able to escape the sales and price controls exerted 
by government agencies and business organizations. The sales would be 
separated, and the shipments subdivided. Only the most sought-after parts 
would be sold with much reduced profit margins. The legation has been able 
to discuss the matter with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Finance 
and the principles have been adjusted under a negotiation with them, skip-
ping otherwise normal control procedures. The sales can now be organized 
following uniform procedures quicker and bigger in scale. (…) The criticism 
from Gadelius is not trustworthy and bears witness of an inability or unwill-
ingness to understand the situation.95 
Be that assessment correct or not, the record of the legation suggests that over 
the next years all trade issues exceeding a few thousand yen went through the 
hands of the legation. From wool and yarn to large shipments of ball bearings, 
nickel, and piano wire, the legation was involved. Entire telegram threats were 
labeled as pertaining to the so-called “nickel question” or the “rubber question,” 
the former being a good that Bagge helped to import to Japan, whereas the lat-
ter was the major export item that the Swedish Trade Bureau wanted to receive 
from Japan.96 
In connection to this role as Swedish trade organizer, the legation also func-
tioned as a financial intermediary through its account at the Yokohama Specie 
Bank, which enabled the clearing system with the Riksbank in Stockholm. Any 
trade that was settled in Japanese yen but had to generate income in crowns 
needed to go through that clearing. This had the beneficial side effect that liquid-
ity for other work areas of the legation was created. Bagge only had to debit the 
accounts that he kept for the trading companies on which they then earned inter-
est. After some negotiations with the Gaimushō, the Japanese side agreed that 
the funds could be used in the entire yen-block. That enabled the use of funds 
for the well-being of the Ningpo and Miramar crews in Hong Kong and Saigon 
(see below); the payments of the consulates in Shanghai, Saigon, Hong Kong, 
and Dairen; as well as for the legation itself to fulfill its Protecting Power man-
dates.97 In summer 1942, for example, Bagge informed the UD that the Section 
B during the six months that it existed had had roughly ¥175,000 in costs for 
which he borrowed SKF’s money at 4.25 percent interest.98 This availability of 




























crunch. Money for its humanitarian activities was available due to its undertakings 
for Swedish companies. 
From these records it can only be judged that the nationalization of indus-
tries in Japan led to a quasi-nationalization of Swedish trade under the legation. 
Although Swedish companies were not nationalized as such, their Japanese sub-
sidiaries became completely dependent on the legation and Bagge’s powers as 
a plenipotentiary to negotiate directly with Japanese ministries. The companies 
were reduced to executing offices. The integration of trade and diplomacy is also 
evident from the many former businessmen, like Ericson, who became legation 
staff—in his case even a diplomat. 
Worsening relations on all fronts 
Overall, the small concessions that Bagge could still get for Swedish trade could
not forestall the worsening situation for its commerce in Asia. On December 30,
1941, Japanese forces had seized the Swedish steamer S.S. Miramar at the port
in Saigon.99 Bagge learned of this event only ten days later when the consulate in
Vietnam informed him about the capture of the ship and its Swedish crew, who
were taken to an unknown location.100 The reason given by Japanese officials was
that the neutral ship was suspected of carrying contraband and would therefore
be handed over to a prize-court. Bagge protested this treatment and the possible
appropriation immediately. He took the case to Foreign Minister Tōgō, where he
protests sharply: “I have insisted toward the Japanese authorities (…) that the benev-
olence and good-will of Sweden as a neutral, friendly country must not be taken for
granted. (…) the gain that Japan can achieve by confiscating Swedish property can
hardly outweigh the damage caused by the loss of trust.”101 Unfortunately, nothing
was gained by the strong words. Over the next two years, the Miramar case became
a major strain on Swedish–Japanese relations. The Japanese side simply refused to
release the ship. The Swedes, therefore, had to settle for a compromise according
to which the Miramar would be leased to the Japanese Navy at an advantageous
rate that was to be paid in yen.102 The crew went free and could be repatriated,
but the ship had effectively been surrendered to Japan.103 Minister Bagge stressed
in one of his many reports regarding the affair that “this is not a question of free
negotiations since the Japanese dictate the terms through prize-courts and confis-
cations.”104 The Miramar was thereby involuntarily leased to the Japanese state and
that was not the only such case. At least one other ship, the Ningpo MV, shared the
same fate. After suffering heavy collateral damage during the Battle of Hong Kong,
where it was anchored at the time when the war broke out, the ship was repossessed
by Japan to serve as a merchant steamer.105 It was sunk sailing under Japanese flag
on June 29, 1944, torpedoed by a US submarine.106 
A similar high-profile case was the treatment of Swedish interests on Japanese-
occupied territories in China. Although the official foreign policy of the Empire 
was not to interfere with neutral interests, the reality looked different—espe-
cially in the case of the American Far Eastern Match Co., a subsidiary of Svenska 
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Because of the unfortunate naming, the Shanghai-based subsidiary was seized 
by the Japanese army at the beginning of the war. Bagge tried to correct the 
misunderstanding, stressing that the company was fully owned and controlled by 
Swedish capital but his repeated demarches at the Gaimushō had little effect.108 
The company was not returned and could not operate anymore. The issue was so 
important to the Swedes that the UD got involved as well, negotiating the case 
still a year later with the newly appointed Minister Okamoto.109 The treatment of 
Swedish interests regarding STAB and the Miramar were the two most conten-
tious bilateral issues plaguing Swedish–Japanese relations until well into 1943, 
partially shattering Minister Bagge’s initial hopes that Sweden’s Good Offices for 
Japan would translate into benevolent treatment. 
By 1944, the situation of the European war had deteriorated for the Axis
Powers to the point that the only possible transport route for cargo from
Sweden to Japan was by submarine from Germany. Steel balls, ball bearings,
and piano wire were brought to Japan underwater.110 Onodera’s office organ-
ized the purchases in Stockholm but a Swedish company carried out the actual
transport.111 The quantities were, of course, much smaller than what they used
to be when proper shipments or rail transports via Siberia were still possible.
On the side of the Swedish legation, all business correspondence related to
rubber exports for Sweden came to an end in late 1943 and the last telegram
pertaining to the sales of nickel to Japan is dated February 1, 1944. During
the last 18 months of the war, trade between the two nations came to a near
standstill.
Diplomatic relations between Sweden and Japan also started suffering in 
1944. A wedge was driven between the Swedish mission and its host by the 
mandatory evacuation of the legation to Karuizawa, a town in the mountains of 
Nagano prefecture. Bagge and his neutral colleagues from Spain, Switzerland, 
Portugal, and Turkey jointly protested with verbal notes against the forceful 
removal of their legations from Tokyo. But the Gaimushō argued that the evacu-
ation was necessary to protect the diplomats from the danger of US air raids 
and that there was no practical downside to the legations because there would 
be a Gaimushō branch office in Karuizawa to allow for continuous communica-
tion with the Japanese Government. Bagge and the other neutral ministers did 
not believe this line of argument. To them, the measures were nothing but an 
attempt at constraining their access to information about the development of the 
war. Tokyo was the center of political activities and an isolation from it impeded 
the Protecting Powers’ ability to carry out their mandates. Especially the strict 
order not to travel to Tokyo without permission and police escort came as a bla-
tant infringement on the freedom of movement guaranteed to diplomats under 
international law. Most suspiciously, the representatives of Axis Powers were not 
under that restriction, which made it all too clear that the primary concern of the 
Gaimushō was not to keep the diplomats safe but to cut off the flow of informa-
tion from Tokyo to neutral governments—who might forward them to the Allied 
Powers.112 The written complaints did not help, the policy remained in force, and 


















In all fairness, it must be said that the evacuation to Karuizawa also did keep 
the legation safe, as the Gaimushō claimed. Nobody from the legation staff came 
to harm during the extensive bombings of Tokyo, in 1945. Still, the lack of access 
to the capital was an acute problem because the representation of foreign inter-
est and the caretaking of Swedish citizens had become by far the most important 
tasks for the legation. Living conditions worsened on the Japanese mainland and 
its shrinking Empire overseas. In February 1944, Bagge had already reported of 
another joint neutral demarche, together with the Swiss and the Spanish lega-
tion, to request the evacuation of their citizens from Japanese-occupied terri-
tories in the Pacific. Especially the Swiss had been vocal for months that they 
wanted their citizens in occupied territories evacuated. The Japanese side had 
been ignoring these requests repeatedly. Joint diplomatic action was, therefore, 
aimed at increasing the pressure on the Gaimushō to receive at least an ameliora-
tion of the living conditions of the concerned neutral nationals. But again, the 
initiative failed. Neutral objections to their treatment inside or outside of Japan 
had rarely an impact anymore. At the same time, reports from Hong Kong and 
the Philippines of mistreatment of neutral nationals kept pouring in, especially in 
the latter half of 1944 and early 1945. The worst atrocities were committed in 
Manila, where more than a hundred Spanish and 20 Swiss citizens were executed 
by Japanese soldiers during the final battle for the city. The Swedes were luckier. 
Not a single casualty was reported. All 17 Swedish families who resided in Manila 
survived the slaughter. Only one Swede, Adolf Greiffe, was wounded by a shot 
from a Japanese officer but he and his family were alive.113 
The incident in Manila was the reason why the Spanish finally relinquished their
representations of Japanese interests in the Americas. For Sweden, no such ques-
tion arose. In one of his last telegrams before departing back to Sweden (in April
1945), Bagge instructed his ministry to prepare for the Japanese request to take
over the country’s interests in the United States, which were previously protected
by Spain. He emphasized that if the Swedish Government decided to accept the
mandate, it should not do so without using the request as a bargaining chip to
receive important concessions for the Swedish mandates as Protecting Power in
Japan. He wanted more food rations for the POWs, to have imprisoned Norwegians
and Swedes freed, and arbitrary arrests stopped.114 In the end, Japan convinced the
Swiss to represent Japan’s interests in the Americas and Bagge could not make his
demands heard. Nevertheless, the episode shows that the Swedish diplomats, much
like their Swiss colleagues, tried to use every possible way to receive concessions
from the Gaimushō to improve the way they and their protectees were treated.115 
Despite all the problems, one of Sweden’s most important wartime favors to 
Japan was yet to come. Toward the second half of 1944, it became increasingly 
clear that Japan would not end up on the victorious side of this total war. With 
the US Navy approaching, the imperial forces in retreat, and American bombers 
bringing havoc to mainland cities, many Japanese inside and outside of politi-
cal circles became aware of the urgency to end the war. But how to do that? A 
negotiated peace that would spare Japanese militarism from dismantlement was 
out of the question for the United States who made it clear that nothing short 
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of unconditional surrender was acceptable to Washington. But in Tokyo, even to 
peace-minded cabinet members like Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, only an end 
that was “consonant to the honor of Japan” was an acceptable solution.116 The 
central issue was to preserve Japan’s polity (kokutai), with which the survival of 
the institution of the Emperor was inextricably linked. The possibilities of the 
Emperor’s political (and physical) survival had to be sounded out.117 One of the 
best chances for that would occur through the Good Office of Minister Bagge. 
Summary 
Pearl Harbor was a watershed moment for Swedish–Japanese relations. 
Diplomatically, Sweden became Japan’s second largest Protecting Power and one 
of the three neutrals tasked with organizing the exchange of enemy nationals 
among the belligerents. Especially its role as Japan’s Protecting Power in Hawaii 
and as provider of exchange ships made it a crucial neutral partner to Tokyo. On 
the other hand, Sweden collaborated in several areas with Switzerland to pro-
tect Allied POWs, diplomats, and civilians. It also became an enabler for private 
humanitarian relief efforts by lending a helping hand to the Neutral Committee 
of the YMCA, consisting of Swedish and Swiss diplomats, which acted as the 
Japan-based branch of the international YMCA. Through the committee, the 
Swedes could channel YMCA goods and funds to interned enemy nationals in 
the Empire. While Switzerland was the diplomatic partner of the ICRC, Sweden 
became the partner of the YMCA. 
For Swedish business, everything changed with Japan’s new mode of produc-
tion for the war economy. Trade and diplomacy became so interconnected that 
they were barely distinguishable. Widar Bagge suddenly was not only Sweden’s 
highest diplomatic representative in Japan, but also became the chief representa-
tive of Swedish commerce. Only he had the necessary authority to negotiate prices 
with the Ministry of Finance. Japan’s nationalization drove, to a large extent, a 
quasi-nationalization of Swedish trade in the country under its diplomatic out-
post. This went so far that Swedish companies complained about the interference 
of the legation in their business. Minister Bagge defended the measures, arguing 
that under the new rules of the game, only the Swedish state—as represented by 
him—had an adequate standing for negotiations with Japan. Indeed, he was able 
to get higher concessions than the company directors. 
Paradoxically, the new role Sweden came to play occurred in tandem with 
Japan’s declining interest in bilateral relations with the Scandinavians. For nearly 
two years (January 1941–November 1942), Japan did not have a minister pleni-
potentiary stationed in Stockholm, operating its legation on minimum capacity 
only. Sweden strongly disliked the situation since it meant even fewer possibili-
ties to make its interests and grievances heard in Tokyo. The official reason the 
Gaimushō gave was a lack of skilled personnel, but the truth was probably more 
mundane—the geopolitical situation of these years had isolated Sweden in the 
eyes of Japan, making diplomatic efforts there unnecessary. That perception 




















Japan’s armed forces realized the value of Stockholm as an outpost for intel-
ligence gathering, Japan sent not only a new minister but a dozen delegates to 
gather information on Allied activities. 
Sweden’s new role as a provider for diplomatic and humanitarian services 
increased the workload of the UD considerably. To cope with the situation, it 
founded a division dedicated only to foreign interests, the Section B. In Japan, 
Bagge made a former Swedish company director the head of his local chapter 
of that section. In general, Bagge had to hire many more Swedish and Japanese 
employees to cope with the increased workload. His mission grew from a handful 
of people to over 20. Besides the apparent necessity to assist individuals in danger, 
Bagge recommended to his government not to turn down request for Sweden’s 
Good Offices because he hoped that these favors would grant Sweden an advan-
tageous position for its own interests, especially inside Japan. These expectations, 
however, did not come true. With every year of the war, it became more difficult 
for Bagge to uphold commercial interests and to protect even Swedish citizens in 
the Japanese Empire. 
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7 In the end 
Widar Bagge, Japan, and the end of World 
War II 
Bert Edström1 
In the final phase of the war, Sweden became involved in a maneuver aimed at 
attaining peace for Japan on terms acceptable to its military and political leader-
ship. In the autumn of 1944, it was obvious to some influential Japanese that 
defeat in the war was inevitable, and various channels were used to sound out 
the possibility of reaching a peace agreement. One of these channels involved 
the Swedish minister to Tokyo Widar Bagge in what is now known as the Bagge 
kōsaku, “the Bagge maneuver,” often also called “the Bagge peace feeler.” The 
endeavor in which he was involved differed in one important respect from all 
other peace efforts in that two (successive) Japanese foreign ministers supported 
it. Although none of the initiatives came to fruition, it is still worth pausing to 
consider this moment of a failed peacemaking effort, as it exemplifies both the 
possibilities and limitations of neutral diplomacy. Bagge’s deed has entered the 
annals of Japan’s diplomatic history but is mentioned only in passing in the stand-
ard work on Swedish foreign policy during World War II written by Wilhelm 
Carlgren, the head of the archive of the Swedish Foreign Ministry 1965–1987. 
Bagge appears only briefly in a footnote in this monumental work of almost 
600 pages.2 
Carlgren’s history was published in 1973. The following year he was con-
tacted by the diplomat Erik von Sydow, who, as we have seen, had worked under
Bagge at the Swedish legation in Tokyo during the war. Von Sydow had been
contacted by the British historian Louis Allen, who wanted him to comment on a
prospective book chapter about “the Bagge peace feeler.” Von Sydow forwarded
the query to Carlgren and asked for his comments. In his response, Carlgren
1 This is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at the Fourth Nordic Symposium on 
Japanese and Korean Studies, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark, September 5–8, 1995, 
and subsequently issued as Center for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University, Working 
Paper 41 (October 1995), 22 pp. The idea of writing the original paper was suggested by Pro-
fessor Ōhata Tokushirō, Waseda University, Tokyo, in a discussion with the author about the 
role Widar Bagge briefly played in the final stage of World War II. The original paper benefited 
from discussions with Dr Berndt Fredriksson, Head, The archive of the Foreign Ministry, 
and Ambassadors Gunnar Jarring, Erik von Sydow, Sven Dahlman, and Mrs Onodera Yuriko. 
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suggested that the background to Bagge’s involvement in the move (instigated
by peace-inclined Japanese) might have originated in Sweden’s achievements
as a peace broker in the Continuation War (1941–1944) between Finland and
the Soviet Union. They might have given the Japanese “the impression that
[Foreign Minister] Günther and his collaborators possessed the discretion and
dexterity needed in this kind of delicate matters.”3 Maybe von Sydow’s letter
made Carlgren look into Bagge’s deed a bit more thoroughly than he had found
necessary when he wrote his 1973 history. In 1985 he included a description
of Bagge’s effort in a study of Swedish mediation during World War II.4 In any
event, the following is the most detailed historical account (as of 2020) of “the
Bagge maneuver” based on published and unpublished sources from Sweden
and Japan. 
The Bagge peace feeler 
Widar Bagge was a senior diplomat but never belonged to the upper echelons of
the Swedish foreign service.5 According to one of his colleagues in the Swedish
diplomatic corps, he was known as a demanding head of mission who had a
pedantic disposition and was very conscious of diplomatic etiquette and his own
dignity.6 Another colleague who worked under Bagge at the Swedish legation
in Tokyo 1940–1945 describes him as annoyed that he had only one embassy
secretary at his disposal while the Swiss minister had one counsellor and two
embassy secretaries.7 This colleague described Bagge as a “difficult person,”8 
3 Wilhelm Carlgren to Erik von Sydow, Letter, October 13, 1974. Copy of letter provided by 
Ambassador von Sydow. 
4 See Wilhelm Carlgren, “Die Mediationstätigkeit in der Außenpolitik Schwedens während des 
Zweiten Weltkrieges,” in Schwedische und schweizerische Neutralität im Zweiten Weltkrieg, eds. 
Rudolf L. Bindschedler et al. (Basel, Frankfurt am Main: Helbing und Lichtenhahn, 1985), 
109f. 
5 For bibliographic information, see chapter 4. See also P1 Widar Bagge, vol. 2, Utrikesdeparte-
mentets arkiv 1920 års dossiersystem, Riksarkivet [The archive of the Foreign Ministry, Filing 
system of 1920, Swedish National Archives] (henceforth: UD). 
6 Gunnar Jarring, Memoarer 1939–1952 [Memoirs, 1939–1952] (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1981), 
144f. 
7 Personal communication from Erik von Sydow, January 29, 1994. According to Sweden’s 
official gazette, the staff at the Tokyo legation in 1945 were Envoy Widar Bagge, First Lega-
tion Secretary Erik von Sydow, Second Legation Secretary Olof Ripa, and First Secretary 
Johan Hjortzberg-Nordlund. See Sveriges statskalender för året 1945 [Sweden’s official 
gazette 1945] (Stockholm och Uppsala, 1945), 266. However, the staff was larger. After his 
return to Sweden in May 1945, Bagge stated in an interview that four officials and nine clerks 
worked at the legation. See “Svenskarna i Tokyo välbehållna” [The Swedes in Tokyo well], 
Dagens Nyheter, May 27, 1945. 
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while a close relative characterizes him as “a loner.”9 He certainly was a bit of a
busybody.10 
Bagge took up his post as Swedish minister to Japan on January 1, 1937, and 
was to remain in the country until mid-April 1945, except for short trips to other 
countries. When he left Japan for Sweden, he was the dean of the diplomatic 
corps in Tokyo. In standard reference works on Japanese foreign policy, he is 
described as a Japanophile.11 According to one of Japan’s wartime foreign min-
isters, Shigemitsu Mamoru, who knew the Swedish diplomat, “Bagge had long 
resided in Tokyo, knew Japan well and had a high reputation for sincerity.”12 His 
good reputation in Japan seems to have been the reason why he was approached 
by peace-inclined Japanese and asked to assist in the attempts to bring the war 
to an end. Another consideration was that he was the representative of neutral 
Sweden, one of the few countries who could function as a go-between between 
Japan and its enemies. 
The peace feeler was initiated in mid-September 1944 when Suzuki Bunshirō, 
an influential journalist and managing director of the Asahi Shimbun, one of 
Japan’s largest dailies, contacted Bagge. They were old acquaintances. Mushakōji 
Kintomo, a former Japanese minister to Sweden, had introduced Bagge to Suzuki 
in 1937.13 According to Bagge’s affidavit at the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (IMTFE), “Mr. Suzuki told me that Prince Konoye and a group 
of men around him were responsible for this plan which they wanted me to 
forward to the Swedish Government with the request that through Swedish 
channels a feeler should be made in London.”14 Bagge reported his conversation 
with Suzuki and the Japanese request in a telegram to the Foreign Ministry in 
Stockholm: 
Telegram in Cl. I code from the Royal Legation 
in Tokyo, 19/9 1944, at 12.0s 
Arrived 19/9 at 1350 
Primo. I learn from a reliable source that influential civilian circles are 
discussing the peace problem with increasing concern. They expect a speedy 
German collapse and do not believe that Japan can resist. It is therefore 
9 Personal communication from Lillebil Bagge, January 31, 1994. 
10 Personal communication from Gunnar Jarring, September 5, 1994. 
11 See Nihon gaikō hyakunen shōshi [A short history of the past century of Japanese diplomacy], 
ed. Gaimushō, rev. ed. (Tokyo: Yamada shoin, 1958), 230; and Nihon gaikōshi jiten [The 
encyclopedia of Japanese diplomatic history], ed. Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan Nihon gaikōshi 
jiten hensan iinkai, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1992), 396. 
12 Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for Peace (London: Hutchinson, 
1958), 339. 
13 Suzuki Bunshirō, “Wahei kōsaku misui no ki” [Account of an attempted peace move], 
in Shūsen shiroku [Historical record of the termination of the war], ed. Gaimushō, vol. 2 
(Tokyo: Hokuyōsha, 1977), 111. 
14 Widar Bagge affidavit, in International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMFTE), Record of 
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considered necessary to attain peace as soon as possible before the country-
side and towns are destroyed. They count on certain British war fatigue and 
generally consider 
Secundo. a peaceful settlement with England would be easier than with 
the United States. To this end, they are prepared to return all areas taken 
from Great Britain during the war and recognize all former British interests 
and investments in East Asia. They are said to realize that other areas occu-
pied during the war would have to be returned and 
Tertio. that even the sacrifice of Manchukuo may be necessary. They 
want this explored in London and believe that this could be done through 
Swedish mediation on condition no British publicity. If understanding was 
found in London, they are prepared for preliminary discussions via Sweden. 
Quarto. Behind my informer is primarily one of the best-known states-
men of the country and the above is without any doubt to apprehend as a 
serious feeler. If you deem it appropriate you may inform the English minis-
ter of the section secundo. Other sections only for your confidential informa-
tion. Request that you communicate to me your opinion prima vista. 
Bagge15 
On the copy of the telegram kept in the Swedish National Archives, two brief 
notes have been scribbled: “the Yellow cupboard” and “Mallet told by Günther 
19/9.” The Yellow cupboard in the office of the head of the political section of 
the Foreign Ministry was used for documents that were so sensitive that they 
had to be kept so secret that their existence was not even admitted.16 Günther 
was Christian Günther, the Swedish foreign minister, who contacted the British 
minister to Stockholm, Sir Victor Mallet, and personally informed him of Bagge’s 
message. Ignoring Bagge’s suggestion that the British minister should only be 
informed of the second point in the telegram, Günther gave him an account of 
the entire contents. Mallet reported immediately to the British Foreign Office 
the information that he had received from Günther and the Tokyo minister’s 
assessment that there was “no doubt that this attempt must be considered as a 
serious one.”17 The Foreign Office shared this view. On September 24 the British 
minister to the United States, Lord Halifax, was instructed by the Foreign Office 
to inform US Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Hull agreed with a British proposal 
that the Swedish Foreign Ministry should be told that the Allies were not pre-
pared to respond to indirect Japanese approaches.18 
15 Bagge to Foreign Ministry, Telegram i Kl. I chiffer från Kungl. Maj:ts Beskickning i Tokio, 
no. 365–367, September 19, 1944. Politik: allmänt, Japan, 1944, aug.–jan. 1946, HP 39F, 
vol. 671 [henceforth: vol. 671], UD. 
16 Personal communication from Berndt Fredriksson, Head, The Archive of the Foreign min-
istry, August 30, 1995. 
17 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Maj-
esty’s Stationery Office, 1976), vol. 5, 501f. 
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Allegedly, behind this peace proposal was Prince Konoe Fumimaro, the 
close relative of the Emperor and former prime minister, whom we have met 
in Chapter 3. Pondering the possibility of finding a neutral mediator for peace, 
Konoe had supposedly asked Suzuki to contact Bagge. Suzuki’s idea was that 
Sweden should take action on its own initiative as a neutral country.19 According 
to the researcher Kobayashi Tatsuo, Konoe, in reality, knew nothing of all this. 
Suzuki only mentioned his name to attract Bagge’s attention and add weight to 
the suggestion but he briefed Konoe about it afterwards.20 A week later, Bagge 
informed Stockholm, “Even the foreign minister is said to be considering the 
possibilities for peace.”21 This telegram was in a special code used when dealing 
with sensitive matters. 
When Victor Mallet on September 30 met Erik Boheman, the undersecretary 
of state for foreign affairs, he was briefed about Bagge’s telegram of September 
27. Mallet told Boheman that Washington and London were not prepared to 
respond to indirect Japanese approaches but the Swedish minister “could reply 
if he wished that he knew it would be useless to deliver the Japanese message to 
us.”22 Later the same day, Boheman sent a telegram to Bagge and informed him, 
“Since we know from previous experiences that the English side does not respond 
to approaches that are not of an official character, we have not seen it suitable to 
pass on the message.”23 Thus, Bagge was kept in the dark about how the Foreign 
Ministry in Stockholm had handled his information. 
Boheman’s telegram was the first reaction from the Foreign Ministry in 
Stockholm to reach Bagge. The sensitive nature of the contents of this telegram 
is clear from the fact that it was kept in the same special safe, “the Yellow cup-
board,” as Bagge’s telegram of September 19. According to Boheman, the tele-
gram was “of considerable interest,” and he asked Bagge to maintain the contact. 
This must have been reassuring for Bagge at the same time as it must have been 
a disappointment to learn that the Swedish Government had decided not to pass 
on a part of his information to the British authorities, as he had suggested in his 
telegram. 
From other telegrams sent by Bagge to the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm 
during the coming months, it can be seen that he had met the Japanese foreign 
minister as well as the deputy foreign minister. This was natural since he was 
the dean of the diplomatic corps in Tokyo, but it also testified to his excellent 
contacts with the Japanese political leadership due to Sweden’s role as Protecting 
19 Letter from Suzuki Bunshirō to Shimomura Hiroshi, April 9, 1945, in Shūsen shiroku, vol. 
2, 113. 
20 Kobayashi Tatsuo, “Suēden o tsūjiru Taiheiyō sensō shūketsu kōsaku” [Maneuvers to end the 
Pacific War by way of Sweden], Kokugakuin hōgaku 18, no. 4 (February 1980), 97f. 
21 Bagge to Foreign Ministry, Telegram i speciellt maskinchiffer från Kungl. Maj:ts Beskickning 
i Tokio, no. 381, September 27, 1944, vol. 671, UD. 
22 Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, 502. 
23 Foreign Ministry to Legation Tokyo, Telegram i specialchiffer, no. 328, September 30, 
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Power for Japan, as explained in the previous chapter. In a cable on December 
12, 1944, Bagge notified Stockholm that the Japanese Government was sincerely 
grateful for the actions taken by Sweden on behalf of Japan.24 In another tel-
egram sent the same day, Bagge informed Stockholm about who was behind the 
approach mentioned in his telegram on September 19. “The individual referred 
to in my code 365 quarto first point resigned as prime minister two months 
before the war.” Bagge also responded positively to the request to keep in touch 
with this person, but pointed out that it was “at present extremely sensitive and 
risky for the person concerned.”25 On the telegram kept in the Swedish National 
Archives is jotted in pencil “this is Prince Konoe, who resigned 16 Oct. 1941.” 
Other scribbled notes on the telegram suggest that Bagge’s information was con-
sidered so vital that it had been brought to the attention of Foreign Minister 
Christian Günther. 
The various meetings that Bagge had with peace-inclined Japanese seem to 
have provided renewed impetus to try to open the door to peace. In a telegram 
sent on April 3, 1945, Bagge referred again to the efforts that were being made 
toward peace. Based on his meetings and discussions in Tokyo, he reported that 
“unconditional surrender” was out of the question given Japanese views. For 
the Japanese, this concept meant disgrace and forcing it on them might lead to 
acts of desperation by the Japanese people. On the other hand, it was likely that 
far-reaching conditions reached through negotiations would be accepted. People 
realized that the war could not be won but, at the same time, believed that it is 
impossible to defeat or occupy Japan. One could expect the Japanese to fight 
to the last man. A change in the Japanese constitution was out of the question. 
The Emperor was unassailable, but democratizing the power of the Emperor in 
much the same way as had happened in Britain with the King might be possible. 
The Institute of Pacific Relations had recently demanded the abolishment of the 
imperial family, which had caused apprehension and would certainly be an obsta-
cle to any peace attempt.26 
The day after Josef Stalin denounced the Soviet Neutrality Pact with Japan 
on April 5, Eric von Post, the head of the political section of the Foreign 
Ministry, conveyed Bagge’s information to Herschel Johnson, the US minister 
24 Bagge to Foreign Ministry, Telegram i Kl. I chiffer från Kungl. Maj:ts Beskickning i Tokio, 
no. 511, December 19, 1944, vol. 671, UD. In January 1945, Bagge reported that the 
Japanese foreign minister in his policy speech in the Japanese parliament on the 21st had 
expressed Japan’s gratitude to Sweden. See Bagge to Foreign Ministry, Telegram i Kl. II 
chiffer från Kungl. Maj:ts Beskickning i Tokio, no. 44, January 28, 1945, vol. 671, UD. 
25 Bagge to Foreign Ministry, Telegram i Kl. I chiffer från Kungl. Maj:ts Beskickning i Tokio, 
no. 512, December 19, 1944, vol. 671, UD. 
26 Bagge to Foreign Ministry, Telegram i Kl. II chiffer från Tokio, April 3, 1945, nos. 127– 
128, vol. 671, UD. The Institute of Pacific Relations was an international nongovernmental 
organization that existed between 1925 and 1960, headquartered first in Honolulu then in 
New York, producing research on matters concerning Asia-Pacific. See Paul F. Hooper, “The 
Institute of Pacific Relations and the Origins of Asian and Pacific Studies,” Pacifc Affairs
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in Stockholm, who immediately forwarded it to the State Department.27 The 
next day he reported that Vilhelm Assarsson, the acting undersecretary of state 
for foreign affairs, had told him that the information that he had been given by 
von Post “represented views expressed to Swedish Minister Bagge in Tokyo by 
‘Jap officials of very high rank’.” Johnson wrote further, “It is Foreign Office 
opinion although Bagge did not say so that these views were intentionally given 
to Bagge in the expectation they would come to [the] attention of United States 
and British Governments.”28 
In February 1945, Bagge met Sakaya Tadashi, a Japanese diplomat with whom 
he had become acquainted at the end of the 1920s.29 In early 1945, Sakaya 
returned from Finland where he had served as the minister. In his meetings with 
Bagge, Sakaya found that they had roughly the same view of the need for Japan to 
end the war. After their meeting in February, the two diplomats met more than 
ten times to discuss the prospects for peace.30 
According to Sakaya’s affidavit to the IMTFE, Bagge had volunteered his 
services as a token of gratitude for the help he had received during his years 
in Japan and asked whether Sakaya thought that Foreign Minister Shigemitsu 
Mamoru would agree to the Swedish Government sounding out US intentions 
concerning what most worried the Japanese: the security of the imperial family.31 
Sakaya immediately informed Shigemitsu. According to Sakaya’s later testimony, 
the foreign minister was very happy when he learned of Bagge’s comment and 
asked Sakaya to write a memorandum and said that he wanted to meet Bagge.32 
Sakaya’s information made Shigemitsu add Bagge to three other possible chan-
nels for sending out peace feelers: approaching the UK through Japan’s minister 
in Madrid, through Switzerland, and through the Vatican.33 
A meeting between Bagge and Shigemitsu materialized shortly before the lat-
ter left as foreign minister when the Koiso government resigned on April 7. In his 
account of their meeting, Shigemitsu later wrote that 
27 The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, April 6, 1945, in U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforth: FRUS), 1945, Diplomatic 
Papers, vol. 6: The British Commonwealth, The Far East (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1969), 477. 
28 The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, April 7, 1945, in ibid. 
29 Interview with Sakaya Tadashi, in Shōwashi no tennō [The emperor in the history of the 
Shōwa period], ed. Yomiuri Shimbunsha, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1967), 401f. 
30 Ibid., 402. In his affidavit at the IMTFE, Bagge mentions that he had met Suzuki several 
times after September 1944, but he does not give any indication of exactly how often they 
met. See Bagge affidavit, 34,560. 
31 Sakaya affidavit, in IMTFE, Record of Proceedings, 1946–1948, 34,455f. 
32 Sakaya, in Shōwashi no tennō, 402. 
33 Miyasugi Hiroyasu, “Dainijitaisenki chūritsukoku Supein-Porutogaru de no Nihon no jōhō
katsudō to gaikō-gunji e no eikyō” [The impact on Japan’s intelligence activities and diplo-
macy and military affairs in the neutral Spain and Portugal during the Second World War], 
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Bagge was shortly returning to Sweden and readily offered to assist, say-
ing, “I cannot bear to think of the ruin of Japan, which has such a ‘glorious 
past’.” After careful thought, I asked him to ascertain what peace terms the 
U.S. and Britain had in mind and to inform me through Okamoto, our 
Minister in Stockholm. I stipulated only that the terms must be consonant 
with the honour of Japan.34 
According to Shigemitsu, Bagge “had agreed to mediate on his return to 
Stockholm.”35 What Bagge told the IMTFE in his affidavit was that Shigemitsu 
“requested me very earnestly to do whatever I could to find out the possibilities 
for peace.” Shigemitsu had also asked Bagge to collaborate with Japan’s minis-
ter in Stockholm, Okamoto Suemasa, who was then to report to Tokyo.36 For 
reasons that are not clear, Bagge waited until April 11 to report to the Swedish 
Foreign Ministry: 
Telegram in machine code from Tokyo 
Sent 11/4 1945 at 110o 
Arrived 11/4 1945 at 1245 
I have kept in touch with my political friend—your 328—and repeat-
edly discussed the situation and the peace problem. He has also had useful 
contacts within the government and recently informed the foreign minister 
about our talks. At my farewell visit with Shigemitsu he dealt with the subject 
during our hour-long conversation along similar lines. Asked for my sincere 
opinion I did not hide that I believe the war is lost for Japan and that contin-
ued fighting would only ruin the country and the people without changing 
the outcome. The foreign minister did not object to this. He emphasized the 
emperor’s desire for peace and hinted at his wish to bring an end to the war 
with the inevitable sacrifices. He expressed his sincere trust and asked me to 
participate in producing a proposal for an acceptable solution. He asked that 
after my return [to Sweden] I should cooperate with Okamoto to this end 
and in the interest of peace. 
A representative of Shigemitsu visited me today and emphasized that the 
matter was urgent and that Okamoto had been informed about the contents 
of our conversation. Based on this, Okamoto should shortly bring up this 
subject with His Excellency. 
Bagge37 
34 Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 339. 
35 Ibid., 355; cf. Sakaya affidavit, 35,455f. 
36 Bagge affidavit, in IMTFE, Record of Proceedings, 1946–1948, 34,561. The gist of the meet-
ing is described in the letter from Suzuki to Shimomura, April 9, 1945, referred to above. 
37 Bagge to Foreign Ministry, Telegram i maskinchiffer från Tokio, no. 133–134, April 11, 
1945, vol. 671, UD. 
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The day for Bagge’s return to Sweden was approaching and he sent a new tel-
egram on April 12 to Stockholm, obviously to wind up and organize the informa-
tion he had received before he left for Sweden. He referred to his telegram the 
previous day and indicated that he now wanted to present “some summarizing 
impressions.” The telegram was less specific than the one he had sent the day 
before as to who were the actors on the Japanese side. In the later telegram, 
Bagge ascribed the opinions expressed to an unspecified agent, “man”—which 
can be interpreted as “the Japanese,” “Japan,” “his discussion partner (or part-
ners),” etc. Interpreted literally, it indicates that the peace feeler was broader-
based than he had reported earlier. 
Initially, Bagge noted that there was a strong desire in Japan for a negotiated 
peace settlement. However, the Japanese were not going to take any initiative as 
it could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Therefore, help was needed to get 
negotiations started, and the Japanese would be pleased if proposals from the 
Swedish side were presented or, at least, information was obtained about the 
views of the counterpart. Above all, they hoped for UK understanding; in certain 
quarters it was found regrettable that war had ever been declared against the UK, 
which was seen as unnecessary and unwise. They counted on English war fatigue 
and worries over US successes in the Pacific Ocean that had put the UK in the 
back seat. On the other hand, the Japanese were prepared to continue to the bit-
ter end, if acceptable conditions were not offered. Bagge noted that his conversa-
tion with Shigemitsu had confirmed his conclusions in his telegram on April 3. 
He added that it was believed that the Americans at this stage must understand 
how exceptionally costly a decisive victory would be and that even the United 
States might, therefore, prefer to discuss conditions that would not humiliate the 
Japanese with their strong national pride, rather than continue the bloodshed.38 
It is clear from notes in pencil on the telegram kept in the Swedish National 
Archives that the information conveyed by Bagge was handled at the highest level 
in the Swedish Foreign Ministry. Three passages must have caught the atten-
tion of the ministry officials. One was the eagerness on the part of the Japanese 
to reach a negotiated peace, the reported inviolability of the Emperor, and the 
fact that the Japanese foreign minister had explicitly asked Bagge to participate 
in bringing about an acceptable solution. The reason for Bagge’s and Sweden’s 
involvement was said to be that it would make it possible for Japan to avoid tak-
ing any initiative which might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. At the same 
time, the officials could probably not help noticing the shift of emphasis in his 
telegrams of April 11 and 12. In the first telegram, he reported that the foreign 
minister had expressed his trust in Bagge and asked him to participate in bring-
ing about an acceptable solution and to cooperate with the Japanese minister 
in Stockholm. In his later telegram, Bagge reported that his Japanese contacts 
38 Bagge to Foreign Ministry, Telegram i Kl. I chiffer från Tokio, no. 137–138, April 12, 1945, 
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wanted Sweden to be active, which had been the main message in his telegram of 
September 19. 
The shift of emphasis in the contents of the two telegrams may be connected 
to the fact that Bagge had met Sakaya the same day. It is not clear exactly when 
Bagge sent the second telegram but as it arrived in Stockholm on April 13 at 
1 pm, it seems likely that he finalized it after his meeting with Sakaya, who had 
come to him to report the views of the new foreign minister, Tōgō Shigenori. In 
his meeting with Tōgō on April 9, Sakaya gave the impression that Shigemitsu 
had stopped short of making a formal request for mediation, and simply asked 
the Swedish Government to sound out US intentions at “its own instance.” No 
meeting between Tōgō and Bagge took place before the envoy departed for 
Sweden, but the new foreign minister’s positive views were conveyed to Bagge 
in no uncertain terms by Sakaya. He informed Bagge that the new foreign min-
ister’s stance to the peace question was the same as his predecessor.39 According 
to Sakaya, Bagge “looked very much delighted” when he was informed of Tōgō’s 
stance.40 
On the copy of the telegram of April 12 in the Swedish National Archives, it 
is noted in pencil that Foreign Minister Shigemitsu “resigned at the beginning of 
April 1945; the new is Togo (former ambassador to Moscow).” This informa-
tion created uncertainty as to whether or not the information Bagge had sent 
to Stockholm was still valid. Shigemitsu had resigned on April 7, the new for-
eign minister had assumed his duties two days later, and Stockholm knew about 
the conflicting views among Japan’s political leadership. In another telegram to 
Stockholm the next day, sent immediately before Bagge departed from Haneda, 
the envoy reported that the Japanese Foreign Ministry “has informed me that he 
[Tōgō] has been briefed about of my conversation with Shigemitsu and that the 
change of government does not mean any change of the approach to the ques-
tion we have been discussing.”41 His telegram must have assuaged some of the 
uncertainties about Japan’s moves in the immediate future. 
The Swedish Foreign Ministry certainly noted Shigemitsu’s shift of focus from 
Bagge to Sweden, which activated the neutrality reflexes of the ministry. They had 
come to the fore shortly before. In February 1945 the German foreign minister, 
Joachim von Ribbentrop, had launched a plan to negotiate a separate peace with 
the Soviet Union. This initiative was effectively killed when the head of the politi-
cal section of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Erik von Post, clarified Sweden’s 
disinterest in taking part in establishing the necessary contacts in what was seen as 
futile plans for a separate peace.42 A key consideration was that the United States 
39 Bagge affidavit, 34,562f. 
40 Sakaya affidavit, 35,457. 
41 Bagge to Foreign Ministry, Telegram i Kl. II chiffer från Tokio, no. 143, April 13, 1945, vol. 
671, UD. According to Bagge, it was Sakaya who was the messenger, see Bagge affidavit, 
34,562. 
42 Erik von Post, head of the political section, Foreign Ministry, to Arvid Richert, Swedish 
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had made it clear that it did not appreciate any German peace feelers.43 It was an 
overriding concern of the Swedish Government to nurture good relations with 
the Allied Powers. The Swedish Government abstained from poking its nose into 
the business of the Great Powers. Swedish actions had to be tolerable to all sides 
for Stockholm to agree involving itself. This had been the case when Sweden 
got involved in bringing about peace between Finland and the Soviet Union.44 
As far as royal interventions were concerned, in fresh memory was the disastrous 
outcome of King Gustaf V’s effort in 1940 to mediate between Hitler and Georg 
VI, which became so embarrassing for Sweden and the Swedish Government that 
no one wanted to bring it up afterwards.45 
A reason for the Swedish Foreign Ministry to proceed cautiously was its dis-
taste for doing anything that the Allied Powers would see as not compatible with 
their vital interests. The US and UK Governments had declared that they were 
not interested in anything but a Japanese unconditional surrender and this could 
not be ignored. The Allied war efforts against the Japanese had produced signifi-
cant successes and the United States was preparing for an all-out effort to take on 
Japan once Germany was defeated. The response of the Foreign Ministry to what 
Bagge reported in his telegrams of April 11 and 12 was conveyed in a telegram 
to him on April 14. It was short and could not be misunderstood: “No initiative 
Sweden either regarding proposals or information.”46 Bagge is certain to have 
noted that while Sweden would not act in any way, nothing was said about his 
role. When this message reached him is, however, not clear. The telegram is dated 
April 14 and by that time he had already left Japan on a special flight arranged by 
the Gaimushō taking him to Manchukuo from where he embarked on the Trans-
Siberian Railway. 
Diplomats in action in Stockholm 
Bagge reached Stockholm on May 10. His first duty after his arrival should have 
been to report to Foreign Minister Christian Günther, but conscious of the role 
he had been assigned by Shigemitsu, Bagge instead first called Minister Okamoto 
Suemasa and asked for an immediate confidential meeting. He rushed from the 
General Böhmes val: Sverige och det nazistiska Tyskland våren 1945 [General Böhme’s choice: 
Sweden and Nazi Germany, Spring 1945] (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1992), 29. 
43 Kent Zetterberg, “Svensk säkerhetspolitik i krigsslutet och inför det nya Europa 1945” 
[Swedish security policy at the end of the war and encountering the new Europe 1945], 
in Horisonten klarnar: 1945 – krigsslut [The horizon dawns – the end of the war], eds. Bo 
Huldt and Klaus-Richard Böhme (Stockholm: Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Bibliotek, 2002), 
179. 
44 The predicament is described in Alf W Johansson, Per Albin och kriget [Prime minister Per 
Albin Hansson and the war] (Stockholm: Tiden, 1984), chapter 16. 
45 Until the embarrassment lifted, McKay was one of the few who brought up Gustaf V’s 
attempt at mediating, see C.G. McKay, From Information to Intrigue: Studies in Secret Ser-
vice based on the Swedish Experience, 1939–1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 208f. 
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ferry to the Japanese legation, eager to discuss his role as a go-between to the 
Allied Powers with Okamoto. He had left Tokyo before the telegram arrived and 
the sensitivity of the topic was such that the ministry had most likely been unable 
to convey the information to him when he was on his way to Stockholm. This 
indicates that he was still in the dark about the Foreign Ministry decision taken 
in mid-April in which the Swedish Foreign Ministry discarded any involvement 
in Japan peace matters. 
The two diplomats met at the Japanese legation at 11 o’clock. Bagge expected 
to enter into serious talks with Okamoto about how to work for peace for Japan, 
which Shigemitsu had discussed with him, and which he knew that Shigemitsu’s 
successor Tōgō supported. According to Bagge’s affidavit to the IMTFE: 
I asked him [Okamoto] whether he had received any confidential telegrams 
about efforts to negotiate peace and I told him that I had several serious talks 
with Mr. Shigemitsu as Foreign Minister before leaving Japan. I told him 
that Mr. Shigemitsu had been very frank and had asked me to make a peace 
feeler. Mr. Okamoto replied that this was a very serious matter but that he 
had not heard anything about it. […] I asked Mr. Okamoto to make inquir-
ies as to whether or not I should continue my work on this peace effort. Mr. 
Okamoto said that he would send a telegram.47 
Okamoto’s subsequent report to Foreign Minister Tōgō the same day was much 
less specific about what Bagge had brought up, as it was described as “the matter 
brought up by Minister Sakaya.” This vagueness was likely a precaution consider-
ing the top-secret nature of the matter. Okamoto stressed that, if the intention 
was that the Swedish Government was to pursue peace negotiations wholly on 
its own initiative, it was necessary to be able to confidentially confirm this to 
Bagge.48 
When Bagge met Foreign Minister Christian Günther, the topics of their 
exchange remain guesswork as no notes were taken.49 Given the situation, a few 
topics must have been in focus: Sweden’s stance vis-à-vis the Japanese interest in 
a Swedish mediation, the situation in Japan, and the Japanese interest in a role 
47 Bagge affidavit, 34,563. 
48 Okamoto to Tōgō, Telegram, no. 950, May 10, 1945, in Nihon gaikō bunsho dejitaru kore-
kushon, Taiheiyō sensō [Digital collection of Japanese diplomatic documents: The Pacific War] 
(2017), ed. Gaimushō, vol. 3, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/ 
archives/pdfs/taiheiyo3_03.pdf, accessed April 11, 2019. 
49 Günther did not have the habit of writing down what he said or did in various contexts 
according to his closest collaborator, see Erik Boheman, På vakt: Kabinettssekreterare under 
andra världskriget [On guard: As undersecretary of state for foreign affairs during the Sec-
ond World War] (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1964), 40. Another senior foreign ministry official, 
Sverker Åström, claims that Günther seldom gave an account for his talks with others, see 
Sverker Åström, Ögonblick: Från ett halvsekel i UD-tjänst [Moments: From half a century in 
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for Bagge. As to the first topic, the decision had been taken a month before. The 
Swedish Government was not prepared to take any initiative. For Günther, it was 
out of the question that Sweden would become involved in any Japan imbroglio. 
However, he knew that the US Government should be informed. On April 19, 
US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius had sent a message to his minister in 
Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, about the information the Swedes had provided 
in early April: 
Although the Department desires that the Legation show no interest or take 
any initiative in pursuit of the matter because to do so might be miscon-
strued as indicating room for modification of this Government’s demand for 
unconditional surrender, there would be no objection if, in reference to this 
or future communications of this nature, the Legation as on its own initia-
tive were to express orally its own thanks for the courtesy of the Swedish 
Government in the matter.50 
The message revealed that the US disinterest in anything but Japanese uncondi-
tional surrender did not mean a lack of US interest in being informed of Japanese 
approaches. It indicated that if any such moves were noted, the US Government 
was interested in knowing about them.51 This made it urgent to pass on Bagge’s 
information and Günther made immediate arrangements for a lunch to which he 
invited Johnson and Bagge. 
The hastily arranged lunch took place on April 12.52 Johnson reported to 
Washington three days later what proceeded during the lunch. Bagge had talked 
about the possibility of Soviet entry into the war and said that the Japanese would 
never accept unconditional surrender. They would rather commit national sui-
cide, especially if the Japanese imperial institution would be attacked. Johnson’s 
response had been to point out that the United States would never allow Japan 
to put up conditions.53 
This report clarifies three matters. First, Bagge had not in any way touched 
upon the Japanese interest in a Swedish involvement in a peace effort or the sig-
nificant role that influential Japanese had assigned to him. This was maybe not 
50 The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson), April 19, 1945, FRUS 1945, 
vol. 6, 478. 
51 The same way of acting can be noted on the British side. See Foreign Office to British lega-
tion, Stockholm, Telegram, April 26, 1945, Japanese surrender. Code 23 File 630 (to paper 
5179), FO 371/46453, The National Archives, London. 
52 The date of the lunch is noted in Herschel V. Johnson, Series 6. Additions, Folder 371, 
Planner 1945, Herschel Vespasian Johnson Papers, 1880–1969, Wilson Library, University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I am grateful to Mr Matthew Turi, Manuscripts Research 
and Instruction Librarian, who checked Herschel Johnson’s papers. 
53 Herschel Johnson, Telegram, no. 1798, May 15, 1945, as summarized in Gerhard Krebs, 
“Aussichtslose Sondierung: Japanische Friedensfühler und schwedische Vermittlungsver-
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so surprising because at the dinner he was sitting next to his boss who had cat-
egorically rejected any Swedish involvement in Japanese peace overtures. Second, 
Johnson’s comment that the United States would not allow Japan to put up con-
ditions can be seen as a veiled criticism of Bagge’s stance. The Swedish Foreign 
Ministry had briefed the US legation in Stockholm about Bagge’s past reporting 
from Tokyo, so Johnson was aware that Bagge had spoken up for Japan’s inter-
est. Third, Günther does not figure in Johnson’s report. Given that the Swedish 
foreign minister is known as a very skilled and experienced diplomat, his way of 
acting, first bringing together Bagge and Johnson and then making Bagge do 
the talking was a way to demonstrate that as far as Japan peace matters were con-
cerned, the Swedish Government was not involved. 
Two days later Bagge learned at the Foreign Ministry that Japan’s military 
attaché in Stockholm, Onodera Makoto, had launched a move similar to the one 
Bagge had been entrusted with.54 The Swedish businessman Eric Erickson, who 
had been on the blacklist in London, had been asked by Onodera to try to estab-
lish contacts with the US and UK ministers in Stockholm. In order to establish 
these contacts, Onodera had asked Erickson to approach Prince Carl Senior, a 
brother of the king. In a meeting with the prince’s chamberlain Gustaf Crispin 
Löwenhielm, Erickson asked if the prince as the chairman of the Swedish Red 
Cross “in some way could fix (mediate) the contact that General Onodera wished 
with the US and English ministers here.”55 
On April 16 Bagge met with Okamoto, who reported to Foreign Minister Tōgō
the following day. According to Okamoto, Bagge had without further ado brought
up Onodera’s move and told him that the Swedish Foreign Ministry had immedi-
ately (sokuza ni) rejected it as an interference of no value. A military attaché could
not take such an action on such an important matter and, not only that, the minis-
try found the move clumsy. Bagge warned that if Onodera continued his activities,
it would disturb the main thread [the Bagge track] and become very dangerous.56 
A strictly confidential memo in the Swedish Foreign Ministry archive confirms 
Okamoto’s report that the prince had immediately informed the Foreign Ministry 
about Onodera’s request and that the ministry had equally immediately rejected 
54 The date is based on that Okamoto reported to Tokyo that Bagge had told him when they 
met on May 16 that he had been informed “the day before yesterday.” See Okamoto to 
Tōgō, Telegram, no. 952, May 17, 1945, in Nihon gaikō bunsho dejitaru korekushon, Taiheiyō
sensō (2017), ed. Gaimushō, vol. 3. 
55 Prince Carl Senior, “PM” [Memo], May 10, 1945, Vapenstillestånd och fred, HP 39F, vol. 
1637 [henceforth: vol. 1637], UD, vol. 1637, UD. 
56 Okamoto to Tōgō, May 17, 1945. The Okamoto version of what took place in May 1945 
referred to in Japanese history writing often relies on a memo he wrote in 1951, presented 
in, for example, Shūsen shiroku, 122f. When he wrote this memo, he does not seem to have 
refreshed his memory by rereading the telegrams he sent to Foreign Minister Tōgō immedi-
ately after his meetings with Bagge in May 1945. In Okamoto’s first telegram sent on May 
10, 1945, he reported correctly that the Swedish businessman Eric Erickson and Prince Carl 
Senior were involved; in his 1951 memo the two Swedes are said to be “a German business-
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the proposal.57 This response should not be a surprise as it was based on the 
government’s decision in mid-April how to handle Japanese overtures. A month 
later it was even less reason to act on a proposal from an inveterate Nazi friend on 
behalf of a Japanese general. Nazi Germany had just been defeated by the Allied 
Powers, and they were not interested in anything but the unconditional surrender 
of the last remaining enemy, Japan. That Onodera’s proposal had not only been 
discarded by the Foreign Ministry but that this was also communicated to the 
Japanese side is corroborated by another jotting, added by hand to the strictly 
confidential memo in the Foreign Ministry archive: “Bagge advised the Japanese 
minister to have General Onodera end further contact searching.” Thus, as it 
takes two to tango and the Swedish side was not interested in Onodera’s invita-
tion, his move was terminated so quickly that it had hardly begun.58 
Having informed Okamoto that Onodera’s move had been discarded, Bagge 
went on to ask if Okamoto had received any response from Tokyo about his 
own action but was told this was not the case. According to Bagge, they needed 
to know Tōgō’s view, which meant that they had to wait for a while. However, 
when Okamoto asked Bagge if he had had contact with the British and Americans 
in Stockholm, Bagge told him that he had met the US minister and had reported 
objectively about what he had observed about the situation in Japan. He had 
done so as someone who had worked for about ten years in the country and was 
a friend of Japan.59 
What Bagge told Okamoto is striking in two respects. First, despite that Bagge 
knew by now that his government had rejected taking any initiative whatsoever 
vis-à-vis Japanese peace overtures, he did not inform Okamoto of the official 
decision. Instead, he queried whether anything had been heard from Tokyo. 
This might be because Bagge still believed that he could function as an inter-
mediary between Japan and the United States and the United Kingdom because 
the warring parties lacked channels of communication. His role continued to be 
potentially important. Second, it is evident that Bagge overplayed his hand in his 
encounter with Johnson. Their meeting allowed Bagge to impress on a leading 
US diplomat his capacity as a diplomat, but he missed this chance. Although he 
might be seen as a suitable mediator in Japanese eyes, a go-between has also to 
be acceptable to the other party. Presenting Johnson with an “objective” view 
is what can be expected from a diplomat but talking as “a friend of Japan” at a 
meeting with the top diplomat in Stockholm representing Japan’s No. 1 enemy 
in the ongoing war did not impress Johnson as was shown by his veiled criticism 
of Bagge. 
57 Strictly confidential foreign ministry memo, typed, unsigned (May 10, 1945?), vol. 1637, 
UD. The date has been added by hand. 
58 For a detailed analysis of “the Onodera peace feeler” based on Japanese sources as well as 
on wartime documents in Swedish archives, see Bert Edström, The Untold Story of Onodera 
Makoto and Swedish Intelligence: “They acted as I expected”: The Surveillance of Japan’s Mili-
tary Attaché and His Intelligence Work 1941–1945, (forthcoming), chapter 8. 
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On the Japanese side, Foreign Minister Tōgō’s concerns must have increased 
when he read Okamoto’s telegram of May 17. When Bagge was still in Tokyo, 
Sakaya had told Tōgō that the Swedish Government would work on its own 
initiative. What he had learned from Okamoto about his meeting with Bagge on 
May 10 was different—if the intention was that the Swedish Government was to 
pursue peace negotiations wholly on its own initiative, it was necessary to confi-
dentially confirm this to Bagge. This would require preparations within Japan, for 
the simple reason that the hard-liners within the army were not willing to allow 
Japan to take part in something tantamount to admitting that the war was lost. 
Unconditional surrender that the Allied Powers requested was out of the ques-
tion. “Had such a move been made,” Paul Kecskemeti concluded in his analysis 
of the diplomatic moves in the final stage of the war, “the extremist elements of 
the Army, among whom the mystique of the ‘holy war’ for Japan held unlimited 
sway, would have staged a coup d’état.”60 In such an event, not even the mem-
bers of the government would have been safe. Kase Toshikazu claimed in his 
book about the end of the war that it was “extremely difficult and dangerous, 
for in those days even the foreign minister’s contacts with foreign envoys were 
apt to invite the suspicions of the vigilant military police.”61 To anyone pursuing 
a peace option, a warning of what could happen had been given when hundreds 
of people were arrested in April on suspicion of harboring anti-war sentiments.62 
A major consideration on the Japanese side all along had been that any Swedish 
intervention should be made as if Sweden were acting on its own initiative so that 
Japan might avoid showing any kind of weakness. Tōgō had to be careful. What 
Bagge told Okamoto about his meeting with Johnson might not be all that took 
place. If it were revealed that an attempt to establish contact with the enemy 
was backed by influential Japanese, even a member of the Japanese Government, 
the army hard-liners would ruin whatever prospects the budding peace endeavor 
might have. Therefore, Tōgō’s response to Okamoto on May 18 was noncom-
mittal: “What happened during the previous government needs to be investi-
gated carefully and this will take time.”63 Tōgō’s response was a signal that the 
Bagge kōsaku had been abandoned also by the Japanese side. 
Concluding remarks 
When the war began to turn into a disaster for Japan, various peace proposals 
were mooted. However, as US Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, testified 
at the end of 1945, “there is no evidence of any peace offer or of any statement 
looking toward peace transmitted to this Government before 10 August 1945, 
60 Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat (New York: Athe-
neum, 1964), 174. 
61 Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 220. 
62 One of those arrested was Yoshida Shigeru, who became prime minister in 1946. 
63 Tōgō to Okamoto, Telegram, no. 953, May 18, 1945, in Nihon gaikō bunsho dejitaru kore-
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from official Japanese sources or from any person authorized to act as an agent 
for the Japanese Government.”64 Acheson’s claim is not entirely correct as “the 
Bagge peace feeler” had the backing of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and his suc-
cessor Tōgō, at least initially. 
In standard treatises on Japanese foreign policy, Tōgō is seen as the one who 
discarded the attempt to take advantage of Bagge to open a channel to the United 
States and the United Kingdom.65 A recent standard work claims, “Shigemitsu 
displayed some interest, but Togo, who succeeded him, was skeptical and ter-
minated the overtures.”66 As we have seen, this does not square with what hap-
pened. Initially, Tōgō was positive to Bagge as an intermediary. The Swede was 
informed of this shortly before he left Japan. Later, Tōgō’s stance changed as was 
revealed by his telegram to Okamoto on May 17. The reasons are not entirely 
clear. Bagge’s immediate reaction was that it lay with Tōgō’s “strong position in 
Moscow since the time he was Japanese Ambassador there.”67 Shigemitsu wrote 
in his recollections: “Togo put a stop to any possible activities by saying that the 
Cabinet had changed in the meantime. Presumably, he had more faith in a con-
tinuation of existing relations with Russia.”68 In his early account, Kase claimed, 
“throughout the Pacific War our main diplomatic endeavors were concentrated 
upon Moscow, creating a sort of habit of mind which, I think, partly explains why 
we chose the Soviet government as the channel for addressing the Allied powers 
prior to our surrender.”69 
Shigemitsu’s claim that Bagge had agreed to be a mediator on his return to 
Stockholm is consonant with Tōgō’s view. Tōgō had been led to believe that 
Sweden was willing to sound out the United States and the United Kingdom, 
but this does not fit what Bagge reported to the Swedish Foreign Ministry. In his 
telegram of September 19, 1944, he reported what amounted to a peace feeler, 
not towards the Allied Powers but singling out the UK as the counterpart for an 
agreement with the initiative being Japanese. In his telegram of April 11, 1945, 
he reported that he had been asked by Shigemitsu “to participate in bringing 
about a proposal for an acceptable solution” and to that end to “cooperate with 
Okamoto for this purpose and in the interest of peace.” The stance taken by the 
Swedish Foreign Ministry was that Sweden was not going to take any initiative, 
64 The Acting Secretary of State [Dean Acheson] to Representative Bertrand W. Gearhart, of 
California, December 18, 1945, FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, 496f. 
65 See, e.g., Fujiwara Akira, “Haisen” [Japan’s defeat], in Iwanami kōza: Nihon rekishi, vol. 21: 
Kindai [Iwanami series: A history of Japan, vol. 21: The modern period, 8] (Tokyo: Iwa-
nami shoten, 1977, 350; Nihon gaikō hyakunen shōshi, ed. Gaimushō, 230f; Ōhata Tokushirō, 
Nihon gaikōshi [A Japanese diplomatic history] (Tokyo: Azuma shuppan, 1978), 200. 
66 Ikeda Kiyoshi, “Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1941–1945,” in The History of Anglo-Japanese 
Relations, 1600–2000, vol. 2: The Political–Diplomatic Dimension, 1931–2000, eds. Ian Nish 
and Yoichi Kibata (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 129. 
67 Bagge affidavit, in IMTFE, Record of Proceedings, 1946–1948, 34,564. 
68 Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 355. 
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neither regarding proposals nor information. At the same time, the ministry had 
asked Bagge to keep in touch with his source, which indicated an active interest 
in the action he was involved in. 
The British historian Richard Storry contacted Bagge in 1960 to get his com-
ments about what took place in the final phase of the war.70 Bagge’s response 
clarifies how he looked at matters in hindsight. In his letter, Storry brought up 
Onodera’s move, which Storry believed had “complicated things for you.”71 This 
comment was natural as although Bagge’s and Onodera’s peace endeavors were 
separate and not at all interrelated, they were occasionally mixed up.72 According 
to Bagge, Storry’s impression was not entirely without foundation: “The efforts 
made by General Onodera were certainly not very fortunate, but I do not think 
they did any real harm.” Bagge went on to describe how Shigemitsu at their 
meeting had been 
very frank and outspoken and there was no question of any ‘veiled intimation’
as Mr Kase puts it in his book. We readily agreed upon the general lines of
how to proceed. That there had to be concessions from the Japanese side was
evident, but Mr Shigemitsu did not specify. As he says in his memoirs: “I stip-
ulated only that the terms must be consonant with the honour of Japan.”73 
The most important clarification made by Bagge dealt with the mission he had 
accepted to shoulder: 
In the collection of documents published by Gaimusho [Shūsen shiroku] there 
are two erroneous and misleading passages that I should like to point out. 
From the statement of Mr Tadashi Sakaya as well as from the one attributed 
to Mr Shigemitsu himself one must get the impression that I did propose 
myself to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This is quite wrong and 
you will see from what I have written above that all the time my attitude was 
carefully reserved, although I was prepared to act for the good sake when I 
was asked to do so.74 
70 The contact resulted in an exchange of letters: Storry to Bagge, February 25, 1960; Bagge to 
Storry, March 9, 1960; and Storry to Bagge, March 9, 1960. Copies of the letters exchanged 
were handed over to the author by Ambassador Erik von Sydow in 1996. He had received 
the material in 1974 from the British historian Louis Allen, who had asked von Sydow to 
comment on a prospective book chapter about the Bagge kōsaku. Personal communication 
from Erik von Sydow, April 21, 1996. 
71 Richard Storry to Widar Bagge, Letter, February 25, 1960, copy in the author’s private 
collection. 
72 Author’s interview with Mrs Onodera Yuriko, Tokyo, June 14, 1991. 
73 Widar Bagge to Richard Storry, Letter, March 9, 1960, in Collected Writings of Richard 
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While Bagge argued that “all the time my attitude was carefully reserved” and 
that he had not proposed himself “as mediator,” he also claimed that he had been 
“prepared to act for the good sake when I was asked to do so.” Thus, what he 
explicitly denied was that he had proposed himself as mediator. He was prepared 
to shoulder the responsibility if asked. But just at the moment when he had the 
opportunity to boost his putative role as an intermediary, his lack of understand-
ing of what was needed from such a go-between became obvious. The question 
is why he ruined any prospects by overplaying his hand when he met Johnson? 
Maybe it is explained by an observation made by a Swedish foreign-policy insider 
about three diplomats named Bagge, who were working at the Swedish Foreign 
Ministry at the same time. According to the insider, they were called Big Bagge, 
Medium Bagge, and Little Bagge, in the order of ability. Unfortunately, the 
insider said, Widar was Little Bagge.75 What took place when Bagge met Johnson 
seems to confirm how the insider characterized Sweden’s former envoy to Japan. 
Bagge was only too aware of his failure and admitted it to a Japanese cor-
respondent in Stockholm in the final phase of the war.76 Yet in hindsight, he 
recollected with affection the short period in May 1945 when “Japan’s national 
fate was decided” and he had been a participant in the Great Power game that 
decided the fate of nations and liked to talk about it.77 When he was offered the 
post of envoy to Cairo after Tokyo, he was not enthusiastic.78 
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As the war in Europe approached its inevitable end, Finland sued for peace with 
Moscow; Denmark and Norway were liberated; and on May 2, 1945, two days 
after Hitler had committed suicide, Berlin fell to Soviet troops. Although not all 
occupied nations were liberated (the unfortunate Baltic States would not regain 
independence for half a century), on May 7, Stockholm witnessed boisterous 
peace celebrations, observed by dismayed Japanese diplomats. As we know, rela-
tions between Stockholm and Tokyo remained normal, which contrasted with 
Finland and Denmark that broke off diplomatic contact, and Norway that even 
declared war.1 On July 31, 1945, Sweden’s national coalition government was 
dissolved and replaced by a Social Democratic cabinet, with Östen Undén as 
the new foreign minister. The war in Europe was over and the road to postwar 
prosperity lay open.2 
The situation could not have been more different for Japan. On August 15, 
the Emperor’s voice was aired in a radio broadcast for the first time. Announcing 
the unconditional surrender of the nation, he ordered all forces to lay down 
their weapons. Two weeks later, on September 2, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu 
Mamoru signed the instrument of surrender on the USS Missouri. The Long 
Second World War that had begun at a railway track in Manchuria ended on 
board a battleship in the Pacific. Japan accepted defeat. With that started seven 
years of US occupation, a transitional leadership in Tokyo, war crime trials, and 
the restructuring of the former Empire. Korea became an independent state again 
but soon broke up into two separate countries, later suffering from another devas-
tating war—the first one of the emerging Cold War. Manchukuo was reintegrated 
into China, while Taiwan was liberated and later became the home of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s Republic of China after he lost the mainland to the Communists, who 
proclaimed the People’s Republic of China from the old capital Peking, in 1949. 
Large parts of the Empire’s diaspora—Japanese soldiers and civilians—returned 
to Japan, sometimes after years of imprisonment. They came home to a destroyed 
country, where major cities lay in ashes. Hiroshima and Nagasaki being only the 
most infamous examples because of their obliteration by the first atomic bombs. 

















The firebombing raid of Tokyo on the night of March 9–10 alone killed more 
than 100,000 people—roughly similar to the death that the A-bombs wreaked. 
Minister Bagge did not have to witness the devastation anymore, but his Swiss 
colleague, Camille Gorgé, described the capital in September 1945 as “a moon-
like city, disfigured. Ruins, kilometers on end. I do not know any more where 
I am. I do not recognize a single district. I am somewhere else, on a different 
planet.”3 
The Gaimushō, too, lay in ashes, as did its diplomacy. With the loss of sov-
ereignty, all decision-making power on Japan’s external affairs passed to the
United States occupying forces under General Douglas MacArthur and the US
government. The Americans swiftly forbade an independent Japanese diplo-
macy, ordering its embassies, legations, and consulates abroad to be handed
over to US representatives. It was the end of official diplomatic contact between
third states and Japan. Only for administrative purposes were foreign repre-
sentatives allowed to interact with the beaten-down Gaimushō in its temporary
premises, but not for political contact with the provisional Japanese cabinet.
Until mid-November 1945 when Japan broke the diplomatic relation with
Sweden, Erik von Sydow served as charge d’affaires. Later, Olof Ripa took on
the role as Diplomatic Representative to the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers. Sweden could no longer appoint a new plenipotentiary to Tokyo nor
receive new Japanese representatives in Stockholm. It is an irony of history that
Swedish–Japanese diplomacy survived 15 years of war but not the reestablish-
ment of peace.
To be fair, Shigemitsu’s signature on the Missouri did not technically restore 
peace, it just ended hostilities. A peace agreement was not signed until 1951, in 
San Francisco. Only then Japan regained its sovereignty, after which Swedish– 
Japanese diplomatic relations were promptly reestablished. In the meantime, 
Sweden’s other primary interest—trade—started to recover from the disruptions 
of the war. Surprisingly fast, commerce became possible again. Although the 
official statistics in Sweden are empty for the year 1946, trade figures reappear 
Figure 8.1 Value of imports from and exports to Japan 1947–1952. Source: Statistisk 
































already for 1947 again. They show that although exports were only worth a mea-
ger SEK 0.5 million, imports were valued already at over SEK 9 million. That is 
nearly the level at which imports stood right before Pearl Harbor. The following 
years of US occupation would see further growth in both directions. By the time 
Japan became independent again, trade was worth many times what it was before 
the Pacific War (see Figure 8.1). Hence, although the occupation ended the 
official diplomatic contact between Sweden and Japan, it did not terminate their 
trade relationship. On the contrary, the end of belligerency was conducive to the 
return to business as usual. 
Final remarks 
The purpose of this book was to study Sweden’s interactions with Japan dur-
ing a volatile and violent moment of its history, with the goal of shedding light
also on the wider international context of the Long Second World War. So,
what did we learn? For one, we can now answer the question why Swedish– 
Japanese relations remained intact during the warfare in China and the War in
the Pacific. The trivial but honest answer is that it simply always made sense for
Sweden and Japan to continue normal relations. The Swedish experience was, as
social scientists call it, path dependent. In the same way that Sweden continued
its relationship with the United States and Great Britain, there was no reason
for Stockholm to give up its relationship with Japan. After 1905, Japan was a
pivotal state for Sweden’s Far Eastern trade strategy. Although commerce with
Japan and China was far less extensive than trade with Western Great Powers
or Scandinavian countries, individual firms and the business community in gen-
eral wanted to maintain access to this region, which they saw as an important
market with much potential. Although Japan’s actions in the League of Nations
went strongly against Sweden’s strategic interests for a law-based international
society, Japanese provocations were never directly targeted against Stockholm.
There was no Swedish “Pearl Harbor moment,” not even a “Manila moment,”
as for Spain. Japan was never responsible for the death of many Swedes or
infringements on other vital interests. Bilaterally, Stockholm was unhappy with
Tokyo’s actions but never ostracized to a point that would have called for a
rupture of relations. In addition, once the war turned against Japan, Sweden
had become so deeply engaged in diplomatic activities for Tokyo and the Allies
that cutting ties with Japan would have been to the detriment of both sides.
From a humanitarian perspective, Sweden was useful as a neutral that could act
diplomatically between the fronts. It did so in the name of all parties. Be it well
understood, however, that these actions were not taken out of pure generosity.
As Envoy Bagge so clearly formulated, Sweden’s Good Office services were part
of its engagement strategy that was supposed to enable its own (trade) interests.
It was a tactic that did not always produce direct results—especially during the
last years of the Pacific War—but considering how quickly trade rebounded after
the end of hostilities, one is tempted to conclude that it was not completely
without merit. 
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The previous chapters also show that Sweden’s return to its traditional neu-
trality in the late 1930s was influenced not only by the Abyssinian sanctions 
fiasco, and the threat from a rearming Germany, but also by Japan’s aggressive 
challenge in East Asia. Sweden was among the most outspoken voices in Geneva 
against these aggressions, but without collective action in the form of sanctions 
or an intervention, there was no way of reining in Japan’s militarists. Tokyo even 
withdrew from the League of Nations, but no consequences followed. This is 
not to argue that Sweden was on higher moral ground. Stockholm, too, did not 
try to impose punishment from its side. Unilateral action would, theoretically, 
have been an option but even a grassroots consumer boycott, after the bombing 
of Chinese cities, failed to gather enough support. There were prominent voices 
not only in the business community but also among diplomats and publicists, 
who subscribed to Japan’s version of the “Manchurian question” which held that 
Japan was only policing a lawless region. In short, there was no common inter-
pretation of Manchuria or the “Chinese incident,” neither domestically nor inter-
nationally, and that paralyzed attempts at collective security through the League. 
Only once this failure became painfully evident (increased by the Abyssinian cri-
sis) Stockholm returned to the principles of neutrality since that was the last avail-
able security paradigm in the absence of multilateral forums. 
Once that decision was taken, it was clear that there would be no more ques-
tion about opposing Japan politically or commercially. In addition, during World 
War I, Sweden’s foreign trade policy had been strictly impartial, which the gov-
ernment at the time had viewed as a pillar of an equidistant neutrality. But trade 
based on “fairness” toward both belligerent parties instead of the needs of the 
Swedish population had caused serious food shortage which translated into wide-
spread social unrest. In 1939, it was clear that neutrality would have to be more 
flexible, less concerned about symmetric trade, and more about national priori-
ties. Just like other states, the neutrals, too, had a right to put their own inter-
ests first. It was nobody less than the ardent internationalist Östen Undén who 
formulated that policy in 1938.4 Over the course of the European war, Sweden 
consequently traded asymmetrically with the Allied and Axis Powers. Which 
belligerent received what kind of economic benefits depended mostly on the 
development of the war and the relative threat level.5 In light of this European 
strategy, and the fact that Sweden had already strictly separated commerce and 
politics when dealing with Japan, it comes as no surprise that the “business as 
usual” approach continued all along, until 1945 (and beyond). Although to do 
so, Sweden needed to leverage its full weight in the form of Envoy Bagge actively 
taking over the trade interests of the companies in the Empire—even to the point 
where the directors of the trading companies would complain about his interfer-
ences in setting prices and negotiating terms with customers. Then again, that 
was but a natural reaction to the nationalization of the Japanese industry under 
government ministries. As private enterprise in Japan was integrated into the state 
(although the zaibatsu never were purely private), Swedish trade had to parallel 
the development if it wanted to maintain eye-level in negotiations. It is important 
to note, however, that the integration of diplomacy and commerce was a two-way 
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street. When the Pacific War led to a massive increase in the diplomatic work and 
costs for Bagge and the legation, because of the Protecting Power mandates and 
the new humanitarian work, it was only the availability of Swedish personnel and 
capital in Japan and around the world that allowed him and the Swedish state 
to cope with the situation. The ability to hire Swedish staff from the companies 
into his services and use their funds was necessary for the functioning of Bagge’s 
legation. The time when foreign nationals could act as agents of Swedish diplo-
macy in the form of honorary consuls was over. Between 1941 and 1945, only a 
Swedish passport had any chance of opening doors to internment camps or per-
suading the Kenpeitai to let their holders fulfill their Protecting Power duties. In 
short, the private–public partnership of the Swedish network abroad was essential 
to neutral trade and diplomacy alike. 
It is also worth noting that Sweden was busy diplomatically during the entire 
15 years. First, Stockholm was deeply involved in the processes in Geneva, during 
the period when it implemented a multilateral foreign relations strategy through 
the League of Nations. Later it was engaged mostly bilaterally with Japan and 
other belligerents when warfare made its position as a diplomatic service provider 
valuable. That engagement even came during a time when Japan had lost all 
political relevance to Sweden and when Swedish politicians and the general public 
were occupied with the European situation. Neutrality did not mean passivity. 
The UD never disengaged. On the contrary, it made additional resources avail-
able to cope with the increased workload that its active diplomacy needed. On 
the other hand, it must also be pointed out that semantics mattered surprisingly 
greatly. That Mukden and the Marco Polo Bridge were both known as “inci-
dents” (just like Nomonhan), and that Japan’s belligerency in China was framed 
in a similar low-key manner, impacted the way in which Sweden could deal with 
these situations. That becomes clear in comparison to the official “war” that 
Japan started with the United States and the Allies. Tokyo even transmitted an 
official declaration of war through its embassy in Washington—albeit only after 
the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although none of these instances led to a termination 
of Swedish–Japanese relations, their impacts on the bilateral relationship were 
distinctly different, as we have seen. 
Lastly, although this was clearly a story of change—the waves of violence of 
Japanese militarists in 1931, 1937, and 1941, all led to visible changes in the 
way that Sweden interacted with Japan—in the end, it was also an uninterrupted 
experience. From the Swedish perspective, the Long Second World War was akin 
to the Cold War—a conflict that raged around it and was dangerous but never 
actually turned “hot” for Stockholm. Although the Long Second World War 
impacted the international sphere heavily, and with that the way in which a neu-
tral country could engage with its international partners, those wars of others 
never created an all-or-nothing situation for Sweden. Certainly, the warfare of the 
1940s could also have engulfed its shores—it was a highly contingent moment. 
But the fact that it did not, opened possibilities for Sweden to act internationally 
in a way that was different from the possibilities of belligerents but consistent 








shows how neutrality for Sweden was not only a security paradigm at home but 
also an effective instrument of its foreign policy—even as far away as in Japan. 
Notes 
1 Onodera, An den Gestaden der Ostsee, 218–219; Yoshitake, Nihonjin wa Hokuō
kara nani wo mananda ka, 34. 
2 Hadenius, Modern svensk politisk historia, 80–81. 
3 DDS, Debâcle au Soleil-levant, 404. 
4 Undén to UD, undated reply to memorandum of August 10, 1938, UD to 
Undén (UDA, 2210.03.1, H 40, Ct). See also Martin Fritz, “Sveriges ekon-
omiska relationer med Nazityskland” [Sweden’s economic relations with Nazi 
Germany], in Sverige och Nazityskland: Skuldfrågor och moraldebatt [Sweden and 
Nazi Germany: Questions of guilt and the moral debate], ed. Lars M. Andersson 
and Mattias Tydén (Stockholm: Dialogos, 2007), 257–258. 
5 On the economic aspects of Swedish World War II neutrality with European 
belligerents, see Eric B. Golson, “The Economics of Neutrality: Spain, Sweden, 
and Switzerland in the Second World War” (PhD diss., The London School of 










   
  








East Asian authorities 
GMS — Gaimushō Archive, Tokyo 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan/Early Shōwa Period 1926–1945) 
A.1.1.0.21-12-1 League of Nations Negotiations 
A.1.1.0.21-12-1-4 Records of conversations with Matsuoka Yōsuke 
A.1.1.0.21-12-1-5 Negotiations concerning the Sino-Japanese incident, 
including with the United States 
A.1.1.0.30 Documents concerning the China incident, in general 
A.1.1.0.30-23 China’s appeal to the League of Nations 
A.1.1.0.30-32 The Nine Power Conference 
A.1.1.0.30-51 Collected proclamations due to the China incident 
A.1.1.0.30-6-1 Measures to stop the material help to Chiang Kai-shek 
via Burma and Hong Kong 
E.4.5.0.13 Foreign matchmaking industry and mixed trade 
matters 
L.1.3.0.1-9 Prince Takamatsu’s visit to Scandinavia in 1930 
M.2.1.013-6 Miscellaneous Documents Relating to the 
Appointment and Dismissal of Ambassadors or 
Ministers Stationed in Foreign Countries, U.S. version 
JACAR — Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National 
Archives of Japan 
B04013434900 103. Precedent of declaration of neutrality as executed 
by Japan 
B04013453600 18. Legal opinion about neutrality 
B14090870300 7. Okamoto Suemasa 
B02032937000 5. Protection of interests of Swedes concerning 
enemy country trading companies in China (including 
“American Far Eastern Match Co.” in Shanghai) /

















5. Protection of interests of Swedes concerning 
enemy country trading companies in China (includ-
ing “American Far Eastern Match Co.” in Shanghai) 
/ From March 30, 1942 to June 30, 1942 
3. Materials on diplomacy: Record of Japan–US nego-
tiations—Materials on Japan–US negotiations (1): 
The 2nd Konoe Cabinet 2 
Swedish authorities 
1919 års tull- och traktatkommittés arkiv, Riksarkivet, Stockholm 
(Archives of the Tariff and Treaty Committee of 1919, at the Swedish National 
Archives) 
Vol. 120 
Archives of the Allmänna säkerhetstjänsten 
(Swedish Public Security Service), at the Swedish National Archives 
F 2 BB:2 Handels- och propagandarapporter 1941–1942 
(Reports on trade and propaganda 1941–1942) 
F 2 BB:3 Handels- och propagandarapporter 1943–1945 
(Reports on trade and propaganda 1943–1945) 
Archives of the NF-byrån 
(League of Nations Bureau, Swedish Foreign Ministry), at the Swedish National 
Archives 
B 1:1 
BA — Beskickningsarkiv, Riksarkivet, Stockholm 
(Missions Archive, at the Swedish National Archives) 
Beskickningsarkiv Tokyo: 230033.2 
E 1 II Inkommande chiffertelegram, 1943–1945 
(Incoming Cipher Telegrams) 
E 2 I Avgående chiffertelegram, 1933–1942 
(Outgoing Cipher Telegrams) 
E 2 II Avgående chiffertelegram, 1943–1944 
(Outgoing Cipher Telegrams) 
E 2 III Avgående chiffertelegram, 1945–1948 
(Outgoing Cipher Telegrams) 
E 4 III Korrespondens, 1937–1943 
(Correspondence) 
E 4 IV Korrespondens, 1944–1948 
(Correspondence) 

















F 2c I Handlingar rörande Y.M.C.A., 1942–1944 
(Documents Concerning Y.M.C.A.) 
F 2e III Passansökningar och krigsfångeärenden, 1943 
(Passport Applications and Prisoner of War Cases) 
Försvarsstabens Arkiv, Krigsarkivet, Riksarkivet, Stockholm 
(Archive of the Defense Staff, War Archives, at the Swedish National Archives) 
Serie Ö I:10 Militära översikter, utredningar och sammanställningar. Japan 
1936–1952 
(Military surveys, investigations and summarized reports) 
Svenska Handelsdepartementets Arkiv, Huvudarkivet, Riksarkivet, Stockholm 
(Archive of the Swedish Ministry of Trade, main archive of the Swedish National 
Archives), 
F II aa: 203 Rapporter från UD. Utomeuropa, 1938 (Reports from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Overseas) 
UDA – Utrikesdepartementets Arkiv, Riksarkivet, Stockholm 
(Archive of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Swedish National 
Archives) 
1902 års dossiersystem: 2210.02 
(1902 Dossier System) 
1 K Rapporter från beskickningarna i Tokyo och Beijing, 1901– 
1919 (Reports from the Tokyo and Beijing legations) 
21 U 1 Rapporter från beskickningarna, 1914–1931 (Reports from 
legations) 
103 A 8 Uppsägning av svensk-japanska handelstraktaten av 1896 samt 
underhandlingar om ny traktat (Termination of the Swedish– 
Japanese Trade Treaty of 1896 and negotiations on a new 
treaty) 
1920 års dossiersystem 1918–1952: 2210.03.1 
(1920 Dossier System) 
H 6 Xj Allmänt angående handel och industri, Japan (General regard-
ing trade and industry, Japan) 
H 6 Xm Allmänt angående handel, industri och hantverk, Manchukuo, 
1934– (General concerning trade, industry and handicrafts, 
Manchukuo) 
H 40 Ct Järn och stål, Tyskland 
(Iron and steel, Germany) 
H 100 Xj Export- och import- samt transiteringsförbud, Japan, 1921– 



























HP 1 N Handlingar från utrikesnämnden (Documents from the 
Advisory Council of Foreign Affairs) 
HP 1 S Utrikesministerns samtal med utländska beskickningschefer 
(Foreign Minister’s talks with heads of foreign missions) 
HP 1 Xj Politik: allmänt, Japan 
(Politics: Japan in general) 
Vol. XIII: 1937–1938 
Vol. XIV: 1938–1939 
Vol. XV: 1939–1941 
Vol. XVI: 1941–1942 
Vol. XVII: 1942–1944 
Vol. XVIII: 1944–1946 
HP 1 Xk Politik: allmänt, Kina 
(Politics: China in general) 
HP 12 Xm Statsformer och konstitutioner samt frågor om erkännande av 
nya stater (Forms of government and constitutions as well as 
issues of recognition of new states) 
HP 20 G Konflikter i Fjärran Östern (Conflicts in the Far East) 
HP 22 Ab Politik: allmänt, 1939–1940 (Politics: General) 
HP 35 A Italiensk-abessinska konflikten, 1934– (Italian–Abyssinian 
conflict) 
HP 37 A Japansk-kinesiska kriget 1937–. Allmänt (Japan–China War 
1937– . General) 
HP 37 B Japansk-kinesiska kriget 1937–. Medlingsförsök. 
Brysselkonferensen m.m. (Japan–China War 1937–. Mediation 
attempts. The Brussels Conference, etc.) 
HP 37 D Humanitär hjälpverksamhet i Kina (Humanitarian aid opera-
tions in China) 
HP 64 Xj Handel och sjöfart i övrigt: diplomatiska framställningar, 
underhandlingar och avtal. Japan (Trade and shipping in gen-
eral: diplomatic petitions, negotiations and agreements with 
Japan) 
HP 64 Xk Handel och sjöfart i övrigt: diplomatiska framställningar, 
underhandlingar och avtal. Kina (Trade and shipping in gen-
eral: diplomatic petitions, negotiations and agreements with 
China) 
HP 64 Xk1 Traktatfrågor: vapenexporten till Kina (Treaty issues: arms 
exports to China) 
HP 64 Xm Handel och sjöfart i övrigt: diplomatiska framställningar, under-
handlingar och avtal. Manchukuo 1935– (Trade and shipping 
in general: diplomatic petitions, negotiations and agreements. 
Manchukuo) 
P 19 A Skyddsmaktsuppdrag: Allmänt (Protecting Power mandates: 
General) 




   
  
  
   
Bibliography 191 
Utrikesdepartementet Andra B-avdelningen, 1939–1969: 2212.02 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs Second B Section) 
F 1 Grupp 1 Xj Inkommande chiffertelegram, 1943–1945 (Incoming 
Cipher Telegrams) 
Swedish nongovernmental sources 
Arvid Lindmans Samling, Riksarkivet, Stockholm 
(Arvid Lindman’s Collection, at the Swedish National Archives) 
Vol. 18 Utrikesnämnden, 1931–1935 (The Advisory Council 
of Foreign Affairs) 
Gadelius’ arkiv, Centralarkivet, ABB, Västerås 
(Gadelius’s Archive, ABB, Västerås, Sweden) 
Vol. 191.02.003 Knut Gadelius, brev 1930–1932 (Knut Gadelius, Letters) 
Vol. 191.02.025 Familjen Gadelius, intervjuer och ihågkomster (The 
Gadelius family, interviews and reminiscences) 
Brauns, Eric. Gadelius & Co – 50 år i Japan 1907–1957, otryckt företagshistorik 
(Gadelius & Co. — 50 Years in Japan, 1907–1957, unpublished corporate history) 
LO:s arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm 
(Archives of the National Federation of Labor, Archives of the Workers’ Movement) 
Landssekretariatets protokoll 1937–39 
(Minutes of the National Secretariat) 
Ostasiatiska Kompaniets Arkiv, Gothenburg (Archives of the East Asian Company) 
Förvaltningsberättelse, balansräkning och revisionsberättelse över 1937 års verk-
samhet (Administrative report, balance sheet account, and audit report for 1937) 
Förvaltningsberättelse, balansräkning och revisionsberättelse över 1938 års verk-
samhet (Administrative report, balance sheet account, and audit report for 1938) 
Styrelseprotokoll (Board Meeting Minutes), 1934–1938 
Sven Hedins samling, 720827, Riksarkivet, Stockholm 
(Sven Hedin’s Collection) Vol. 328 
Diaries 1937–1939 
Svenska kommittén av världssamling för fred, arkiv, Riksarkivet, Stockholm 
(Archive of the Swedish Committee of the International Peace Campaign, at the 
Swedish National Archives) 
A 1: 1 Mötes- och AU-protokoll, 1936–1939 (Minutes from 
meetings and the executive committee) 
  










DDS — Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland 
dodis.ch/50633 Debâcle au Soleil-levant - Journal de Camille Gorgé 
Federal Archives of Switzerland 
E2001D#1000/15531980* Vertretung amerikanischer Interessen in 
Japan und von ihm besetzten Gebieten, 
Burma, Hongkong, Philippinen, Singapore, 
Mandschukuo, Shanghai, 1941–1945 
(Representation of American interests in 
Japan and occupied territories: Burma, 
Hongkong, Philippines, Singapore, 
Manchukuo, Shanghai, 1941–1945) 
ICRCAA — International Committee of the Red Cross Audiovisual Archive, 
Switzerland 
V-P-HIST-00985-22 International Committee of the Red Cross, War 1939– 
1945. Barcelona. German-allied exchange. Departure 
of the hospital ship “Gradisca” which passes near the 
Swedish boat “Gripsholm” having in its board British 
and American prisoners 
League of Nations Archive, Geneva 
League of Nations Official Journal 
Records of the Special Session of the Assembly: Convened in virtue of Article 
15 of the Covenant at the Request of the Chinese Government. 
1932 Volume I: Special Supplement No. 101 
1932 Volume II: Special Supplement No. 102 
1933 Volume III: Special Supplement No. 111 
Documents Relating to the Question of the Application of the Principles of the 
Covenant 
1936 Special Supplement No. 154 
LHMA – Liddell Hart Military Archives, King’s College, London 
MAGIC Summary No. 272, December 23, 1942. 
332, February 21, 1943. 
378, April 8, 1943. 
382, April 12, 1943. 
384, April 14, 1943. 
516, August 24, 1943. 





       
       

















Offcial Swedish publications 
Aktstycken utgivna av Kungl Utrikesdepartementet, Nationernas Förbunds första
(etc.) församling i Genève, Stockholm 1921–40 (Documents issued by the Royal
UD, first (etc.) meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva, Stockholm 1921–40) 
Årgång (Year) 1931 
1932 
1938 
Export Committee, Betänkande med utredning och förslag angående åtgärder 
till den svenska exportnäringens främjande, avgivet av 1938 års exportutredn-
ing [Report with survey and proposal concerning measures for the promotion 
of Swedish exports, presented by the Export Committee of 1938], Stockholm: 
Norstedt, 1938. 
Statistiska Centralbyrån (Central Office for Statistics), Stockholm 
Levnadskostnadsindex/KPI (juli 1914=100), Historiska tal 1830- (Cost of living 
index since 1830). Online at https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter
-amne/priser-och-konsumtion/konsumentprisindex/konsumentprisindex-kpi/ 
pong/tabell-och-diagram/konsumentprisindex-kpi/kpi-historiska-tal-1830. 
Statistisk årsbok för Sverige (Statistical Yearbook for Sweden) 








Handel, Berättelser från Kommerskollegium  (Trade, Reports from the National 
Board of Trade) 
Årgång (Year) 1919–1938 
Redogörelser avgivna till Utrikesnämnden i enlighet med § 54 RF, Stockholm 
1928–1942 (Reports submitted to the Advisory Council of Foreign Affairs in 











RP — Riksdagens Protokoll (Parliamentary Records of the Swedish Riksdag) 
Första kammaren (FK) (First Chamber) 
1933, No. 14 
1936, No. 3, 36 
1938, No. 1, 24, 40 
1939, No. 39 
1942, No. 3 
1943, No. 30 
Andra kammaren (AK) (Second Chamber) 
1933, No. 5 
1936, No. 4 
1938, No. 4 
1939, No. 4 
1942, No. 3 
Utrikesdepartementet (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
Kungl. utrikesdepartementets kalender [Calendar of the Royal Foreign Ministry]. 
Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. 
Årgång (Year) 1938 
1955 
Offcial international publications 
Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Second Series, Vol. XII. London
1972. 
Eidgenössisches Statistisches Amt. Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz 1943 [Statistical 
Yearbook of Switzerland 1943]. Basel: E. Birkhäuser & Cie, 1944. 
Gaimushō Jōyakukyoku (ed.), Kyū Jōyaku isan [Former Treaties]. Tokyo, 1934. 
Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku (ed.), Kaigai Keizai Jijō [Overseas Economic Conditions]. 
Tokyo, 1939. 
“Resolution for the Dissolution of the League of Nations, Adopted by the Assembly 
on April 18, 1946.” International Organization 1, no. 1 (1947): 146–251. 
United States. The Conference of Brussels: November 3–24, 1937. Convened in Virtue 
of Article 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington of 1922. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1938. 
———. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931–1941. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1943. 
Magazines and journals 
Hvar 8 Dag [Every Eight Days]. Stockholm 
Idun. Stockholm 
Mellanfolkligt samarbete [International Cooperation] 
Sfären. Tidning för SKF-folk [The Sphere. Journal for SKF Employees] 
Shūkan Jihō [Weekly Announcements] 
  
 




Svensk Export [Swedish Exports] 
Svensk Tidskrift [The Swedish Journal] 
Svensk-Japanska Sällskapets årsskrift [Yearbook of the Swedish–Japanese 
Association] 
Sveriges Försvar [Sweden’s Defense] 





Chūgai Shōgyō Shinpō, 1889–1942. 
Dagens Tidning, 1911–1914. 
Den Svenske Nationalsocialisten, 1933–1950. 
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, 1823–1973. 
Japan Advertiser, 1913–1940. 
Japan Times & Mail, 1918–1940. 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1780–now (until 1821 Zürcher Zeitung). 
Norrskensfamman, 1906–now (called Flamman since 1998). 
Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 1859–1944. 
Östergötlands Dagblad, 1890–1959. 
Social-Demokraten, 1885–1944 (called Morgon-Tidningen 1944–1958). 
Stockholms-Tidningen, 1889–1984 (interruption 1966–1981). 
Svenska Dagbladet, 1884–now. 
Svenska Morgonbladet, 1890–1958. 
The Japan Times, 1897–now. 
The New York Times, 1851–now. 
Tōkyō Asahi Shimbun, 1879–now. 
Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 1872–1943. 
Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1895–now. 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 1874–now. 
Databases 
Meiji Portraits (by Bernd Lepach), www.meiji-portraits.de. 
Statistics Sweden, www.scb.se. 
The Wrecksite, wrecksite.eu. 









Agrell, Wilhelm. Fred och fruktan. Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska historia 1918–2000 [Peace 
and fear. The history of Swedish security policy, 1918–2000]. Lund: Historiska 
Media, 2000. 
———. Stockholm som spioncentral: spåren efter tre hemliga städer [Stockholm as a spy 
center: Traces of three secret cities]. Lund: Historiska Media, 2020. 
Akiyama, Kaori. Hawai nikkeijin no kyōsei shūyōshi: Taiheiyōsensō to yokuryūsho no hensen
[The history of Japanese internment in Hawai‘i : Changes in the camps and camp 
life during the Pacific War]. Tokyo: Sairyūsha, 2020. 
Ankarcrona, Sten S:son. “A Review of the Commercial Relations between Sweden 
and Japan.” In Svensk-Japanska Sällskapets årsskrift [Yearbook of the Swedish– 
Japanese Association], edited by Svensk-Japanska Sällskapet, 49–52. Stockholm: 
Victor Pettersson, 1934. 
Arakawa, Ken’ichi. “Japanese Naval Blockade of China in the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, 1937–1941.” In Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-
Strategies 1805–2005, edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, 105–166. 
Oxon: Routledge, 2006. 
Arima, Manabu. Teikoku no shōwa [The Empire during the Shōwa era]. Tokyo: 
Kōdansha, 2010. 
Auboin, Roger. “The Bank for International Settlements 1930–1955.” In Essays in 
International Finance, edited by Gardner Patterson, 1–49. Princeton: Princeton 
University, 1955. 
Auslin, Michael R. Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the 
Culture of Japanese Diplomacy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
Bagge, Gösta. Politiska tal år 1937 [Political speeches in 1937]. Stockholm: Egnellska 
Boktryckeriet, 1937. 
Barnhart, Michael A. Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 
1919–1941. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. 
Boëthius, Maria-Pia. Heder och samvete: Sverige och andra världskriget [With honor
and conscience: Sweden and the Second World War]. Stockholm: Norstedt,
1991. 
Boheman, Erik. På vakt: Kabinettssekreterare under andra världskriget [On guard: As 
the state secretary for foreign affairs during the Second World War]. Stockholm: 
Norstedt, 1964. 
Boldt-Christmas, Gustaf E.F., Lilljequist, Olof and Cederberg, Carl-G., eds. Ostasiat. 
Utgiven med anledning av AB Svenska Ostasiatiska Kompaniets femtioårsjubileum 
1957 [Ostasiat. Published on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Swedish 
East Asia Co.]. Gothenburg: Svenska Ostasiatiska Kompaniet, 1957. 
Bosworth, Richard James Boon. Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History 
Writing and the Second World War 1945–1990. London: Routledge, 1993. 
Buck, Pearl S. The Good Earth. New York: John Day, 1931. 
Burkman, Thomas W. Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 
1914–1938. Honolulu: University of Hawai´i Press, 2008. 
Carlander, Axel. Dagboksanteckningar från resan rundt jorden 1891–1892 [Diary notes 
from the world tour in 1891–1892]. Gothenburg: Göteborgs Handelstidnings 
Aktiebolags Tryckeri, 1893. 
Carlgren, Wilhelm M. Svensk utrikespolitik 1939–1945 [Swedish foreign policy, 1939– 






———. Svensk underrättelsetjänst 1939–1945 [Swedish intelligence service, 1939– 
1945]. Stockholm: Liber, 1985. 
Cassel, Hjalmar. Det nya Östasien [New East Asia]. Stockholm: Alberts Bonniers 
Förlag, 1906. 
Cederschiöld, Gunnar and Feilitzen, Einar. Den svenska tändsticksindustriens historia 
före de stora sammanslagningarna [The history of the Swedish match industry 
before the big mergers]. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur, 1946. 
Corbett, Paul Scott. Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United 
States and Japan during the Second World War. Kent: Kent State University Press, 
1987. 
Cortazzi, Hugh. “The Death of Melville James Cox (1885–1940) in Tokyo on 
29 July 1940: Arrests of British Citizens in Japan in 1940 and 1941.” In Britain 
and Japan: Biographical Portraits, 491–506. Leiden: Global Oriental, 2013. 
Craigie, Robert. Behind the Japanese Mask. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1945. 
Davidann, Jon Thares. Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Delcorde, Raoul. Belgian Diplomats. Edited by Pierre Mardaga. Wavre: Mardaga, 
2010. 
Donzé, Pierre-Yves, Hauser, Claude, Lottaz, Pascal and Maître, Andy, eds. Journal 
d’un témoin: Camille Gorgé, diplomat Suisse dans le Japon en guerre 1940–1945
[Journal of a witness: Camille Gorgé, Swiss diplomat in wartime Japan]. Vol. 10, 
Quaderni di Dodis, Berne: Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland, 2018. 
Dower, John W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacifc War. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1986. 
Drea, Edward J. The 1942 Japanese General Election: Political Mobilization in Wartime 
Japan. Kansas: Center For East Asian Studies at the University of Kansas, 1979. 
Edele, Mark. The Soviet Union: A Short History. New Jersey: Wiley Blackwell, 2019. 
Edström, Bert. “Widar Bagge, Japan and the End of the Second World War.” Center 
for Pacifc Asia Studies at Stockholm University, Working Paper 41, 1995. 
———. “Sweden: 23–30 April 1873.” In The Iwakura Mission in America and 
Europe: A New Assessment, edited by Ian Nish. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. 
———. “Japan as a Distant Friend: Scandinavian Countries Adjusting to Japan’s 
Emergence as a Great Power.” In The Decade of the Great War: Japan and the 
Wider World, edited by Tze-ki Hon Tosh Minohara and Evan Dawley. Leiden: 
Brill, 2014. 
Edström, Bert and Svanberg, Ingvar, eds. Fjärrannära: kontakter mellan Sverige och 
Japan genom tidern [Far and near – Contacts between Sweden and Japan through 
the ages], Stockholm: Arena, 2001. 
Fransson, Stig A. Bofors 350 år [Bofors 350 years]. Stockholm: Probus Förlag, 1996. 
Fritz, Martin. “Sveriges ekonomiska relationer med Nazityskland” [Sweden’s 
economic relations with Nazi Germany], in Sverige och Nazityskland: Skuldfrågor 
och moraldebatt [Sweden and Nazi Germany: Questions of guilt and the moral 
debate], edited by Lars M. Andersson and Mattias Tydén. Stockholm: Dialogos, 
2007. 
Frykholm, Lars and Brundin, Margareta, eds. Samråd i krigstid: Utrikesutskottets 
memorialprotokoll 1940–1945 [Wartime consultation: The Foreign Affairs 
Committee’s memorial protocol 1940–1945]. Stockholm: Sveriges Riksdag, 2007. 
Fujiwara, Ginjirō, Bōkan sannen [Three years of work and leisure]. Tokyo: Tōyō
Keizai Shinpōsha, 1942. 
  
 
     
198 Bibliography
Gerhard, Ingemar. Problem rörande Sveriges utrikeshandel 1936/8 [Problems related 
to Swedish foreign trade, 1936/8]. Gothenburg: Elanders Boktryckeri, 1948. 
Gilmour, John. Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin: The Swedish Experience in the Second 
World War. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010. 
Goldman, Stuart D. Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army’s Victory that Shaped World War 
II. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012. 
Golson, Eric Bernard. “The Economics of Neutrality: Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland 
in the Second World War.” PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2011. 
Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Gorgé, Camille. Débâcle au Soleil-levant: Journal d’un témoin [Fiasco in the land 
of the Rising Sun: The diary of a witness]. Berne: Diplomatic Documents of 
Switzerland, 1940–1945. 
———. “Les Trois Japons” [The three Japans]. In Nippon-Helvetia, edited by Comité 
du Centenaire. Tokyo: Akatsuki Insatsu, 1964. 
Grew, Joseph C. Ten Years in Japan. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944. 
Hadenius, Stig. Modern svensk politisk historia: Konfikt och samförstånd [Modern 
Swedish political history: Conflict and consensus]. 6th ed. Stockholm: Hjalmarson 
& Högberg, 2003. 
Hägglöf, Gunnar M. Svensk krigshandelspolitik under andra världskriget [Swedish 
trade policy during World War II]. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1958. 
———. “A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War.” International 
Affairs 36 (1960): 153–167. 
———. Möte med Europa. Paris-London-Moskva-Genève-Berlin 1926–1940
[Encounter with Europe. Paris-London-Moscow-Geneva-Berlin, 1926–1940]. 
Stockholm: Norstedt, 1971. 
Handō, Kazutoshi. Shōwashi [The history of the Shōwa era]. Part I (1926–1945). 
Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005. 
Harrison, Mark. The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International 
Comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Hedin, Sven. Sverige och den Stora Östern [Sweden and the Far East]. Stockholm: 
Alberts Bonniers Förlag, 1905. 
Hellyer, Robert I. Defning Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640–1868. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009. 
Hildebrand, Bengt. “Ewerlöf, släkt” [The family Ewerlöf]. In Svenskt biografskt 
lexikon [Dictionary of Swedish national biography]. Stockholm: Riksarkivet, 1953; 
online ed., 2020. https://sok.riksarkivet.se/sbl/artikel/15574. 
Holmberg, Åke. Världen bortom västerlandet: Svensk syn på fjärran länder och folk 
från 1700-talet till första världskriget [The world beyond the West: Distant lands 
and peoples through Swedish eyes from the 18th century to the First World War]. 
Gothenburg: Kungl. Vetenskaps- och vitterhets-samhället, 1988. 
Honma, Ryūshi, ed. Nippon keizai tōkeishū 1868–1945 [Japanese economic statistics, 
1868–1945]. Tokyo: Nichigai Associates, 1999. 
Howland, Douglas. “Japanese Neutrality in the Nineteenth Century: International 
Law and Transcultural Process.” Transcultural Studies 1, no. 1 (2010): 14–37. 
Hunt, Byron Walfred. “The League of Nations and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict.” 
PhD diss., University of Montana, 1957. 
  
     
Bibliography 199 
Jacobson, G., “David Kristian Bergström.” In Svenskt biografskt lexikon [Dictionary 
of Swedish national biography]. Stockholm: Riksarkivet, 1922; online ed., 2020. 
https://sok.riksarkivet.se/sbl/artikel/18677. 
Jangfeldt, Bengt and Watson, Harry D. The Hero of Budapest: The Triumph and 
Tragedy of Raoul Wallenberg. London: Tauris, 2014. 
Jensen, R.J., Davidann, J.T. and Sugita, Y. Trans-Pacifc Relations: America, Europe, 
and Asia in the Twentieth Century. Westport: Praeger, 2003. 
Johansson, Alf W. and Torbjörn, Norman. “Sweden’s Security and World Peace.” 
In Creating Social Democracy. A Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party 
In Sweden, edited by Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin and Klas Åmark. Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 
Jones, S. Shepard. The Scandinavian States and the League of Nations. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1939. 
Karlgren, Bernhard. Japans väg och mål [Japan’s path and goal]. Stockholm: 
Utrikespolitiska institutet, 1940. 
Karlsson, Ingela. “Staten och rederierna. Den svenska handelsflottan 1937–1947” 
[War, state, and shipping companies. The Swedish merchant fleet, 1937–1947]. 
PhD diss., Gothenburg University, 2003. 
———. “Sig själv närmast” [Every man for himself]. In En (o)moralisk handel? Sveriges 
ekonomiska relationer med Nazityskland [(I)moral trade? Sweden’s economic 
relations with Nazi Germany], edited by Charlotte Haider. Stockholm: Forum för 
levande historia, 2006. 
Kawasaki, Seirō. “Kenkyu Nōto: Meiji jidai no Tōkyō ni atta Gaikoku kōkan (4).” 
[The foreign missions in Tokyo of the Meiji period (4)]. Gaimusho Chōsa Geppō, 
no. 1, 2014. 
———. “Kenkyū Nōto: Meiji jidai no Tōkyō ni atta Gaikoku kōkan (5).” [The Foreign 
missions in Tokyo of the Meiji period (5)]. Gaimusho Chōsa Geppō, no. 2, 2014. 
Kluyver, Classina Albertina, ed. Documents on the League of Nations. Leiden: 
International Intermediary Institute, 1920. 
Konoe, Fumimaro. Konoe Fumimaro shuki: heiwa e no doryoku [Notes by Konoe 
Fumimaro: The peace efforts]. Tokyo: Chūōkōron Shinsha, 1947. 
Krebs, Gerhard. “Aussichtslose Sondierung. Japanische Friedensfühler und 
schwedische Vermittlungsversuche 1944/5” [Hopeless probing. Japanese 
peace feelers and Swedish mediation attempts 1944/45]. Vierteljahrshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte 45, no. 3 (1997): 425–448. 
Larsson, Jan. Diplomati och industriellt genombrott. Svenska exportsträvanden på Kina 
1906–1916 [Diplomacy and industrial breakthrough: Swedish export ambitions in 
China, 1906–1916]. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1977. 
Larsson, Nils R. Sverige som skyddsmakt: historik och praxis [Sweden as a Protecting 
Power. History and practice]. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1988. 
Laver, S. Michael. The Sakoku Edicts and the Politics of Tokugawa Hegemony. New 
York: Cambria Press, 2011. 
Leitz, Christian. Sympathy for the Devil: Neutral Europe and Nazi Germany in World 
War II. New York: New York University Press, 2011. 
Lensen, George Alexander. The Strange Neutrality: Soviet-Japanese Relations during 
the Second World War, 1941–1945. Tallahassee: Diplomatic Press, 1972. 
Lönnroth, Erik. Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 1919–1939 [The history of 








Lottaz, Pascal. “Neutral States and Wartime Japan: The Diplomacy of Sweden, Spain, 
and Switzerland toward the Empire.” PhD diss., National Graduate Institute for 
Policy Studies, 2018. 
———. “Neutrality and Wartime Japan.” In Notions of Neutralities, edited by Pascal 
Lottaz and Herbert R. Reginbogin, 113–134. Lanham: Lexington, 2019. 
Lottaz, Pascal and Reginbogin, Herbert R. “‘Private Neutrality’ — The Bank for 
International Settlements.” In Notions of Neutralities, edited by Pascal Lottaz and 
Herbert R. Reginbogin. Lanham: Lexington, 2019. 
Lottaz, Pascal and Rodao, Florentino. “The Vatican, WWII, and Asia: Lessons of 
Neutral Diplomacy.” In Notions of Neutralities, edited by Pascal Lottaz and 
Herbert R. Reginbogin. Lanham: Lexington, 2019. 
Makko, Aryo. European Small States and the Role of Consuls in the Age of Empire. 
Leiden: Brill, 2020. 
Malmborg, Mikael af. Neutrality and State-building in Sweden. New York: Palgrave, 
2001. 
Matsushima, Shikao. “Mission to Sweden.”. In Svensk-Japanska Sällskapets årsskrift
[Yearbook of the Swedish–Japanese Association], edited by Svensk-Japanska Sälls. 
Stockholm: Victor Pettersson, 1940. 
Mitter, Rana. China’s War With Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival. London: 
Penguin Books Limited, 2013. 
Möller, Yngve. Rickard Sandler: folkbildare, utrikesminister [Rickard Sandler: 
educator, foreign minister]. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1990. 
Moreno, Rodolfo. Mas alla del Oriente [Beyond the East]. Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Sudamericana, 1946. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. “The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe.” American Political 
Science Review 33 (1939): 473–486. 
Mori, Takemaro. Ajia Taiheiyō sensō [Asia Pacific war]. Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1993. 
Nakamura, Takafusa. Shōwashi [The History of the Shōwa Era]. Vol. I. Tokyo: Tōyō
Keizai Shinpōsha, 1992. 
Neff, Stephen C. The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2000. 
Newsom, David Dunlop. Diplomacy under a Foreign Flag: When Nations Break 
Relations. London: Hurst & Company, 1990. 
Ninagawa, Arata. Sino-Japanese War and Nullifed Nine Power Treaty. Tokyo, 1937. 
Nish, Ian. Japanese Foreign Policy 1869–1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka. Foreign 
Policies of Great Powers. London: Routledge, 1977. 
———. Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism. Japan, China and the League of 
Nations 1931–1933. London: Routledge, 1993. 
———. Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period. Westport: Praeger, 2002. 
———. The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment. London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. 
Nittzell, Gunnar O. “Gustaf Oskar Wallenberg — En bortglömd Japanvisionär” 
[Gustaf Oskar Wallenberg — A forgotten Japan visionary]. Orientaliska Studier
55/56 (1994): 39–69. 
Nordyke, Eleanor C. and Matsumoto, Scott Y. “Japanese in Hawaii: A Historical
and Demographic Perspective.” Hawaiian Journal of History 11 (1977):
162–174. 






Olsson, Kent. Göteborgs historia [The history of Gothenburg] Vol. 3. Stockholm: 
Nerenius & Santérus, 1996. 
Onodera, Yuriko. An den Gestaden der Ostsee: Onodera Makoto als japanischer 
Heeresattaché in Riga und Stockholm: (1936–1938, 1940–1945) [On the shores of 
the Baltic Sea: Onodera Makoto as Japanese military attaché in Riga and Stockholm: 
(1936–1938, 1940–1945)]. Translated by Ryōji and Mariele Onodera. Edited by 
Gerhard Krebs. Tokyo: OAG, 1999. 
Ottosson, Ingemar. Krig i fredens intresse eller neutralitet till varje pris?: Sverige, 
NF och frågan om kollektiv säkerhet 1935–1936 [War in the interest of peace or 
neutrality at any cost?: Sweden, League of Nations, and the question of collective 
security, 1935–1936]. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1986. 
———. “Svensk frihandelsimperialism. Det ojämlika fördraget med Japan 1868– 
1896” [Swedish Free-trade Imperialism: The unequal treaty with Japan, 1868– 
1896]. Historisk Tidskrift 2 (1997): 199–223. 
———. “Att framtvinga ett vänskapsavtal – Sverige och Japans öppnande” [Enforcing 
a treaty of amity: Sweden and the opening of Japan]. In Fjärrannära: Kontakter 
mellan Sverige och Japan genom Tiderna [Far and near – Contacts between Sweden 
and Japan through the ages], edited by Bert Edström and Ingvar Svanberg, 65–79. 
Stockholm: Dialogos Förlag, 2001. 
———. Handel under protest: Sverige och Japan på väg mot andra världskriget 1931– 
1939 [Trade under protest: Sweden and Japan on the way to the Second World 
War 1931–1939]. Lund: Sekel, 2010. 
———. Trade under Protest: Sweden, Japan and the East Asian crisis in the 1930s. 
Tokyo: Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy, 2012. 
———. Möten i monsunen. Sverige och Kina genom tiderna [Encounters in the 
monsoon. Sweden and China through the ages]. Stockholm: Dialogos, 2019. 
———. “Fujiwara Ginjirō och Japans möte med Sverige” [Fujiwara Ginjirō and
Japan’s encounter with Sweden] in Orientaliska studier [Oriental Studies], no.
161 (2020). 
Paine, S.C.M. The Wars for Asia 1911–1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012. 
Pauer, Erich. “Deutschland-Japan: Überblick über die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen, 
1900–1945 [Germany–Japan: Overview of economic relations, 1900–1945]. 
In Japan und Deutschland im 20. Jahrhundert [Japan and Germany in the 20th 
century], edited by Klaus Kracht, Bruno Lewin and Klaus Müller. Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 1984. 
Peifer, Douglas Carl. Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, 
and Panay incidents. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Politis, Nikolas. Neutrality and Peace. Translated by Francis C. Macken. Washington, 
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1935. 
Ramel, Fredrik. “Från årets förbundsförsamling i Genève” [From this year’s General 
Assembly in Geneva]. In Meddelanden rörande Nationernas förbund [Bulletins 
concerning the League of Nations]. Stockhom: Svenska föreningen för Nationernas 
förbund, 1931. 
Reeves, John Pownall, Day, Colin, Garrett, Richard and Calthorpe, David. The Lone 
Flag: Memoir of the British Consul in Macao during World War II. Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2014. 
Reginbogin, Herbert R. Faces of Neutrality: A Comparative Analysis of the Neutrality 
of Switzerland and other Neutral Nations during WW II. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2009. 
  








Reischauer, Edwin O. Japan: The Story of a Nation. 4th ed. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1990. 
Roberts, Michael. Sweden as a Great Power 1611–1697: Government, Society, Foreign 
Policy. London: Edward Arnold, 1968. 
Rodao, Florentino. Franco y el Imperio Japonés [Franco and the Japanese Empire]. 
Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2002. 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., Fireside Chat. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
The American Presidency Project, (n.d.) https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node
/209990. 
Ross, John. Neutrality and International Sanctions: Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Collective Security. New York: Praeger, 1989. 
Sai, David Keanu. “Hawaiian Neutrality: From the Crimean Conflict through the
Spanish-American War.” Paper presented at the University of Cambridge, UK,
Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Scineces and Humanities, Sovereignty and
Imperialism: Non-European Powers in the Age of Empire, September 10–12 (2015). 
Salmon, Patrick. Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Sandler, Rickard. Ett utrikespolitiskt program [A program for foreign policy]. 
Stockholm: Tiden, 1934. 
———. Svenska utrikesärenden. Anföranden 1934–1935 [Swedish foreign affairs. 
Speeches 1934–1935]. Stockholm, 1936. 
———. Strömväxlingar och lärdomar: utrikespolitiska anföranden, 1937–1939
[Changing currents and lessons learned: speeches on foreign policy, 1937–1939]. 
Stockholm: Tiden, 1939. 
Seidensticker, Edward. Tokyo Rising: The City Since the Great Earthquake. Tokyo: 
Knopf, 1990. 
Shigemitsu, Mamoru. Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for Peace. Edited by Francis 
S.G. Piggot. Translated by Oswald White. London: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1958. 
Shinohara, Hatsue. Kokusai renmei: Sekai heiwa e no yume to zasetsu [League of 
Nations: The dream of world peace and how it was shattered]. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron 
Shinsha, 2010. 
Sibre, Olivier. La Saint-Siège et l’Extrême-Orient (Chine, Corée, Japon): De Léon XIII 
à Pie XII (1880–1952) [The Holy See and the Far East (China, Korea, Japan): 
From Leo XIII to Pius XII (1880–1952)]. Rome: École Française de Rome, 2012. 
Six, Franz Alfred, ed. Dokumente der Deutschen Politik: Das Werden des Reiches
[Documents of German Politics: The Establishment of the Reich] vol. 7. Berlin: 
Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1940. 
Slackman, Michael Target: Pearl Harbor. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991. 
Slavinsky, Boris. The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History, 1941– 
1945. Translated by Geoffrey Jukes. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. 
Steckzén, Birger. Bofors: En kanonindustris historia [Bofors: The history of a cannon 
industry]. Stockholm: Esselte, 1946. 
Sveriges socialdemokratiska ungdomsförbund [Swedish Social Democratic Youth 
League]. “Protokoll fört vid Sveriges socialdemokratiska ungdomsförbunds sjunde 
ordinarie kongress i Stockholm den 11–15 nov. 1934” [Minutes from the 7th 
ordinary congress of the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League in Stockholm, 




Swedish Academy of Science. Sveriges Statskalender för året 1942 [Sweden’s State 
Calendar for 1942]. Edited by Vetenskapsakademin [Academy of Science]. 
Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells, 1942. 
Taube, Carl. Kriget som inte var något krig. Som krigskorrespondent i Manchuriet 
18 september 1931–9 mars 1932 [The war that wasn’t a war. As a war correspondent 
in Manchuria, 18 September 1931–9 March 1932]. Stockholm: Bonnier, 1932. 
Tōgō, Shigenori. The Cause of Japan. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1977. 
Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, ed. Nippon bōeki seiran [Japanese trade survey]. Tokyo, 1935. 
Traung, Olof. Dan Broström: 1870-½-1920.: Några kapitel sjöfartshistoria utgivna med 
anledning av 50-årsdagen [Dan Broström 1870-February 1-1920 : A few chapters 
of naval history, published on the occasion of his 50th birthday]. Gothenburg: 
Nautics, 1920. 
Trepp, Gian. Bankgeschäfte mit dem Feind: Die Bank für Internationalen 
Zahlungsausgleich im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Von Hitlers Europabank zum Instrument 
des Marshallplans [Banking with the enemy: The bank for international settlements 
in the Second World War: From Hitler’s Europe bank to an instrument of the 
Marshall plan]. Munich: Rotpunktverlag, 1997. 
Tsurumi, Shunsuke. “Chishikijin no sensō sekinin” [The intellectual’s responisibility 
for the war]. Chūō kōron 71, no.1 (January 1956): 57–63. 
———. An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan. London: KPI, 1986. 
Unno, Yoshirō. Kokusai renmei to Nihon [The League of Nations and Japan]. Tokyo: 
Hara Shobō, 1972. 
Wahlbäck, Krister. Finlandsfrågan i svensk politik 1937–1940 [The Finnish question 
in Swedish politics, 1937–1940]. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1964. 
Walters, Francis Paul. A History of the League of Nations. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1965. 
Wang, Jianlang. Unequal Treaties and China. Hong Kong: Enrich Professional 
Publishing, 2015. 
Weinberg, Gerhard L. Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II. 
New York: Enigma Books, 2010. 
Wetterberg, Gunnar. Wallenberg: The Family That Shaped Sweden’s Economy. 
Möklinta: Gidlunds Förlag, 2014. 
Wilson, Sandra. “Rethinking the 1930s and the ‘15-Year War’ in Japan.” Japanese 
Studies 21, no. 2 (2001): 155–164. 
Wolfers, Arnold. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962. 
Yoshitake, Nobuhiko. Nihonjin wa Hokuō kara nani wo mananda ka. Nihon— 
Hokuō seiji kankeishi nyūmon [What did the Japanese learn from Scandinavia? An 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Speech by Eliel Löfgren at the League of Nations Assembly, 
March 5, 1932 
This speech was held by Eliel Löfgren at the League of Nations to express the 
opinion and views of the Swedish Government on the “Mukden Incident.” While 
Löfgren spoke in French, the following is the English translation as to be found 
in the League of Nations Official Journal, “Records of the Special Session of the 
Assembly: Convened in virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant at the Request of the 
Chinese Government.” Geneva, Vol. I, 1932. 
In his speech during the general discussion of the Disarmament Conference, 
Baron Ramel, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, drew attention to the 
growing anxiety with which, in Sweden as in many other countries, events 
in the Far East are being followed, involving, as they do, a serious threat to 
the results obtained at Geneva in the organization of peace. On behalf of the 
Swedish Government, he expressed the most earnest hope that peace might 
be promptly restored by the energetic action of the League and the Powers 
principally concerned. 
From that time until the last few days the position in the Far East has 
become worse, and although the news appears to be contradictory, no one 
can deny that what is taking place is war in everything but name. At this 
moment I will say nothing as to what has been done by the organs of the 
League to put an end to this deplorable conflict. I note, however, with sat-
isfaction that, from the first phase of the conflict, the Council has laid stress 
on the fact that it could not be solved satisfactorily without the withdrawal 
of the troops concerned. No one can deny, especially after the report by the 
Committee of the League at Shanghai dated February 3rd, that the military 
means employed in the conflict between China and Japan are not in con-
formity with existing treaties. 
Sweden, for her part, has maintained on several occasions during the League
discussions that the provisions of the Covenant prohibiting the use of armed
force retain their entire validity whether either of the Parties describes the use
of armed force as war or not. Without wishing at this moment to give any
opinion on the respective claims underlying the conflict, I wish to state that, in
the opinion of the Swedish Government, the landing of troops and their use in
military operations on the territory of another Power are contrary to the provi-
sions of the Covenant and of the Pact of Paris. Any such attempt to extend the
conception of legitimate defence in the manner adopted in the present case
would render it impossible to maintain any legal international order. 
Consequently, my Government unhesitatingly gives its support to the 
note addressed to Japan by the twelve members of the Council on February 
16th last, and, in my opinion, the Assembly should endorse this appeal. 
I realise the complicated nature of the conflict and the special conditions 
prevailing in the Far East. These special circumstances cannot, however, be 
invoked by one of the Parties as an excuse for evading the procedure of con-




It is, however, evident that, at the present time, the first duty of the special 
Assembly is to obtain, not only the cessation of firing, but also the definite 
cessation of hostilities. The latter is an indispensable condition in order that 
the organs of the League may contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Sino-
Japanese conflict. The cessation of hostilities should, however, take place in 
such a manner that the position of the Parties to the dispute may not, in view 
of the settlement of the dispute, be influenced by military pressure and that 
invasion of Chinese territory may be stopped. I welcome the appeal adopted 
yesterday by the Assembly as first step towards this result. 
I wish, however, to point out that, once hostilities have ceased, it will 
naturally be the essential duty of the League to ensure the peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict in the spirit of the Covenant. In this connection I may 
recall the remarks contained in M. de Brouckère’s report, which was adopted 
as a valuable guide by the 1927 Assembly. 
At this moment a heavy responsibility weighs on the special Assembly 
of the League and on all the States taking part in it. As M. Hymans, the 
President of the Assembly, stated in his opening speech, we must conscien-
tiously seek for ways and means of restoring concord through justice. It is 
true that small countries like ours have less possibility than the Great Powers 
of influencing the course of events; but our interest in the maintenance of 
legal international order is all the greater. 
If the League does not succeed, in present circumstances, in establish-
ing peace based upon justice, the proper and loyal application of its own 
constitution, there is a danger of the more or less complete collapse of those 
ramparts which we have built up together with so much patience and zeal in 
order to prevent force from supplanting justice. 
Reports by Nils E. Ericson on POW Camp Visits, 1942 
The following documents are the records of Ericson’s first visits to the POW 
camps in Nagasaki, Zentsūji, and Kobe (originals in: BA, 230033.2, F2b, I). The 
documents have been retyped for this publication. All mistakes (grammar and 
spelling) are reproduced. 
LEGATION DE SUÈDE 
The undersigned, Swedish Minister to Japan, hereby 
certifies that the bearer of this letter Mr. Nils E. 
Ericson, a Swedish subject, is travelling to Nagasaki, 
Zentsuji and Kobe in order to visit Dutch and Belgian 
nationals interned at these places. 
The Swedish Minister will greatly appreciate any 
assistance rendered to facilitate the carrying out of 
this mission. 
Given in the Royal Swedish Legation in Tokyo this 
28th day of May 1942. 
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Tokyo, the 3rd June 1942. 
H. Ex. Envoyee W. Bagge, 
Royal Swedish Legation 
Tokyo 
Your Excellency, 
I wish to inform Your Excellency, 
that I returned yesterday from my trip to Nagasaki, 
Zentsuji and Kobe. As instructed I requested per-
mission from the Okayama Police Station to visit 
the interned Belgian missionary at Hiroshima, but 
as there was no mention of this visit neither in 
the letter from Gaimusho nor in the police permit, 
this request was refused. I attach my reports on 
the visits to the above mentioned camps. 
I returned herewith attached documents 
received before my departure: 
1 letter from Gaimusho, introduction 
1 “ ” Legation, “ 
2 “ copies from Legation 
1 p.m. from Legation 




















amounting to ¥1.101:00 and ¥899:00 in cash remaining 
from the amount of ¥2.000:00 received from the Lega-
tion.
 I remain, Your Excellency,
 Respectfully yours,
 (Signature)
 Nils E. Ericson 
Tokyo, the 3rd June 1942. 
Report No.1 – visit to Nagasaki. 
The enemy nationals are interned at the St. Marie 
School on the outskirts of Nagasaki bity. The 
school is located high up on the hills in very 
pleasant surroundings. Chief Inspector Hamamoto of 
the Foreign section of Nagasaki Ken-cho is in charge 
of the camp and he has made a special trip to in-
spect the camps in Tokyo, Yokohama and Kobe. He told 
me that he has tried to make his camp better than the 
others in every respect and I am pleased to report 
that he has succeeded very well. The interned were 
unanimous that they were treated very well, received 
sufficient and good food (cooked by some of the in-
terned Canadian priests). I also partook in one of 
their meals, which consisted of peasoup, braised beef 
with fried eggs and potatoes, bread, milk and fruits. 
There were about 30 people interned, and they had 
complete freedom to play games in the school compound, 
read, play cards and they were even to a certain ex-
tend allowed to write letters and to receive letters 
and parcels. The wifes were permitted to visit there 
husbands daily.
The interned seemed not to know anything about the 
evacuation and I made the Belgian and Dutch subjects 
aquainted with the evacuation scheme in general, their 
probable destination and also about the baggage regu-
lations as far as known at present. I also wish to 































BELGIAN subjects. Contrary to the Legation list I 
found two Belgian subjects interned at this camp,namely 
Messrs. Pourbaix and Somers. 
1)Mr. Paul Pourbaix. He requests that the Legation 
try to obtain permission from the proper authori-
ties for him to return to his home as soon as 
ever possible on the plea that he is suffering 
from high blood preasure for which reason he 
must have special xx diet, which is impossible to 
get at the camp. I have discussed the question 
with Mr. Hamamoto, who states that a Japanese 
physician has examined him and that he expressed 
the opinion that there is no immediate need for 
such special treatment. However, in view of the 
delayed evacuation, it might be advisable to 
consider some action in this matter.
Mr. Pourbaix confirmed that neither he nor his 
wife desire to evacuate and he also stated that 
he has sufficient funds. 
2)Mr. Julien Somers. He confirms that he wishes to 
remain in Japan. He has ample funds and is not 
in need of funds at present, but is anxious to 
know if he can count on his pension in the future. 
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He receives a pension from the Netherlands 
Government, but has not received anything since 
the outbreak of the war. I have discussed this 
question with our Consul at Kobe and I find that 
he has received funds from the Legation to effect 
payment of pensions, including Mr. Somers, but 
that he cannot pay out this money without permits 
from the Finance Department. 
NETHERLANDS subjects. There were four Netherlands sub-
jects interned, as per the Legation list. I presented
them and the Belgians with the following items: 
4 packets of Sugar 
1 tin coffee 
2 tins cocoa 
lo tins pink salmon 
3 books 
and I have been asked to convey their apprechiation for 
these gifts as well as their gratitude for the courtesy 
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in sending a special respresentative of the Legation all 
the way down to Nagasaki. 
1) G.W. Calicher is anxious to be evacuated, but he
insists upon that his wife must go with him. The
reason for his fear in this respect is that she
still, despite the fact that she is legally mar-
ried and holds a Netherlands passport, is con-
tained in the village register at Minami Takigun,
Nagasaki-ken as a Japanese subject. She wishes,
if possible, to retain her dual registration,
but if this is impossible, she wishes to cancel
her Japanese citizen ship, as she naturally
desires to follow her husband. He asks if an
answer could be given on this point and he also
desires an assurance that whatever happens his
wife will be evacuated with him. He stated that
his passports had expired on May 6th, but as same
were kept by Ken-cho, he was unable to have them
prolonged. By arrangement with Mr. Hamamoto I
obtained the two passports, but unfortunately I
received them at the very last moment and I now
find that he was mistaken and that same are valid
until next year. I regret this unavoidable mis-
take and ask you to return them to Foreign Sec-
tion of Nagasaki Ken-cho. At the same time I
was able to recover some private documents, that
the Ken-cho had taken from him.
He further desired to obtain from the Netherlands
Consulate-General in Kobe a certificate, that he
has only obtained his pension for November 1941
(about ¥600:00) and also part for December, or
¥270:00. He must have this certificate to prove
his claim for further payments after his evacua-
tion. I have discussed this matter with Mr.
Pennink, who promissed to make the certificate
and to send same through our local Consulate. 
2)Mr. D.H. Grootes requested an advance of money as 
he only had a small sum left. He asked for and 
received ¥250:00, receipt for which I will attach 
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3)to the statement of accounts. His passport ex-
pired on 6th March 1942 and I enclose the same for 
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extention. It should be returned through Nagasaki 
Ken-cho.  
He is very anxious to be evacuated.
 4) K.L. van Teyn. He does not desire to be evacuated  
nor does his wife. He was worried about various 
 documents including marriage certificate, insurance 
policy etc. taken by the Kencho, but I received  
an assurance from Mr. Hamamoto that everything  
would be returned at the time they are set free. 
He holds an endowment policy with the Hollandske 
Societee for Lifforsakring (spelling?), Amsterdam,  
on which he received Gil. 250:00 for each period  
of 3 months, but he has not received anything for  
the last 2 years, and is anxious to know if  
arrangements for payments could be made through  
the London Government.
 5) P.G. Wisse desires to be evacuated. As he only  
had ¥10:00 left, he requested ¥200:00, which amount 
was handed to him. His receipt will be attached  
to my statement of travelling expenses.
- - - o o 0 o o - - -
3)  cont. His and his wifes joint passport, which  
expired on the 14th July 1929, has never been  
renewed. He asks that the same is prolonged or  
new passports made out. I enclose the same and  
wish to add, that should photographs be required,  
same could be obtained through the Nagasaki Kencho.
1)  cont. Mrs. Calichers address is not as stated on 
 the Legation list, but as follows:
c/o Mrs. Tsune Hashibe, 
21, Ouraizuno-machi, 
Nagasaki.
Tokyo, the 3rd June, 1942
Report No.2 – visit to Zentsuji.
I visited the war prisoners camp at Zentsuji in the  
morning of May 30th and all the prisoners were busily 
 engaged to clean the camp, as the Prime Minister,  
General Tojo was expected that afternoon. I was met  
with great courtesy and I was introduced to the Com-
mandant of the camp and his assistant. They both seemed 
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to be retired officers called up for special service.  
Some disused military barracks have been turned in to a 
camp and there were about 450 war prisoners there,  
chiefly Americans from Guam. The general impression was  
that they were not very happy, as they have no occupa- 
tion and also as the food does not seem to suit them. 
They receive the same ration as Japanese soldiers and  
the ingrediences are delivered to their kitchen and they 
themselves can make the food to suit their own taste. 
One of the nurses from Guam, who has now been transferred 
to the Eastern Lodge in Kobe, were I met her, told me  
that most of the prisoners have lost 10 – 20 lbs during 
the first two months at the camp. 
To occupy themselves they have lectures on various sub-
jects, they keep rabbits and try to do some gardning.  
They have their own shoe repair shop, tailoring shop,  
barber etc. and they also have a canteen, which however  
is only open for a few hours a day, as they have very  
little to sell there. 
I inspected the whole camp and I found that they were  
housed according to their rank. The commanding officers  
had rooms in the administration building and they were  
generally 2 persons in each room, the subalterns were  
generally 8 in one room and the ratings were in larger  
rooms. 
The two Netherlands subjects in the camp were (please  
note the spelling of their names, as the spelling on  
the Legation list is wrong):
Looijen, Abraham Arnoldus  Naval Engineer with  
Commanders rank.
Beudeker, Herman, Diederik  Lieutenant of the Navy
They were both on a Netherlands sub-marine, which 
was  captured at an island north of New Zealand and were  
together with the rest of the crew taken to Hongkong,  
were they arrived in under-pants and slippers. They  
received some clothes from the British stores there and  
for some unknown reason only the two of them were brought 
to Japan and the rest of the crew was left at Hongkong.  
They were both most anxious to inform their wifes that  
they are safe and if direct communication with the  
Netherlands East Indies is impossible, they wondered if  
it would not be possible to send a message through the  
International Red Cross. The addresses of their respect- 
tive wifes are as follows:
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Mrs. T. K. T. Looijen, 
47, Tegalsarie, 
Soerabaia. 
Mrs. C. L. Beudeker, 
8, Sedepmalemweg, 
Soerabaia.
Mr. Beudeker was also most anxious to send a message to  
his parents, address as below, to the effect that he is  
safe. 
Mr. Beudeker,  
52, Montfoorlaan, 
The Haag.
They told me that they found the winter very cold as  
they had no warm under clothes and if it is possible to  
obtain some under clothes for the coming winter they,  
should be very grateful. They are respectively 169 and  
184 cm in high and both are very lean. They further  
asked me to try to find an English-Dutch dictionary for  
them and I am pleased to report that Mr. Pennink has  
kindly donated this dictionary, which I attach with a  
request that it is forwarded to the Commandant of the  
prisoners camp at Zentsuji. I have already inquired if  
the dictionary and the below mentioned books could be 
send direct in this manner and the answer was  affirmative. 
As they are being paid the same salaries as Japanese  
officers of corresponding rank, they have money and they  
have asked us if we could try to buy the following books  
for them. By the permission of the camp authorities, they 
will be in the position to remit by postal money order  
the cost of the books.
Looijen Technical book re steam engines 
   “    “   “  turbines 
   “   pocket book 
The three books are by DUBBEL and are  
written in German
Beudeker Higher mathematics 
Books on navigation 
No special books have been specified and 






































I presented them with one large slab of chocolate each,
38 tins of Salmon and 4 tins of sardines for which they
were extremely grateful and they have both asked me to
convey their apprechiation. By special permission I was
also allowed to give them three books (novels). 
- - - o o 0 o o - - -
Tokyo, the 3rd June 1942. 
Report No.3 – visit to Kobe. 
All below mentioned visits were made together with
our acting Consul - Mr. L. Wiren, who very kindly
held himself at my disposal during my stay there.
In accorande with instructions we tried our very best to
obtain permission to visit the four Netherlands
subjects in prison, but this proved impossible, as pris-
oners cannot be visited before the judgement has been
passed. The matter was discussed over the ‘phone between
the judicial officials and the Foreign Section
of the Kencho, but as the prison was referred to as
“amari omoshiroi tokoro ja nai”, they decided to make
the above excuse for not giving the permission. 
All interned people in Kobe, both officials and civi- lians
seem to be treated quite well, but the rules
about visits have become stricter. They were all well
informed regarding the evacuation, but the civilians
were worried as they had been told by the police that
they could not bring any books, documents or other
written papers with them on the evacuation ship. 
I wish to report on the individual visits as follows: 
Netherlands Consulate-General. I met Mr. J.B.D. Pen-
nink, the Consul General, his wife, Mr. de Voogd, Censul 
and two other consulate officials, who were all interened
in Mr. Pennink private house. I have already in my 
previous reports mentioned some subjects I discussed 
with Mr. Pennink. There are, however, two other subjects 
on which he is most anxious to obtain some more definite 
information and they are as follows: 
1)Baggage. He stated that he and the other 
officials have together 120 cubic meters or 
more of furniture etc. and he is anxious to 
know, if the ship is really coming to Kobe 
to fetch the luggage. If not, he is anxious 





































freight train to Yokohama, but as such for-
warding would require several weeks, he trusts 
that a definite answer to this question can be 
given in the very near future. 
2)Insurance. He has been informed through Mr. 
Wiren that insurance can be effected abroad, 
but as no detailed information has been given, 
he asks to be informed xxx about the name of 
the company, the rate of premium etc. 
Norwegian Consulate. The Kencho was very unwilling to 
give their permission for us to visit the Norwegian Con-
sulate, as they have no information from Tokyo, that 
Sweden is permitted to look after the Norwegian interests
and also as nothing was mentioned in the Gainmusho letter
that I was supposed to visit this Consulate. However, we 
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finally succeeded to get the permission and we met 
Mr. T. B. Gansmoe and his wife. They expressed their 
great pleasure at the news that they will now be looked 
after by the Swedish Government and they have asked me 
to convey greetings and thanks for all the trouble Your 
Excellency has taken on their behalf. There were two 
thing Mr. Gansmoe has asked me to convey, namely: 
1)that O.E.N. Samuelsen, 69 years old and his 
Japanese wife, residing at Sano, Awaji have 
been informed by the police at Awaji, that 
they must evacuate. They are both anxious 
to remain, as they have property both at Awaji 
and in Kobe and as they have sufficient means 
of support. Mr. S. is a retired official of 
the Chinese Maritime Customs. He went to Kencho 
in Kobe on the 1st inst. regarding this police 
order and they confirmed that he must evacuate. 
He now requests through Mr. Gansmoe, that every-
thing possible may be done to permit him to 
remain in his home in Awaji. In view of his 
age I consider that his request is reasonable. 
2)that he wishes to point out that a Norwegian 
subject residing in Nagasaki – Mr. Albretson 
is anxious to evacuate, probably with his wife. 
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that investigation is made and their names 
added to the list. 
Eastern Lodge, Kobe. 
Belgian subject: 
1) Joseph Spae states that he under no circumstances 
wishes to evacuate unless he is forced to do 
so. He wonders if it would not be possible to 
make an other request to Gaimusho that he may 
be allowed to return to Peking, as there is not 
a single missionary there, who can speak Japan-
ese for which reason he ought to be very useful. 
If this is quite impossible, he wishes to return 
to Kyoto, where he is studying for a Doctors 
degree and where xx he is publishing a book. 
Netherlands subjects: 
1)C.W. Brand wishes to evacuate only on the con-
dition that his chief – Mr.van Ketel is allowed 
to go. Otherwise he considers it his duty to 
remain to give him any assistance that he can 
2)H.J.Heuperman are not on the evacuation list, 
but they are now anxious to be evacuated and have 
requested that their names be placed on the list 
3)W. Lengkeek requests that we cable his princi-
pal (address below) for permission for him to 
evacuate, as he otherwise feels obliged to re-
main, as they have stocks of considerable value 
in Japan. Address: PRINS CARE WINTER COMPANY, 
106 WALLSTREET, NEWYORK 
4)H. Meyer states that he has been informed by the 
police that his name has been taken off the 
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evacuation list, as he has a court case pending 
against him. The nature of the case was not 
disclosed, but I understand that it concerns 
transactions in exchange etc. He is very an-
xious to evacuate and requests that everything 
be done to assure his evacuation. 
5)A.C.van Nahuys confirms wish to evacuate. He is 
also anxious to get news from his wife. Latest 
  
 
















   
 






address: Mrs. G.F. van Nahuys c/o Mrs. Kilsdonk, 
16 Mampangweg, Batavia. 
6)H. Olk has lost his pass port and requests that 
a new one is made out. He states that he is 
personally known to the Netherlands acting 
Minister. The particulars required for the 
passport are as follows: 
Birth p lace: Amsterdam 
“ date: 10/7/1898 
Domicile: Japan 
Shape face: Round 
Colour eyes: Greyish-green 
Special marks: Spectacles 
As he was employed by a Japanese firm he is 
worried about getting some work after the eva-
cation and asks if it would be possible to no-
tify his friend – Mr. Gielgud, Secretary-General 
of the International Red Cross, Geneva that he 
would much apprechiate some work upon arrival 
at the destination of the evacuation. 
P.S. He will send photographs for the passport 
through Mr. Wiren in a few days time. 
7)J.G. Oost Lievense wishes to evacuate only on 
the condition that his chief – Mr. Holtkamp is 
allowed to go. Otherwise he considers it his 
duty to remain to give him any assistance that 
he can. 
8)C.T. Rolandus confirms wish to evacuate. 
9)O.J. Rookmaaker could not be visited, but Mrs. R. 
definitely states that they do not wish to evacu-
ate (acc. To Mr. Wiren) 
10)B. Spanjaard confirms that he and his wife wish 
to evacuate together. He also stated that he 
has now been able to arrange for the total pay-
ment of the fine and that required permits have 
been obtained, but that it might take some time 
before he can make the final payment. 





Table A.3 List of Swedish representation of foreign interests in World War II 
Interests of Country Represented in Country/Territory Starting Date 
Argentina Bulgaria 














Denmark Soviet Union 
Finland Australia 









Finland New Zealand 
Finland Romania 
Finland South Africa 
Finland Soviet Union 
France Mexico 






























































Table A.3 (Continued) 
Interests of Country Represented in Country/Territory Starting Date 
Hungary Brazil 
Hungary British Empire 
Hungary Chile 
Hungary Dutch East Indies 
Hungary Egypt 




Hungary New Zealand 
Hungary Paraguay 
Hungary Romania 















































































Table A.3 (Continued) 
Interests of Country Represented in Country/Territory Starting Date 
Japan South Africa 1941-12-12 
Japan Switzerland 1945-11-02 
Japan Turkey 1945-01-19 
Japan Uruguay 1945-05-04 
Mexico France 1942-11-13 
Mexico Germany 1941-12-12 
Mexico Italy 1941-12-12 
Mexico Japan 1941-12-12 
Netherlands Denmark 1940-05-10 
Netherlands Finland 1941-06-28 
Netherlands France Vichy 1940-09-13 
Netherlands Germany 1940-05-10 
Netherlands Greece 1941-04-09 
Netherlands Hungary 1941-04-09 
Netherlands Italy 1940-06-14 
Netherlands Japan 1941-12-12 
Netherlands Norway Unknown 
Netherlands Romania 1941-02-14 
Netherlands Thailand 1941-12-12 
Netherlands Belgium Unknown 
Norway Belgium Unknown 
Norway Denmark 1940-05-07 
Norway Finland Unknown 
Norway France Vichy 1940-09-13 
Norway Germany 1940-04-09 
Norway Japan 1942-03 
Norway Netherlands Unknown 
Norway Romania 1943-11-19 
Norway Territories in Far East Unknown 
Norway Thailand 1942-05-22 
Poland Germany 1939-09-01 
Romania Argentina 1944-02-11 
Romania Brazil 1942-04-17 
Romania British Empire 1941-02-14 
Romania Japan 1944-11-17 
Romania USA 1941-12-12 
Slovakia Iran 1941-11-21 
Slovakia Soviet Union 1941-06-25 
South Africa Germany 1939-09-06 
Soviet Union Denmark 1941-06-28 
Soviet Union Finland 1941-06-28 
Soviet Union France Vichy 1942-03-27 
Soviet Union Germany 1941-06-25 
Soviet Union Hungary 1941-06-25 
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Source: Various lists in UDA, 2210.03.1, P19, A. 
Notes: Names of countries or territories are standardized, e.g., Siam = Thailand. No differentiation 
between de jure and de facto mandates. Starting dates are not reliable, use with caution. Some 
lists in the sources mention different dates for same mandates. 
a Refers to British oversee territories, including South and North Rhodesia, Pacific Islands, 
Cyprus, Hong Kong, the Bermudas, British Honduras, British Guyana, Barbados, Port Castries, 
Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
b Unclear why mentioned together. 
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